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PREFACE 
This thesis is a collection of essays about choice. It 
examines the determinants and outcomes of economic and political 
actions in different arenas. Whether the analysis concerns the 
determinants and outcomes of the different strategies of a water 
reservoir manager, the centralized management of an oil field, a voter 
or a party, there is a unifying theme which runs through all of these. 
This theme is the "rationality" of choice. In this thesis rationality 
is interpreted to mean that actions and strategies are chosen in order 
to maximize certain economic or political indices which are related to 
the obj e ctives of the actors. 
This thesis was made possible by the award of a fellowship from 
the Iraqi government with funds provided by the National Computer 
Centre, the Board of Planning , Baghdad . The author is indebted to the 
N.C.C. and to the staff of the Scholarship Section, Ministry of 
Planning, Baghdad. To Professors R. Noll, J. Quirk, M. Fiorina, 
F. Nelson, J. Ferejohn, L. Wilde, D. Grether, M. Hinich, S. Burness, 
D. Montgomery, R. Bates and B. Cain, the author expresses sincere 
gratitude for their friendly encouragement and deep personal interest 
I would also like to mention my colleagues S. Matthews and L. Cohen. 
The manuscript was typed by Roberta Luna, to whom the author 
expresses his appreciation. 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a collection of essays. Each essay is a whole 
chapter. I have prepared the following separate abstracts for each 
chapter. 
Chapter 1 
CHANCE CONSTRAINED DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING MODEL OF WATER 
RESERVOIR WITH JOINT PRODUCTS 
This chapter presents two models for reservoir management. 
Model l is a dynamic programming formulation which only allows exporting 
and importing of water to correct excesses or deficiencies caused by the 
optimizing decisions. It shows that if the one-period profit is a 
function of the water releases, water stock, and the physical capacity 
of the reservoir, then optimal decisions regarding water releases and 
capacity exist and are unique both for the N-period and the infinite 
period problems. Moreover, the model shows that if the profit function 
is separable and linear in the releases, then the optimal decision rule 
is linear and the long-run distribution for the stock of water exists 
and is a simple form. The model in the Appendix of this chapter is a 
deterministic equivalent chance constraint formulation in which an 
approximation for the long-run distribution of the water stock is 
determined. 
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Chapters 2 and 3 
ON THE RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN CONGRESSIONAL 
ELECTIONS: A SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION MODEL APPROACH 
In these chapters a simultaneous equation model is employed to 
investigate the relative effects of: 1) economic conditions, 2) incum-
bency, and 3) recognition of the presidential party's candidate on the 
dual decisions of the individual to participate and vote in congres-
sional elections. My finding is decidedly negative regarding the effect 
of economic conditions on both turnout and voting for the presidential 
party. I have, however, established the relative effects of both 
incumbency and recognition. 
Chapter 4 
THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: 
MAYHEW MAY STILL BE RIGHT 
Several theories have been advanced to explain the reduction in 
the number of competitive congressional districts during the past 
decade. Among these is Mayhew's theory, which attributes the reduction 
to the increasing control of campaign resources by incumbents. 
Ferejohn presents evidence which casts doubt on Mayhew's thesis. In 
this chapter, Ferejohn's evidence is examined within the framework of a 
simultaneous eqtcation model. I conclude that Mayhew' s thesis, although 
bloodied by Ferejohn's attack, is still very much alive. 
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Chapter 5 
LEFTIST IDEOLOGICAL SHIFTS IN ARAB CONTEMPORARY POLITICS: 
A SPATIAL THEORY APPROACH 
This chapter presents a formal model of some aspects of leftist 
ideological shifts in contempora ry Arab politics. In pa rticular it 
focuses on the effects of information costs and the cost of ideological 
vagueness on the competitive parties of the left. A spatial model is 
used to examine analytically an observation originally advanced by the 
Baath Arab Socialist party. This observation states that both the cost 
of vagueness and the inability to meet the high information costs 
inherent to an articulate ideology may have been the factors which 
caused the adoption of Marxism Leninism by some leftist groups. 
Certain reasonable assumptions ge ne rated results consistent with the 
Baath observation. 
Chapter 6 
THE EFFECT OF A RANDOM PLANNING HORIZON ON PRODUCTION AND INVESTMENT 
FOR PETROLEUM RESERVOIR -- A NOTE ON KULLER'S AND CUMMING'S MODEL 
There have been several formulations of models for crude oil 
production which tried to identify the elements of user cost and show 
their effect on production and investment decisions. In this chapter, 
previous results are extended by incorporating the uncertainty regarding 
the date of arrival of the backstop technology in the model. This 
uncertainty adds a new element to the user cost identified previously 
and is shown to affect the production and investment decisions. 
vi 
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CHAPTER 1 
CHANCE CONSTRAINED DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING MODEL OF WATER 
RESERVOIR WITH JOINT PRODUCTS 
1.1 Introduction 
Historically, rivers have been the focus of many international 
conflicts, especially in the arid and semi-arid areas of the world. 
However, within a particular river basin, water was relatively abundant 
and there was generally enough to meet the various needs of the basin's 
population. Wa ter usage was limited mainly to human consumption and 
irrigation. 
The growth in population and rising level of industrialization 
in many arid and semi-arid parts of the world are increasing the demands 
for water. However, no corres ponding change in the world supply of 
river water occurred. It has become a scarce resource, and- active 
planning for water utilization is under way. 
An important aspect of this planning is the distribution of the 
benefits of the rivers over time and among uses and users. Increasingly 
the construction of large reservoirs is becoming the vehicle to achieve 
and integrate these diverse objectives. Very few reservoirs are 
normally dedicated to achieve a single objective, at least as far as 
their "feasibility studies" are concerned. Invariably, irrigation, 
power generation, flood control and recreation are among the objectives 
listed for any dam project. That does not mean there is no hierarchy 
imposed on these objectives by the planner. In fact, there may exist 
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one or two prime objectives. The absence of explicit statements on this 
hierarchy has become a political expedient to appease the various groups 
affected by the construction of the dam. Model builders have reflected 
this hierarchy by directly including some variables in the objective 
function and others are formulated as constraints. 
Some of these constraints are "soft," in the sense that they 
could be violated at a cost. This cost is dictated by the demand of the 
planner for these constraints to hold. The following analysis will 
focus on irrigation and power generation with soft constraints on the 
stock of water in the reservoir. These soft constraints reflect a 
trade-off between flood control and recreation purposes on the one hand 
and salinity control in the downstream on the other. 
There are two design considerations in the process of reservoir 
construction: 1) the optimal reservoir size, and 2) the optimal 
operating rule of the reservoir. Although many scholars [12, 15] have 
previously pointed out that the two considerations cannot be separated, 
many attempt to separate the dual decisions of optimal size and optimal 
operating policy. The model in this paper will recognize the 
"jointness" of the decisions and treat them in a unified manner 
within the framework of dynamic programming. 
An often neglected aspect in the design of impounding reservoirs 
in arid and semi-arid regions where evaporation losses are significant 
is the trade-off between two opposing considerations: 
1. There are benefits from assuring a more regu~ar flow 
of water and hence a "better" distribution of the river 
benefit over time and among users and uses. 
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2. There are also costs imposed by the evaporation of 
the impounded water in the reservoir. These costs are 
significant. As Quirk and Burness point out [22] for a 
minor river such as the Colorado with an annual mean runoff 
of 13.5 million acre-feet per year, evaporation losses from 
existing reservoirs have already reached as high as 1.5 
million acre-feet per year. 
To produce an outflow pattern satisfying a given economic 
objective, the preceding trade-off is taken into consideration in 
ascertaining the relationship between the hydrology of a stream and the 
optimal decision rule. The optim2l size of the reservoir which is 
consistent with the chosen operating rule will be derived. Moreover, 
the long-run distribution of the water stock in the reservoir when 
the profit function from the reservoir operation has a special form 
will be derived. 
Uncertainty will be revealed as the single most important 
factor affecting the optimal . design and operation of a reservoir. 
Formally, this uncertainty may be reflected in the objective function, 
the constraints, or both. Consider the situation where the reservoir 
manager is maximizing an n-period downstream profit function TI(y) 
of water releases y == (y1 ,y2 , ... ,yn), . This maximization is subject to 
non-negativity and minimum pool level (R) constraints in every period i 
of the form: 
r.(x. 1 -y.)+e. >R l i- l l (1) 
where xi-l is the stock of water at the start of period i, 
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yi is the release at the start of period i (before ei is 
observed) , 
e. is the stochastic runoff in period i with known 
1 
probability density function f ~ and 
e 
1- ri i .s the evaporation loss in period i. 
We can re-arrange (1) as follows: 
r.y. < r.x. 1 + e. - R Vi, i=l, ... ,n 1 1 -· 1 1- 1 
or in matrix form 
Ay _.:. b where b. is a function of the random variable e .. 
1 1 
Thus the problem becomes that of: 
Max TI(y) (2) 
Subject to Ay < b f (e) (3) 
y > 0 (4) 
where e, y, b: n · 1 and A: n · n 
There is a possibility that optimal decisions will lead to violation 
of the constraints because of very high or very low values of e. 
This is the basic problem posed by the nature of the random constraints. 
At least three different types of characterizations are 
available in the optimization literature to cope with the random 
nature of the constraints. First, there is the penalty function 
approach [27] which introduces penalties for vici·lating the random 
constraints. This is accomplished by adding the expected penalty costs 
to the objective function. For example, if there is a constant penalty 
cost c. > O per unit violation of the jth constraint a. y < b., and the 
J . J - J 
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violation of the constraint has a finite probability density function 
i)!(z), then the total expected penalty cost is CE(i)!(b - Ay)] . The 
modified problem then becomes 
Max TI(y) - CE[i)!(b - Ay)], subject toy~ 0. (5) 
This method is actually related to two-stage programming under 
uncertainty [8] . 
The model in this paper uses a dynamic programming approach 
in conjunction with a penalty function. The penalty is a convex 
increasing function of the magnitude of the violations. These penalty 
costs differ from the fixed accounting costs employed by Askew [2, 3] . 
Accounting costs are never actually intended to be paid, but are merely 
devices to ensure optimal behavior by the management. Penalty costs in 
this model, however, are actually economic costs imposed on the manager 
to correct for stock deficiency or surplus which results from his 
decisions and the random flow of the river. 
Second, there is the truncated distribution approach which 
interprets the inequalities a'.y < b. (i = 1,2, ... ,m) as a truncation of 
l l 
the probability distribution of b .. 
l 
2 
For example, Sengupta [28] uses 
the X distribution for a truncated normal. 
Thirdly' there is the chance constrained characterization rs]' 
(6) which puts a reliability interpretation on the constraint, such as 
prob (b. > a'. y.) > A., 
l - l l - l 
0<\.<1,i=l, ... ,m 
- l -
(6) 
by preassigning reliability (tolerance) measures A. up to which 
l 
constraint violations are permitted. The A . . can be varied paramet-l 
rically to account for the different reliability levels. Alte·rnatively, 
a reliability term can be added to the objective function and can be 
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solved for an optirr.al set of ).. . 's [24]. For example, the problem could 
l 
be characterized as: 
m 
Max U ( y , A) = w 1 TI ( y) + w 2 l: log A . ( 7) i=l l 
Subject to y ~ 0, 0 :'.: \ :'.: 1, 0 :'.: wj :'.: 1 (8) 
and l-Fi(a~y)2_Ai 'Vi,i=l,2,.,.,m(9) 
where F. is the cumulative distribution function of the random 
l 
variable :rnd w. j = 1,2 are weighting factors. J , 
ln the first version, where A. 's are not derived optimally, 
l 
the chance constraint is reduced to an equivalent deterministic 
constraint [6] by the use of the marginal distribution function of 
b.: ¢(b.). The existence of a fractile b
1
. such that 
l l 
P(b. > a'.y) > >... 
l - l - l 
b.(l - >...) > a'.y 
l l - l 
(10) 
makes this reduction possible. To facilitate this transformation in the 
reservoir models, the optimal decision rule is restricted to the class 
of linear functions [16, 17, 19]. Additionally, it is sometimes assumed 
that the random variable is distributed normally or truncated normal at 
zero [ 7, 2 8] . 
Linear Decision-Rule and Chance Constraint 
Essentially the linear decision rule is a device to facilitate 
the transformation of chance constraints into equivalent deterministic 
forms while avoiding a difficult convolution problem [9]. To illustrate 
this, consider the situation where, at any period p the starting stock 
of water is x 1 , and the inflow and discharge is e and y respectively. ~ p ~ 
Then the continuity equation, assuming no evaporation losses, is 
7 
x = x + e - y . p p-1 p p (11) 
The deterministic equivalent for a chance constraint of the form 
u P(xp 2 x ) 2'._ a1 , cannot be determined since the probability distribution 
of x is unknown even if the distribution of e is known. The linear 
p p 
decision rule, first used by Revelle et al. f23 ] , defines x and y in 
p p 
terms of e by postulating that the optimal decision rule is of the form 
p 
x - a p-1 p where a p is a decision variable. 
Since, from the continuity equation, x 
p 
then 
and 
x p 
e + a p p 
y - e + a - a . p - p-1 p-1 p 
x 1 +e -y p- p p 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
Since the distribution of e p is known and a is a deterministic 
.P 
decision variable, (13) and (14) define the distribution of x and y . p p 
Hence, deterministic equivalents for the chance constraints: 
or 
u P (x < x ) > a p - - 1 
P (y > y) > a2 p-
can be found. 
(15) 
(16) 
There exists no guarantee that the linear decision rule is 
actually optimal among all possible classes of bounded functions. 
Moreover, the deterministic equivalent approach to the solution of 
chance constrained problems suffers from a number of shortcomings: 
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1. The continuity equation, used to develop the deterministic 
equivalent for the chance constraints and the steady state distribution 
of the stocks, ignores the overspill. The overspill occurs because the 
constraints may be violated in these models. 
2. The net return function in these models does not reflect the 
probability that the constraints could be violated. Violation could 
occur as a result of the optimizing program, yet the net return is not 
affected. This condition raises a question regarding the incentive 
structure in these kinds of models. 
3. The ad hoc specification of the reliability levels (A..' s) 
l 
raises objections from many planners and politicians. No decision-maker 
would risk making an explicit statement on reliability. The problem of 
the choice of the weight wi given to the reliability term in the 
composite objective function persists, even if the choice of A. 's is i 
included within the optimizin~ framewnrk , as in the model shown in (7-9) . 
Nevertheless, chance constrained models are an important and prevalent 
class of water resource formulations. The model in the appendix serves 
as an introduction to this class, and its shortcomings shall be pointed 
out. However, the inclusion of this model is more than a mere 
expediency to the current literature on water resources, in that it 
assumes no linear decision rule for optimal policies. Moreover, it 
allows a bound to be developed on the long-run distribution of water 
stock, using the Chebychef inequality. This bound is developed with-
out assuming a line~r profit function. Such an assumption is 
necessary to get similar results in the dynamic programming frame-
work, as will be presented in this paper. 
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1. 2: A Dynamic Prograrrunii:i-g N~del with Penalty Function 
In this model the penalty function approach is utilized to 
account for the possibility of violating the constraints within a 
dynamic programming framework. These penalty costs are more than 
"accounting" costs used to insure that the dam manager takes the imposed 
"soft" constraints into consideration in arriving at his decision rule 
[2), [3]. They are costs actually paid by the dam manager for importing 
or exporting water to compensate for violating the constraints. 
Although no a priori form for the optimal decision rule is 
imposed, it will become evident that this formulation implies a simple 
"one part" decision rule with "predictable" characteristics. Further, 
the linear decision rule, which implies constant optimal stock policy, 
will be shown as a consequence of certain restrictions on the form of 
the profit function. 
It will also be shown that the long-run distribution for the 
stock of water in the reservoir exists and can be derived when the 
linear decision rule applies. This formulation will not suffer from the 
shortcomings of the chance constraints-deterministic equivalent approach. 
Moreover, the analysis will be expanded to include profits from the 
generation of electricity directly in the profit function and will 
be shown to affect the optimal policy and the optimal reservoir size. 
The Objective Function 
The manager of the reservoir is maximizing at every period, a 
concave objective function of the form TI(y,x-p) where ·rr12 ~O, y is the 
release at the start of the period and x is the stock at the start of 
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the period. The first argument of the objective function, y, reflects 
the payoff to agricultural downstream users from relea ses and the second 
argument reflects the payoff from power generated by the electrostatic 
head provided by the stock of water after releasing y. 
The objective function, TI, may be interpreted in various ways: 
1. In a socialist economy, TI might be the criterion function provided 
by the central planners. TI is, then, the expected net social 
revenue which equals the expected revenue minus expected cost , 
all inputs and outputs being evaluated at prices set by the 
planners. The manager carries on the maximization procedure 
treating these prices as parameters. Under ideal conditions, the 
prices for inputs and outputs set by the centra l planners would be 
prices consistent with a Pareto optimum . In this special case, the 
optimality rule derived from the maximization procedure is also 
optimal from the point of view of welfare maximization. Under 
more realistic conditions, the criterion function simply reflects 
the central planners' evaluation of all the alternatives in the 
economy. 
2. In a private economy operating under the appropriative doctrine, 
property rights to water are held by users of water. A possible 
situation is one in which the reservoir manager is instructed to 
operate so as to maximize aggregate expected profits, En, of down 
stream users where TI= {In i +TIE} and TI. is the profit of downstream 
i l 
user i and TIE is the profit from power generation. Such a scenario 
is approximately the situation for the Colorado river where down-
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stream users hold appropriative rights to the water in the reser-
voir and the Bureau of Reclamation operate the reservoir system for 
them under rules that derive from the Supreme Court decision in the 
famous Arizona v. California case (1963). Note that maximization of 
aggregate profits of downstream users is generally inconsistent with 
Pareto optimality, particularly when there is market power, e.g., 
as in the case of the Imperial Valley Irrigation District, a major 
force in the winter fruit farm market of the U.S., and the largest 
user of Colorado River water. The situation gets worse if there 
are externalities in the agricultural and power markets or if there 
are other imperfections in these markets. 
3. rr may be interpreted as the payoff in terms of social welfare 
associated with operating the reservoir. In this case rr is the 
total expected surplus which equals expected consumer's surplus 
plus expected producers' surplus. The use of total expected 
surplus involves the usual difficulties of partial equilibrium 
welfare economics. Such problems include the need to use compensated 
demand curves, aggregating areas under demand curves over all 
consumers, the interactions with other markets and the like. There 
are further complications posed by the multi-periods nature of the 
problem: the lack of contingent claims markets to internalize 
uncertainty with respect to prices of future inputs and outputs 
means that we have the added problem of dealing with expectations 
involving diverse subjective probability distributions. Finally, 
if there are many reservoirs taking only the output of this parti-
cular reservoir into consideration in measuring social welfare 
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is inappropriate. In this case, we are only considering the output 
of a part of the industry rather than the whole. This leads to 
special problems of measuring consumers' surplus. 
4. TI may be the utility of the reservoir manager over profits from 
the operation of the dam. The concavity of TI introduces risk 
aversion directly in the analysis. No social welfare argument may 
be made from this interpretation unless we consider this reservoir 
as part of a competitive market and no imperfections in any input 
and output markets. In this case, the usual classical welfare 
arguments applies to the economy and efficiency and unbiasedness 
are assured. 
We pointed out that interpretations of the properties and results in 
this chapter differ according to how TI is being interpreted. However, 
we shall show that from a technical point of view all that is needed 
to derive the formal results are concavity and/or linearity, and 
separability and/or the nonnegatively of the second mixed partials of 
the objective function. 
The Model 
The manager of the reservoir is maximizing at every stagel p, 
1 :s_ p :s_ n, a profit function TI(yp,xp - yp), concave in both its 
arguments such that 1\2 ~ 0. The maximization is subject to an upper 
constraint xu and a lower constraint xm on the reservoir storage level. 
1 
Following dynamic programming tradition, p is counted in reverse order 
from the terminal point. 
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The optimization is condu c •:ed as follows: 
1. The manager observes the reservoir level, x , at the start p 
of the period. 
2. He calculates the optimal release in the period yt, 
0 _:::_y~(xp) < xp , taking into consideration the following 
factors: 
a. 
[7T(Yp•Xp - Yp) - c(x)] where c(x) is the strictly 
convex annualized cost of construction; 
b. The costs of violating the upper and lower constraints 
c1 (z) and c2 (z). Each cost is related, respectively, to 
the cost of disposing or importing water to compensate 
for excesses or deficiencies in water storage; 
c. The probability distribution of the inflow¢ (•); 
. e 
d. The evaporation rate k. 
3. He implements the optimizing decision Yt by releasing water 
from the reservoir. 
4. Toward the end of the period p, the manager has enough 
information to observe the inflow ep 
following decisions: 
Then he makes the 
If, as a result of his decision, the water level in the 
reservoir falls below xrn , he imports water at the cost of 
c 2 (z) to make up for the deficiency (z). He then starts 
2When the profit function is separable, it will be exnressed as: 
g(y) + h(x). 
p 
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m period (p + 1) with a water stock equal to x . c2 (z) is 
assumed to be a convex and increasing function of z with 
c 2 (O) = 0 and c; (0) is finite and positive. This assumption 
holds whether a constant or increasing net price for water 
is assumed. The case of rising net price of water is being 
considered to account for the increasing difficulty of 
importing larger amounts of water from further locations. 
See Figure 1. If, however, the optimizing decision results 
in water stock exceeding xu, the manager disposes of the 
excess water (z) at the cost of c 1(z). He then starts the 
next period (p + 1) with a water stock equal to xu. c
1
(z) 
is assumed to be a convex function of z with c
1
(0) 0 and 
ci(O) finite. This is consistent with a situation where 
the export price of water net of transportation cost is 
constant or decreasing because of the increasing difficulty 
of marketing larger quantities of water. The net export 
price may eventually be negative. See Figure 2. The 
sequence of events and decisions are illustrated in Figure 3. 
z z 
-+ 
z z 
Figure 1 
cost/unit 
export 
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z 
net cost of 
violation 
cost/unit 
transportation 
Figure 2 
} fixed cost 
z 
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The Cont i nuity Equation 
This is the mass bal an c e equation for water in any period p, 
1 ~ p < n, and is given by: 
x = r(x - y ) + e + i - m p-1 p p p p p (17) 
x e x e x p p p-1 p-1 p-2 
-01-+\JL...........,' ,------J-'-f-[J+--"i-..--_ ___._,~ 81-+-l _}..__ __,___ Time 
p /j\ ~ p-1 
I yp-1 
residual 
decision i or m 
p p 
Fi gure 3 
where: r = 1 - k and k is the c onstant evaporation r a te, i is the p 
amount of imported water, m is the amount of ex ported water and p 
x is the · level of the reserv oir at the end of sta ge (p + 1) and p 
after implementing the importin g and exporting dec isions. Or, 
equivalently x is the water stock at the start of period p. p 
If (a) i > 0 then m p p O, x p-1 
and 
If (b) 
and 
i p 
m 
x rx - e + ry p p p 
m > o then i 
p p 
0, x p-1 
m p 
u 
rx + e - ry - x p p p 
m 
x 
u 
x 
If .(c) i 
p 
m = 0 then x -p p-.l 
r x + e - ry p p p 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
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A concave salvage value function of the terminal stock of water 
v(x) will be added to account for the concern of the planners for future 
generations. v(x) will also prevent the use of water to the point where 
its marginal profitability is zero. Moreover, it will be assumed that 
the manager does not import or export water unless he must. In the 
u 
static case, this implies that the marginal salvage value at x must not 
u be less than the marginal benefit from exporting water v'(x) > -cl(O). 
It also means that the marginal salvage value of water at xm must not be 
greater than the marginal cost of importing water v' (xm) :5 cz (0). 
Clearly, if these conditions do not hold, exporting and importing water 
becomes profitable and should be included in the optimizing framework of 
the problem. Whether to import or export water, in this model, is 
merely a residual decision taken at the end of each period. 
The lines of this analysis will follow the traditional methods 
employed by dynamic programming formulations [12]. First, the existence 
and uniqueness of the solution for p = 1 and p = 2 and the concavity of 
the expected net discounted revenue functions will be established. This 
will pave the way for an inductive proof for the existence and unique-
ness of the solution to the n-period problem. Next, it will be shown 
that for an infinite period problem the sequence of the expected net 
discounted revenue function converges under the assumed regularity 
conditions. This establishes the existence and uniqueness of the 
solution for the infinite period problem. Finally, maximization of the 
n-period expected discounted net revenue function will define the 
optimal size of the reservoir. 
18 
The One Period Problem 
Let f 1 Cx1) be the expected revenue from the r e lease of 
an optimal quantity of water including revenue from the hydroelectric 
operation of the reservoir. Let 
(21) 
where v(x) is the concave salvage value function indicating the worth of 
the terminal stock of water to the future generations. 
Define 
where 
co 
- !3 { c (rx + Ju 1 1 
x - rx1 + ry1 
e -
Max G1 (y1 0 < y < x 
l - 1 
ry - xl) ¢ de 1 e 
c(x). 
We have the f ollouing prop osition: 
(22) 
(23) 
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Proposition l 
If a) TI(y,x-y) is concave in the first argument and 
strictly concave in the second and TI12 ~ O· , 
b) c1 (z), c 2 (z) are convex and c1 (0) = c 2 (0) = O; 
c) u v' (x ) > cl(O); 
d) m v' (x ) < cz(O); 
where the primes denote the derivatives of the functions with respect 
to the arguments then : 
1) there exists a unique interior maximum y>'< (x ) 
1 1 
dy;< 
2 ) 0 _!_ l ' -- < 
- dxl -
Moreover if 
e) 
then 3) 
u 
x 
0 < h' < g' < r 
dyi< 
-1 < -J. < 0 dx -
Proof of 1): 
From (23) we have: 
TI -TI -1 2 
h(x) , and 
20 
The primed functions denote their derivatives and all functions 
are parameterized by x. The optimal release policy
3 
Yf (x1) is 
defi:ned by 
(25) 
Second Order Conditions: 
4 
To show that yi(x1 ) is a regular maximum, observe that 
co 
m 
x -rx1+ry1 
-Br
2 J c"(xm- rx + ry - e)¢ de 2 1 1 e 
0 
-3(24) illustrates the effect of incorporating the stock of water in 
the profit function. Consider Case 1: 'IT= g(y) + h(x-y), g and hare 
concave; Case 2: 'IT= g(y). Then the expression of (24) in Case 1 is 
less than that of Case 2 by h' > 0. Since the g functions are identical 
in the two cases then 
< everyw·here. 
Case 1 Case 2 
This implies that yy I Case 
1 
< y"· 1 Case 
2 
However, when the profit 
function is separable: 'IT= g(y) + h(x), the optimal release policy will 
not be effected when the g functions are identical. 
4
consider the two cases in 
d2G 1 
2 
dyl 
< 
Case 1 
footnote 2. 
d2G 1 
2 
We have 
dyl 
Case 2 
However, when the profit function is separable: g(y) + h(x), the second 
partial will be the same provided all the g functions are identical. 
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We have c~, c2 ~ 0 by convexity; v" < 0 TI < 0 1T < 0 an·d 
- ' 11 - ' ' 22 
rr12 > 0 by assumption. Also if, as we have reasonably argued before, 
u 
> -CI (0) v' (x ) 
and 1 
(27) 
m 
v' (x ) < c2(0) (28) 
then 
2 d G1 
< 0. 2 
dyl 
(29) 
Therefore, yi(x1) is a regular maximum. 
Assumption (27) implies that the marginal salva ge value of 
u 
the stock of water at x , at the terminal time, must not be less than 
the net marginal benefit from exporting water. This must be the case 
if the interest of the future generation (represented by the terminal 
stock) is to be safeguarded a gainst profitable water export. Assumption 
(28) states that the marginal salvage value of the stock of water at Ill x ' 
at the terminal time, must not be greater than the net marginal cost of 
importing water. This relationship is reasonable if the planner is not 
m pushed to import water beyond x = x • The important assumption in both 
(27) and (28) is that the manager does not import or export water unless 
he must. This is because (27) and (28) a lso imply that 
ci (0) 2: v' (x1 ) 2: c2 (0), vx 1, xrn < x1 2: xu, which means that it is not 
profitable to engage in importing or exporting water in the permissible 
region of x1 . 
Notice that it does not matter whether c'(O) is positive or 
1 
negative provided that (27) holds. 
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To show that Yf Cx1) is an interior maximum, it is sufficient 
to show: 
dG
1 > 0 d(O,xl) 
Y1 
(30) 
and 
dGl 
< 0 • d(xl,O) 
Y1 
(31) 
Or from (24): 
m 
x -rx 
TI (0 ) TT (O ) 0 · f c'(xm~rx -e)" de 1 'xl - 2 'xl - µ r 2 1 '+' e 
0 
co 
Sr J c 1 (rx + e - xu)cjl de 1 1 e > 0 
xu-rx 
l (32) 
This is trivially satisfied if lT(y, x-y) is a neoclassical 
. 1 . th t Li m0 Tr1 (y .. , x1 -y1)-->coand LimTr2 (y1 , x1-y )+co function, which imp ies a y1 __,_ l. . y 1+x1 1 • 
Generally, however,the assumption that (30) and (31) are satisfied is 
reasonable in terms of an intuitive economic argument. This is 
demonstrated by rearranging the terms of (32) as follows: 
00 
c' (rx + e 1 1 
23 
- rx - e)cp de 1 e 
u 
x )¢ de + 
e 
+ e) cp de. 
e (33) 
The economic interpretation of (33) is that the net marginal profit-
ability of releasing water exceeds that of storing it at any stock of 
water between xm and xu, providing water release is zero. Even at 
m 
x
1 
x , this must be true if large scale damage to the downstream users 
is to be avoided. To see that this interpretation is correct, we have 
to remember that: 
> 0 v z > 0 
c; (z) (34) 
0 v z < 0 
w m u > 0 v x < z < x 
v' (z) (36) 
= 0 otherwise. 
This means that (33) can be rewritten and the limits of integration 
changed as follows: 
e 
+ Br E { v' ( z) }. 
e 
24 
(37) 
Equation (37) is essentially what the previous economic interpretation 
asserts. One might notice the peculiar range of the salvage value 
function, but this range .facilitates a smooth induction argument. It 
can be clarified by reinterpreting the salvage value function as follows: 
m 
- c 2 ( z) v 
m 
v(x ) z, z < x 
V(z) v( z) v z' m x < z < x 
u v(x~ - c1 ( z) v z , z > x 
where v(z) is defined as before. Thus, 
n1 (O,x1 ) > n2 (o,x1 ) + E{V(zl}. 
e 
(37) can be 
which is a formalization of the preceding argument. 
On the other hand, (31) implies that 
00 
- srj u c]_ (e - x ) + 
m 
x 
x 
u 
-Br~ c;(xm - e)¢ede. 
0 
u 
x 
Brf 
m 
x 
u 
(38) 
rewritten as follows: 
(39) 
(40) 
This is true if TI is a neoclassical profit funct-;Lon. Also, using the 
previous argument, this is eqqivalent to either: 
or 
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e e 
- Br E {cz(z)} 
e 
TI 
2 
(x
1
, O) + Br E {v ( z)} > TI1 (x1 , O) 
e 
(41) 
(41) states that the marginal profitability of storing the last unit of 
water exceeds that of releasing it, assuming all x 1 is released. 
Proof of 2): 
In this section, the effect on the optimal release policy of a 
parametric change in the starting stock of water x
1 
or in the physical 
capacity of the reservoir i will be investigated. Differentiating the 
first order conditions (eq. 24) with respect to x 1 gives: 
('TT -\ 11 
O'.) 
+ f. c" ( rx + e 
. 1 1 
u 
x -rx1+ry1 
2 Br ( -1 
dy~ 
+-1 
dx1 
m 
x -rx1+ry 1 ) [J "( m c2 x - r x1 
0 
u 
x -rx1+ry1 fm v"(rx1 + e 
x -rx1+ry1 
- ry )¢ de 
1 e 
(42) 
or, 
From (31) we 
? 
d~Gl 
-2-
dy, 
L. 
Therefore, (43) implies that 
Proof of 3): 
26 
(43) 
(44) 
(45) 
g(x) and xm = h(x), such that o < h' < g' ~ r 
Di fie r entiating (23) with r2s pect to ~ and us L tg (26), we have 6 
dy>'< 
1 
From 
5
consider the two cases of footnote 3: 
1-
Case 2 
dy~ g" (1 - dy dy* d(x-y)) 1 1 -dx1 2 dx1 Case 1 d G1 Case 
2 
dyl 
Case 1 
d2G d2G dy>'• 1 <--1 the:r;e.fore 1 footnote 3: - . -2- ? dx 
dy 
. " d(x-y) + g 2 
2 d Gl 
2 
dyl 
Case 
dy* 
> --1. 
(46) 
(47) 
1 
dyl Case l dyi Case 2 1 Case 2 
dx1 Case 1 
1 l0 f dy 
on y d(x-y) is unambiguously negative otherwise it is ambiguous. 
6To keep the expressions simple, we shall drop the arguments 
of the functions and the integral limits in such expressions whenever 
it is unambiguous to do so. 
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From (27), (28), and the convexity of c 1 and c 2 , the right-hand side of 
(47) 
dy* 1 is positive, which implies that --- is negative. dx Moreover, for 
each term in the right-hand side of (47), there is a corresponding term 
d2G 
in the expression of -f with opposite sign and weight equal to either 
dyl 
r or..!:..... which, by assumption, are greater than 1. Thus, comparing the h' g'' 
2 
d G1 expression on the right-hand side of (47) with the expression of 
we conclude that 
dyl 
-1 < < 0. (48) 
dx 
(End of Proof of Proposition 1) 
This result has been obtained by placing some restrictions on 
the derivatives of hand g; these are 0 2_ h' 2_ r, and 0 2_ g' 2_ r. These 
assumptions will be justified on the following basis: 
a) the non-negativity restriction on g'(x) is reasonable. This is 
because increasing the physical capacity of the reservoir, 
for the same inflow and hydrology of the river basin, offers 
h u -t e opportunity to increase x = g(x) and hence, the hydroelectric 
power potential of the reservoir. This increase in xu must 
not be greater than 1 in order to avoid decreasing the 
designed free board capacity (x - xu) of the reservoir. To 
illustrate further, consider the case where g' = a 
(a is a constant), and the inflow in the period before last 
28 
brings the total storage to x. The storage after 
evaporation in this case is rx. Hence, if g' = a ~ r or 
u 
ax > r x which means that x > r x , then there is no need to 
export water under all conditions where x1 2_ x. That is, 
the natural process of evaporation under these conditions 
provides an automatic excess water disposal. Such a 
situation is imaginary and will not be considered any 
further. Thus, it seems reasonable to accept the assumption 
that g' is bounded in the range 0 ~ g' < r. 
b) The non-negativity of h'(x) is more straightforward. This is 
m because the minimum pool requirement x h(x) is dictate d by the 
minimum hydrostatic head required for the operation of a 
particular turbine on one hand and the salinity control 
on the other. Neither of these requirements is affected 
negatively by the increase in the physical capacity of the 
reservoir. m x can be expected to stay constant or increase slightly 
to account for the increase in salinity brought about by a 
larger stock of water. Moreover, increasing x is expected 
to weaken the overall constraints on the system. Hence, the 
control volume xc = xu - xm is expected to increase . There-
for e , g' ~ h'. However, by the previous discussion in (a), 
g' 2 r, which implies that 0 < h' 2 g' 2 r. In the 
previous sections, it has been argued that the assumptions 
responsible for our seemingly counterintuitive 
Lemma l 
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Jy"' 
results, -1 ' ~-1 < 0, are reasonable. The meaning of the 
dx 
result itself follows. Given the same inflow and river 
basin hydrology and starting with the same stock of water x, 
the increase in the physical capacity of the reservoir x has 
resulted in: 
1) weakening the upper constraints u x ' 
2) strengthening the lower constraints xm. 
This situation leads to a reduction in risk of having excess 
water and an increase in risk of having to import water, 
which can only lead to a reduction in the optimal release 
policy y*(x,) . 
.L 
If y7<(x ) exists and is unique and TT ""' 1r or both identically l 1 . · 31 1~1 
vanish, then the optimal release rule is linear of the form yyCx1) 
· constant dictated by the hydrology of the stream, 
= x
1 
- a1 , where a1 is.a 
the size of the reservoir, and the specific form of the profit function. 
Proof: dv* Jl 
From (43) , if nll = TI12 ~ 0, then dxl 
yi(xl) = xl - a 
1 and 
(49) 
a is a constant dictated by the hydrology of the river basin, the size 
of the reservoir and the specific form of TI, 
Thus, the celebrated linear decision rule, used so often in 
chance constraint models, emerges as the optimizing decision rule when 
a specific form of the profit function TI is used in this model. 
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Considering the interpretation given to TI earlier: 
1. In the first case, where TI is the expected net social revenue from 
operating the reservoir, TI12 may be zero if either the second mixed 
partials of expected social revenue and expected social cost 
functions are identically equal, as evaluated by the central 
planners, or that both second mixed partials vanishes. The latter 
case may be argued on the bases that there is no reason for marginal 
expected cost to be affected by a change in the water head left in 
the reservoir after the release and used for power generation. 
Moreover, TI11 - 0 if either the second partials with respect to the 
releases of the expected social revenue and expected social cost 
functions are identically equal or if both partials vanishes. The 
latter is consistent with a situation where both functions are 
characterized by fixed proportion and there is a perfectly competi-
tive market for agricultural products. 
2. In the second case, where TI reflect the aggregate expected profit 
of downstream users who own the water in the reservoir, TI12 may be 
zero if the marginal profitability in agriculture is unaffected by 
a change in the stock of water which remains after the release. 
Moreover TI11 = 0, if the production function of the downstream 
farmers is characterized by fixed proportions and that farmers sell 
their product in perfectly competitive market. 
3. In the third case, where TI is the total surplus, since we are talking 
about the areas under compensated demand curves conditions such as 
31 
n12 :: 0 if the utility is separable and n11 :: 0 if the marginal 
utility from the payoff which arises from release is linear. This 
case arises if risk neutrality with respect to uncertainty in 
agricultural prevails. 
Proposition 2 
a) If assumptions (a) - (d) in proposition 1 hold, then the 
expected return f 1 (x1 ;x) has the following characteristics: 
I) dfl = 
Tf l {yi' xl - Yi}; dx
1 
2) fl(xl;~) is strictly concave in xl. 
b) If- assumption (e) in proposition 1 holds, and 
c) if u g(x), x g is concave, and 
d) if m h(x) x = = constant, then 
3) f (x , x) 
l 1 
is strictly concave in x. 
Proof of 1): 
The existence and uniqueness of the solution to the two period 
problem depends on the nature of the expected net return function in 
the last period f 1 • Therefore, in Lhe following, the concavity of f 1 
with respect to x1 and, under some assumptions, with respect to x, 
shall be shown. From (25) we have 
TI(Y-1*• x - y*) +S 1 1 
32 
m 
r -rx +ry* 1 l rn v(x )cp de e 
0 
S 
( 
+ ~ - ry*)cp de 1 e 
x -rx +ry>'< 1 1 
00 00 
+ B L v(xu)cpede - B 
x -rx1+ryt 
fu cl (rxl + e 
x -r:x1+ryt 
. u 
- ryk - x )cp de 1 e 
- s 
m 
r -rx +ry* 1 1 rn c 2 (x - rx1 
0 
- e + ry*)cp de'""' c(x) 
1 e 
Therefore, 
u 
dy* dy* 
1T _l + (-1 + _l) 
'1 
( -rx1+ryt 
[ - Sr J m v ' ( rx 1 + e 
x -rx +ry* 1 1 
u 
- ry* - x )cp de 1 e 
rm-rxl+ryt 
- Srj c;(xm-rxl-e +ryt)cpede - TI2) 
0 
(50) 
- · ry*)cp de 1 e 
(51) 
However, from (24), the bracketed term in (51) equals ( - TI 
1
), then 
df 
1 (52) 
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Proof of 2) . 
Differentiating (52) with respect to x1 , we have 
Also, from (43) 
dy* 1 
dx1 
Substituting 
d2G 
dy* 
f 1 . or __ in 
dx 
l 
d2f 
eq. (53), 
2 d c1 1 1 
--= [rrll -2-2 2 
dyl dx1 dyl 
However, (23) shows that 
or equivalently, 
Also since rr12 _:::_ 0, then 
(53) 
we have 
2 
('fTll - 'fT21) ] . - (54) 
(55) 
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Therefore 
And, hence, 
That is, f 1 is strictly concave in x1
. 
Proof of 3): 
(56) 
u Also from (24), substituting for x 
m 
g(x) and x h(x) and 
differentiating with respect to x, we have 
j h (x)-rx1 +ryi Sh' (;z) c2 (h (;z) - rx1 - e 
0 . 
-c' (x) 
dx 
+ Sg'(x) ~ :ci(rx1 + e - ryt - g(x))¢ede 
g(x)-rx1+ryl 
In par~icular if h' = 0, then 
(5 7) 
dfl 
dx = -c'Cx) + 
co co 
Sg' (X)J _ c '¢ e de + 6g' (;;J _· v' (g(X) ¢ e de. (58) 
g(x) - rx1 + ry\ g(x) - rx1 + ryf 
In general, however, 
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dy* 
+ Bh'(h' + r dx})(v'(h) - c'(O))¢(h-rx +ry'") 2 1 1 
dy
* 1 J ~* 
- Sg'(g' + r dx) cl¢ede - Sg'(g'+ r ~_l)(v'(g) 
dx 
(59) 
dy* dy* 
It can be shown that g' + r 1 > O while h' + r 
1 is ambiguous, 
which makes the sign of 
if 
2 
dx 
d f ~~l indeterminate. 
-2 dx 
dx 
However, it is obvious 
that 1 rn _ 2 < 0, under assumption that x is a constant. dx 
Thus , under 
plausible assumptions, f 1 is shown to be strictly concave in x (as 
7 
well as x1). 
7 
is also negative if h' g' constant. 
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Proposition 3 
Under the assumptions of proposition 2, there exists a 
unique optima l size xt for the reservoir which maximiz es f 1 (x1 ,x). 
Proof 
If it is assumed, as in the first model, that 3y0 such that 
n-1 (yo) = Oand that .3 x0 ::iv' (x0 ) = 0, then x is bounded by 0 and Yo + 
This implies that f is defined on a compact set 0 < x < y +XO. If 1 - - 0 
the assumptions of proposition 2 hold, then f is a strictly concave 
1 
function in x defined on a compact set. Therefore, it must have a 
unique maximum x*. 
1 
This ends the analysis of the one-period problem. It appears 
x 
that the inclusion of the water stock in the profit function, although 
it affected the optimal policy and size of the reservoir, did not make 
substantial difference to the technical conditions needed to get the 
0 
usual inventory dynamic programming results. Inspecting (33) and (40), 
the conditions which insure interior maximum, enhance this observation. 
Certainly, for a neoclassical pro f it function, the finite terms n 2 (0 , x 1) 
and n 2 (x 1 ,0) do not make either of the inequalities (33) and (40) more 
stringent or relaxed. For any other concave function, the inclusion 
of the water stock makes (33) more stringent while relaxing (40). Thus, 
the concavity of Tr with respect to the water stock and that 1r > 0 
12 
are all the additional requirements needed to get the usual inventory 
dynamic programming results. 
37 
Summary of the One-Period Problem 
It has been shown that a unique solution yt(x1) for the 
functional equation (1) exists and is unique if 
1) u v' (x ) ~ -ci (0) 
2) rn v' (x ) _:. c z ( 0) . 
Moreover, it has been shown that 
a) 
dy* 
0<--1 <l dx1 
b) f 1 is strictly concave in x1 . 
Furthermore, it has been shown that if 
then 
3) 
4) 
u 
x g(x), 
rn 
x = h(x) 
dy* 
c) -1 < - 1 < 0. 
dx 
0 < h' < g' _:. r 
In particular, if 
then 
5) h' = 0 and g is concave 
d) f
1 
is strictly concave in x; and 
e) f 1 (x) has a unique maximum, xl, prov ided x j_ s bounded 
above. 
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The Two Period Horizon 
. . 8 
In this case, the continuity equation is 
Define 
where 
u 
r(x2 - v ) + e , 2 
co f x -rx2+ry2 + S f 1 (rx2 + e 
m 
- ry2)¢ede - S f c (rx + e u 1 2 
x -rx +ry x -rx2+ry2 
- s 
8 
rx - e 2 
2 2 
(60) 
(61) 
u 
- ry - x )¢ de 2 e 
Assume that at the start of every period the manager knows the 
actual inflow. However, he only knows the probability distribution of 
the inflow for future periods. Then a redefinition of terms and a 
relabeling of periods leaves the analysis intact. For example, in the 
two period case, x2 is the starting stock of water, after observing e 2 
and correcting for deficiencies or surplus in the previous period. 
Therefore, x 1 = r(x2 y 2) + e 1 + i 2 - m2. Relabelling ei by ei+l gives 
x 1 = r(x2 - y2) + e 2 + i 2 - m2 , which is the original continuity 
equation. However, it must be noted that since e is now known with 
certainty, the decision in the last period is det~rministic, not 
stochastic. 
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Proposition 4 
If assumptions (a - d) in proposition 1 are accepted, the 
following results hold: 
1) There exists a unique interior maximt.:m 12<x2), 
2) y~ (x) 2_ Yi (x), 
3) 
dy* 
0<--2 <1 d ' x -2 
4) Further, if n
11 
takes the form 
n12 _ 0 then the optimal release rule 
a is a constant dictated by the hydrology of the stream, 
2 
the size of the reservoir and the specific form of the 
profit function TI . 
Moreover, if assumption (3) in proposition 1 holds then, 
dy1< 
5) -1 < - 2 < 0. 
dx 
Proof of 1): 
When (61) is compared with (22), the two expressions for 
the optimal return function in the one period and the two period case 
are identical except that fl replaces vl wherever vl occurs in 
expression (22). Moreover, since both v
1 
and f . are concave, it can be 
1 
verified that under identical assumptions, all the qualitative results 
of the one period problem also hold in the two period case. In 
particular: 
+ 
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co 
Sr fci(rx2+e - ry2 - xu)¢ede Ju 
x -rx2+ry2 
(62) 
The primes denote the derivatives of the functions with respect 
dG
2 
arguments. Thus, y~(x2 ) is defined by -- = 0 Similarly, 
d2G 2 
-2-= 
dy 2 
dy2 . 
u 
- ry - x )¢ de 1 e 
to their 
(63) 
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u Moreover, at x, the benefit from releasing the . last unit of yt(x1) must . 
exceed the marginal benefit from exporting water. If this is not the 
case, then it becomes profitable to export water rather than release it 
to downstream users. Hence, 
(64) 
Similarly at xm, once yi(xm) is released, the marginal benefit from 
releasing an extra unit of water must be less than the marginal cost of 
violating the lower constraint (the price of water import). If this is 
not the case, it becomes profitable to import water and release it to 
downstream users. Therefore, 
m f 1 (x ) 
1 
<Cl (Q). (65) 
These conditions motivate the same economic behavior as that in (32) and 
(33) ; it is not profitable to engage in importing or exporting water in 
m u the permissable rangQ of x 1, x 2. x1 2. x . However, from (63) , these 
conditions imply 
< 0. (66) 
Thus, y*(x ) is a regular maximum. Moreover, it can be shown that the 
2 1 
(x2 ,0) 
< 0 hold, and are based on the 
same economic arguments presented in the one period case. 
is an interior maximum. 
Proof of 2): 
To prove that y~(x) ~ y£(x), notice that if v(x) 
Hence, y*(x ) 
2 2 
0, then 
from (24) and 
Figure 4. 
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dG 2 dG1 (62), dy < dy everywhere and hence y2(x) < yy(x). 
dG 
dy 
Figure 4 
dG 
1 
dy 
See 
dG1 . In general, however, if ~-is evaluated at y
2
*, it can be proven that 
dy 
dG d/ I > o. Since < 0, i dG. l 1,2 everywhere and dy = O has only one 
y = yi< 
2 2 
solution, the following inequality must hold: 
(67) 
See Figure 4. This result has already been implied by the previous 
analysis, where it has been shown that 
\..I m u 
v x, x .:::_ x1 < x . 
Hence, it is economical to release some of the unit increase in initial 
storage rather than retaining the entire storage increase. Therefore, 
the marginal expected return from releasing some of the unit increase 
43 
in initial storage and storing the rest must exceed the marginal 
expected increase in salvage value due to the storage of the whole unit 
increase, 
Hence, 
I 
u 
x -rx+ry 
f i ( rx + e - ry )¢ e de > 
xm-rx+ry 
m u 
x < x1 < x 
u 
J 
x -rx+ry 
v'(rx + e - ry) ¢ de. 
e 
xm-rx+ry 
(68) 
(68) holds because the arguments of both fi and v' lie in the interval 
m u 
x to x for the specific range of the random variable e defined by the 
limits of integration. 
Comparing the first order conditions in the one period and the 
two period cases, the previous argument implies that y~(x) ..'.'.:, yf(x ) , 
Proof () f 3) ; 
From ( 62) ' • t-l ... is found 
d2G d * 
2 
2 Y2 d G2 
-2- --, -. -2-
dy2 dx2 dy · 2 
It follows that 
0 < 
I'roof of 4); 
Notice that if 'Tf ll 
dy* 
· 2 
1 
that 
. . Cnll . . 'IT21). (69) 
(70) 
'IT21 - o~ then 
(71) 
and 
y* 2 
u 
<. x (72) 
az is dictated by the hydrology of the river basin, the size of the 
reservoir and the specific form of the profit function. 
Proof of 5): 
-1 < 
Proposition 5 
dy>'< 
2 
dx 
h(~) , 0 < h' < g' 2_ r, then 
< 0. 
Under the assumptions (a - e) of proposition 1: 
1) 
2) f
2 
is strictly concave in x
2
. 
(73) 
3) u - m If, in addition x = g(x), x h(x), g is concave and his 
a constant, then f is strictly concave in x. 
2 
Proof of 1): 
Differentiating (61), we have 
df 1 
Since --.L 
dx1 
df2(x) 
concavi ty of TI , ---'---'-dx 
+ (1 -
> 
dfl(x) 
dx 
(7 4 ) 
(75) 
Proof of 2): 
From 
ct2 f 2 
dx2 
(74) 
1 
d2G 
dy* 2 
2 
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and (69) ' 
2 d G2 2 [Till -2- - ('ITll - 'IT21) ] (76) 
dy2 
This can be shown to be negative, in a manner similar to that employed 
in the one period case. Thus, f 2 is concave in x2 . 
Proof of 3): 
m Also, if xu = g(x), and x = h(x), then 
J 
h (x)-rx +ry"' 2 2 
Bh'(x) 
0 
c2(h(x) - rx2 (77) 
Therefore, it follows that 
d2f dy'" 2 Bh I (h I + 2 [fi(h(x)) - c2(0)]cjl(h(x) - rx + ry~") --= r -=-) 
-2 1 1 dx dx 
dy"' 
- Bg' (g I + 2 [fi(g(x)) ci (O)}cjl(g(~) - rx + ry''') r-=-) + 
dx 1 1 
-Bh" c'cjl de - Bh'(h' + r -J.) c"cjl de J dy1• J 2 e dx 2 e 
46 
(78) 
In particular, if h' = 0 and g is concave, and since fi(g(x]+ ci(O) > 0 
and fl(h(x)) - c;(o) ~ 0, we conclude that 
d~2 < 0 
i.e. f 2 is strictly concave in x. 
Proof of 4): 
fl and f can be rewritten 2 
f = 1 Max [ 1T + E {V}] 
Y1 
f 2 Max [ 1T + E {f1 }J 
Y2 
as follows : 
where V is defined as in (38). An equivalent expression 
f = 2 Max [ 1T + Max 
{TI} + Max E{V}] 
Yz Y1 Y1 
Max [fl + Max { 1T}] 
Yz Y1 
hence 
(79) 
for £2 is 
(80) 
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Proposition 6 
Under the assumption of proposition 3, 
1) 3a unique optimal size ~2 for the reservoir which maximizes 
th~ total expected return f 2 (x); 
2) x* 
2 
Proof of 1): 
In this case, x is bounded below by 0 and above by 
2 
2y0 + x0 . Thus, f 2(x) is defined on a compact set. However, f 2 (x), 
under the assumptions of proposition 4, is strictly concave. Thus, 
f 2 (x) must posess a unique maximum xi on its convex and compact domain. 
Proof of 2): 
df2 df 1 
x~ and xt are defined by dx = 0 and dx 0 respectively. 
or, equivalently by 
and 
00 
-c' (x) + Bg ' (x) f _ci (rx2 + e - ry2 - g(x)<jlede 
g(x)-rx2+ry2 
00 
+ Bg' (x) J ~i (g(~))<j>ede 
g(x)-rx2+ry2 
00 
0 
-c' (x) + Bg' (x) f _ ci (rx1 + e - ryi - g (~))<Pe de 
g(x)-rx1+ryi 
+ Bg' (x) 0. 
(81) 
(82) 
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Since y~ (x) < Yf (x) , therefore 
ci (rx + e - ry~ - g (x)) > ci (rx + e - ryi - g (~)) 
and 
g(x) rx + ry~ < g(x) - rx + ryf. 
As a result 
r -oo Ci (rx + 
Jg(x)-rx+ry~ 
Also , since 
e - ry''< -2 
f:i_(g(x)) >v'(g(x)) 
then 
00 
g(x) )¢ de 
e 
00 
i 00 ci(rx + e g (x)-rx+ry''~ 1 
f f:i_(g(x))¢ede g (x)-rx+rr" 2 > J" _"' (g (;:) )¢ e de. g(x)-rx+ryl 
From (81) and (82) , these results imply that 
df (x''~) df (x"~) 
_2 ___ . > 1 . 
dx dx 
and hence 
The n Period Problem 
(83) 
(84) 
For an arbitrary n, the continuity equation is given by 
r (x - y ) + e + i - rn . 
n n n n n 
Define 
f (x ) 
n n 
where 
Max G (y , x 
n n n 
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y ) 
n 
m 
G (y ,x - y ) 
n n n n 
x -rx +ry 
n(y ,x - y ) + S f f n1 (xm)¢ de n n n n- e 
+ s 
00 
f u fn-l (x )¢ede + S 
u 
x -rx +ry 
n n 
00 
u 
x -rx +ry 
J 
n n 
f 1 (rx n- n 
m 
x -rx +ry 
n n 
- S Ju c1 (rxn + e 
x -rx +ry 
u 
- ry - x )¢ de 
n e 
n n 
m 
0 
+ e - ry )¢ de 
n e 
f x -rx +ry n n m - S c2 (x - rxn - e + ry )¢de - c(x). n e 
·o 
dG 2 Then y''<(x ) is defined by -- = 0 or equivalently by n n · dy2 
u 
- x )¢ de - Sr 
e 
u 
m 
x -rx +ry 
f n n c;(xm - rxn 
0 
00 
Sr f ci (rxn + e 
+ ry 
n 
~u 
x -rx +ry 
n n 
)¢ de 
e 
- e 
rx -rx +ry 
n n 
- Sr J f' 1 Crx + e - ry )¢ de. n- n n e 
m 
x -rx +ry 
n n 
(85) 
- ry 
n 
(86) 
so 
Using a straightforward induction argument (31), the following propo-
sitions can be proven: 
Proposition 7 
If assumptions (a - d) in proposition 1 hold, then 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
3 a unique interior maximum y>': (x ) 
n n 
dy* 
0 < n < 1 
dx 
n 
y* (x) < y>~ (x) 
n n-1 
If n11 = n12 = 0, then the optimal release rule is of 
the form 
y* (x ) 
n n 
x 
n 
a 
n 
where a is a constant dictated by the hydrology of the 
n 
river basin, the size of the reservoir, and the specific 
form of the profit function. 
Proposition 8 
Under the assumptions of proposition 1 (a - e), if g is concave 
and h is a constant, then 
1) f 
n 
is strictly concave in x and x 
n 
df 
2) n 
= 7T (y*(x ) x - y*(x )) dx 2 n n ' n n n 
n 
3) f I > f' 
n n-1. 
Proposition 9 
Under the assumptions of proposition 3: 
1) 3 a unique optimal size xi: for the reservoir which maximizes 
n 
2) 
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the total expected return f (x) 
n 
;,., > x* . 
n n-1 
The Infinite Stage Process 
In this section the following functonal equation will be 
discussed. 
f(x) Max 
0..'.:_y..'.:_x 
00 
(TI(y,x-y) + f3 
m 
x -rx+ry 
J f (xm)<P de 
e 
0 
00 
+ f3 J f(xu)¢ de 
e 
u 
x -rx+ry 
u 
x -rx+ry 
- S J c1· (rx + e - ry - xu)¢ de + f3 J f (rx + e - ry)cp de e e 
u m 
x -rx+ry x -rx+ry 
- f3 J 
0 
Proposition 10 
m 
x -rx+ry 
m 
c (x -2 rx - e - ry)cp de - c(x)]. e (87) 
There is a unique solution to (85) which is bounded for x in 
any finite real interval. This solution, f(x), is continuous and 
concave. 
The proof of this proposition is well known and follows 
closely the development given in Bellman [31]. Define the sequence 
{f (x)} as follows: 
n 
f 1 (x) = Max G (y, x - y, f ) . n+ n 02_y.2_x 
n 
where f 0 (x) = v(x) and f 0 (x) is continuous 
shown that Lim f (x) f (x) exists for x > 
n ->-oo n -
0,1,2, ... 
over x > 0. 
-
0 and is the 
f(x) =Max G(y,x,f). Moreover, the convergence of f (x) n 
o:::y:::x 
Then it can 
solution of 
is uniform. 
be 
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Therefore, since each function in the sequence is continuous 
and concave, f(x) is continuous. To show the similarity of (87) to 
the problem discussed by Bellman [31], the following theorem is stated: 
Bellman's Theorem 
The functional equation 
00 00 
f(x) Min [k(y - x) + z [J p(s-y)¢(s)ds + f(O) J ¢(s)ds 
y'?:._x J y 
+Jy f ( y - s )¢ ( s ) ds ] ] 
0 
has a unique solution which is bounded for x contained in any finite 
interval. The solution f(x) is continuous. Assumptions: 
K(y-x) and P(x-y) are convex. 
Proposition 11 
In the case of an infinite planning horizon and under the 
assumption that y*(x) exists and is unique for any arbitrary n:. 
n 
Proof: 
1) there exists a unique optimal policy y*(x) where 
2) 
3) 
y;(x) -+ y*(x), 
0 < dyi< < 1 
dx 
-1 < d * ~ < 0. 
dx 
m Since for any arbitrary n, we have x < x 
- n 
u 
< x it follows that 
53 
yii(xn) has an upper bound equal to xn and a lower bound equal to 0. It 
has also been shown that the sequence {y7<} is a non-decreasing sequence 
n 
such that 
Since each Yi is bounded below, y~(x) converges to y*(x) [26], where 
y*(x) is the solution of 
+ sJ:ci (rx + 
Jx -rx+ry 
x - y) - Br l m ' x -rx-rry m CI (X -2 rx + ry - e)¢ de e 
(88) 
· I xu-rx+ry 
e - ry - xu)¢ de - Br f'(rx + e - ry)¢ de= 0. 
e e 
m 
. . x -rx+ry 
The proof of the comparative statics results in the infinite stage 
process is similar to the proof previously outlined for the two period 
case. 
Proposition 12 
There exists a unique optimal size xi< for the reservoir which 
maximizes f(x; x). 
Proof: 
Since the assumptions of the model make each member of the 
sequence {f (~)} concave, f(x) is also concave. The next step is to 
n 
prove that x is bounded. Assume as before that there exists y0 such 
that n1 (y0) = 0 and x0 such that n 2 (x0) = 0. The discounted gross 
revenue realised must .be less than the gross revenue when the reservoir 
54 
is always operating at y0 , because of the cost of importing and 
exporting water. Thus, 
realized gross revenue < 
TI(yo,xo) 
x • 
(1-r) 
Define by c(x) 
TI(yo,xo) 
x (1-r) (1-r) 
then 
realized gross revenue < c(~) 't;j x 
(1-r) 
That is if x > x, then the realized net revenue must be negative and 
hence x bounds x. 
The Long Term Distribution and 
the Case of the Linear 
Decision Rule 
equation 
The process we are dealing with is represented by the continuity 
x p-1 rx - ry* + e + i - m . p p p p 
This is a discrete time, continuous state Markov process . Therefore 
the usual "ergodic theorem" could not be employed to find the long- run 
distribution of the water stock. 
In this section it is shown that the long-run distribution 
exists and can be derived for a special class of objective functions. 
This class of functions corresponds to the case when TI11 and TI12 = 0. 
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Proposition 13 
If the assumptions of proposition 12 hold, and if n 11 = n12 = 0, 
then there exists a long run distribution for the water stock in the 
reservoir given by 
P(x m ¢(x + ra) 
P(x 1 - <\l(xu + ra) 
and x ,.._, ¢(x + ra) for x, xm < x < xu 
where a is a constant. 
Proof: 
We have seen that 
i > 0 *=> m p p 
~> e p 
0 or rx p ry''<(x )+e µ p 
< xm - rx + ry* (x ) . 9 
p p 
m 
< x 
(89) 
Moreover, we have seen that separabilit f and linearity of TI implies a 
linear decision rule of the form 
y*(x ) = x - a 
D p 
10 (90) 
Then, from (89) and substituting for y*(x ) from (90) , we have p 
i > 0 ~> e p p 
m 
< x - ra. (91) 
Therefore, it follows that 
P(i > O) = ¢ (xm - ra) 
p . 
(92) 
9This is Iff statement, because importing and exporting actions 
are not optimizing decisions, but rather a penalty imposed· by the 
stochastic nature of the inflow to correct for deficiencies or surpluses 
after the decisions are taken. 
long 
case 
lONotice that a is the same from period to period only in the 
run for the infinite planning horizon case. However, in the finite 
y~(xp) = xp - ap. 
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In a similar fashion, it is possible to show th a t 
u P(m > 0) = l - ¢(x - ra) 
3.i. td 
p 
P(i 
p 
0, m 
p 
) ( u m 0 = ¢ x - ra) - ¢(x - ra). 
However , we know that 
and 
P(i > 0) = P(x l p-
0, m p 
0) 
m 
x ) , P(m > O) 
p 
·Therefore, 
P(x l p-
m 
<P(x - ra) 
P ( x = xu) = 1 - ¢(xu - ra) p-1 
and x 1 is distributed as ¢ (x 1 - ra) p- e p-
P(x 
p-1 
(93) 
(94) 
(95) 
(96) 
(97) 
(98) 
(96-98) u show that the distribution of x 1 has two mass points at x p-
m 
and x and is continuously distributed with cp (x 1 ra) in the range e p- -
of (xm, xu). That is, the distribution of xis given by 
¢ (xm+ra) at x = 
cp(x+ra) m x 
1 -
u ¢(x +ra) x = 
and 
m 
x 
< x < 
u 
x 
J 
x j 
u 
x 
(99) 
E(x) xm¢(xm - ra) + xu {l - ¢(xu - ra)} + f x (x - ra)dx. 
m 
x 
The expression above could only be evaluated if a specific form for the 
profit function is postulated. It is also necessary to simulate the 
dynamic program for a large number of periods p until 
(a - a 1 ) -+ 0 . p . p-
Using the simulated value of a and postulating a specific form for the 
2 
inflow distribution (e.g. log-normal or X ) after calibrating with 
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actual data, the solution is found by: (1) select the optimal policy, 
given a particular physical size of the reservoir~ (i.e. Y'~ = x-a(~)); 
(2) obtain the optimal size of the reservoir x*. The selection of x* 
defines a exactly; therefore, the distribution of x is determined and 
so is E(x). 
1.3 Conclusion and Summary 
It has been demonstrated that chance constrained programming can 
be incorporated within the usual dynamic programming formulation by 
transforming the chance constraints into a penalty function that is 
added to the criterion function to be maximized. Moreover , it has been 
found that allowing for importing and exporting of water from the 
reservoir provides an economic rational for the penalty function and 
provides acceptable economic interpretation to the technical require-
ments for the solution of the maximization problem. Allowing for 
evaporation losses, the manager of the reservoir maximizes a criterion 
function which reflects benefits from water releases to agriculture and 
from the water stock in the reservoir for power generation. Within 
the chance constrained dynamic programming, the manager solves for the 
dual problem of optimal operating policy and optimal size of the res-
ervoir. The procedure of maximization is similar to that of two-step 
programming in that water import and export is considered a residual 
decision to correct for the violation of the constraints. Specifically, 
it does not pay to engage in importing or exporting water unless vio-
lation of the constraints occur as a result of implementing the optimal 
policy. These conditions, together with concavity of the criterion 
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function and convexity of the penalty function, are found sufficient to 
get all the usual dynamic programming results, such as the existence, 
uniqueness, monotonicity, and convergence of the optimal policy. It 
has also been demonstrated that the usual dynaw~c programming results 
extend to the optimal size of the reservoir under these and some other 
plausible conditions. Assuming the criterion function to be separable 
and linear in water releases, the optimal operation policy is found to 
be linear. Moreover, under this condition, it has been demonstrated 
that the long-run distribution of the water stock in the reservoir 
exists and is derived. Finally, another model is presented in the 
Appendix which incorporates the chance constrained problem into a 
planning model by finding a deterministic equivalent to the chance 
constraints. It has been demonstrated, that for an infinite sized 
reservoir, the optimal operating policy exists and is unique. Moreover, 
a formula for the long-run distribution of the water stock is derived 
and some bounds on the expected value are developed. 
Appendix 
A Chance Constrained Model: 
Deterministic Equivalent 
Approach . 
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Consider a reservoir of infinite size, the problem is 
to maximize over a T period planning horizon a net discounted benefit 
function subject to chance constraints. Formally: 
T p-1 
Max L: s n(y ) (1) 
O<y <y p=l p 
- p- max 
p=l, ... , T 
Subject to P(x < xu) p > al \;j p 1,2, ... ,T (2) 
P(x p 
m 
> x ) > a2 ' \;j p = 1,2, ... ,T (3) 
x rxp-l ± e - rv > 0 \;j p = 1,2, ... ,T 
(4) 
p p ·p 
u 
where x is the usable capacity, fixed by law to provide for flood 
control or some other consi'de rations. xm is the minimum head required 
for power generation. Alternatively, xm can be determined by 
environmental considerations such as wildlife preservation or, perhaps 
more importantly, salinity control downstream. a_ is the maximum 
l 
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tolerance level associated with the ith constraint and xp is the storage 
level at the end of period p (measured from the start of the planning 
period). yp and ep are the release and inflow in period p, respectively. 
S is an appropriate discount rate. Finally, 
r = 1 - k, 0 < r < 1 (5) 
where k is the percentage evaporation from .the reservoir. For simpli-
city, the salvage value function at the end of the horizon is assumed to 
be zero. n(y ) is a strictly concave profit function such that p 
Tf(y ) = 0 p 
It is assumed that dTf 
ay p 
at 0 and y are finite, and that there 
max 
exists y 0 , 0 < y 0 < y such that y < y 0 max p 
~ h_ ~ ay > 0 ' Y P > Y o ==? 
p 
dTf 
ay 
p 
dTf 
ay 
p 
0, as shown in Figure 1. e is assumed p 
independent and identically distributed with mean µ and variance cr. 
! 
;c(v ) '1. 
'p . 
I 
Figure 1 yp 
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In the following, the deterministic equivalent of the sto-
chastic problem is found, using the method developed by Charnes and 
Cooper [5]. The deterministic problem is then solved for the optimal 
policy (y~, y~, ... , y;) over the planning horizon. Next the impli-
cation of this policy is examined within the original ·random context of 
the problem. In particular, the effect of this deterministic policy on 
the distribution of the stock of water is investigated when the planning 
horizon is extended indefinitely and the random setting of the problem 
is restored. This method has some problems which will be mentioned 
later. Finally, the distribution of the water stock, developed here, is 
only an approximation, as will be explained in detail below. 
A Proposition 
There exists a unique optimal solution yi, y~ , ... , y~ to die 
constraint of equations (1) - (4) if (xu _ xm) > c-1-
/S1 
_l_) 
~ 
The implementation of this policy yields a family of approximate long 
term distributions for the water stock in the reservoir given by 
. . 2 
ij;J (µJ a ) where 
xp' xp 
m 
x 
a 
< 
u 
x 
a 
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Proof 
The deterministic equivalents for the chance constraints will 
be developed first. C · d (2) P' < xu) > a · 1 tl onsi er : \X _ 1 or equiva en y f 
But from the continuity equation, we have x p rx 1 + e p- p 
y* is the optimal release in period p. Hence, p 
Or, 
where 
Then 
where 
x p 
x p 
Thus from (6) we have 
or, equivalently 
E p 
p . 
L: p-i+l ... + 
~ r Yi_ 
i=l 
~ p-i+l ·'· 
'-' r Y"' 
i=l 1 
p p-i 
L: r e. l . 
i=l 
E ~ g (µ , a ) 
p p p 
2 
a 
p 
p p-i 
L: r e .. 
i=l l 
E - ]J 
p p) < 
a p 
(6) 
ryi< where 
p 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
Define K(3 by 
1 
Then (14) implies 
P(KS < 
1 
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E - ]J 
p P) 
0 
p 
However, by Chebychef's inequality, 
E - ]J 
p p) < 
0 p 
Therefore, (15) ~ f\ <-1- ==} KS / 
- 2 
K 13 
1 
Substitution in (16) for KS 1 we 
1 Ir\ 
p p-i+l ' u rpx + !: 11 x r Y'·' 1-'p L) i=l l 
(15) 
(16) 
< 
1 (17) 
= ~ 1 
have 
0 
n 
r' 
-- > n v. (18) 
;s;:-
This .is a more stringent constraint than the original deterministic 
equivalent constraint which would have resulted from using the actual 
distribution of ep rather than the Chebychef bound. Alternatively, 
sharper bounds such as Markov, or special case bounds [4] could be used 
to develop deterministic equivalents for the chance constraints in this 
problem. 
to be 
Similarly, the equivalent deterministic form for (3) is found 
~ p-i+l ' 
L. r y>.: - ]J -
i=l l p 
0 
p 
< 0 (19) 
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Thus the problem is transformed into 
T 
E Sp-l 1r(y ) 
p Max O<y <y 
- p- max p=l 
p=l, 2, ... , T 
subject to (18) and (19). 
No t e that (18) and (19) can be rewritten as 
u p~l p-i+l 
> 1 [ -x + rp x - L r y:• + JJ + 
YP _ r o i=l i P 
0 
_P_ 
~ 
1 m p p-1 0 " p-i+l * + __L ] 
Y < - [-x + r x 0 p - r L.. r Yi+ 1-lp i=l lcX":::-2 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
The solution will be determined next. The Langrangian for 
the problem in (20-21) is given by: 
L 
T p 1 - } T u rpx E S - {1r(y ) - C(x) + 2: Alp [-x + o 
1 p p=l p= 
~ ''< p-i+l + [_, y .r 
i=l l 
(23) 
a 
T m p p * p-i+l - _p_]. 
2: A [x· - r x0 + L y.r - JJP r-p=l 2p i=l l 1'0.2 
Ignoring the nonnegativity constraints on the y's, the first order 
conditions are given by 
0 - (24) 
VP , p = 1, 2 , . . • , T. 
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This is the usual marginality condition; the discounted marginal benefit · 
from a particular choice of water release y''< must be equal to the total 
discounted marginal cost which results from that choice. Th2 other . 
first order conditions are: 
0 
u p 
-x + r x0 
~ '· p-i+l + [., y':r ]JP + _E_ < 0 
i=l l 
(strict inequality implies A.* O); 
lp 
m 
-x 
p + ~ J, p-i+l 
r x0 1.; y :·r - µ i=l l p 
(strict inequality implies A"j'~ 2p 0); 
and A.* 2p > 0. 
16i-
0 
_E_ < 0 ;a;-
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
Differentiating the first order conditio n (24) with r espect to y : p 
2 
p-1 2 i3 d TI 
d 2 Yp 
But d TI< Oby strict concavity of TI, 
d 2 
yp 
the ref ore < 0 . 
Thus the solution t o (2Lf) , y~< , is unique. 
p 
(28) 
(29) 
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Denoting the right-hand side oi (21) -(22) by Zp and yp respec-
tively, it follows that 
and 
TI (y ) 
p 
p-1 . a 
yp ~ .:'._p 1 u p L: ·'- p-1+1 + µ + _y_] -[-x + r x y·:r r 0 i=l l p If\ 
l µ rpx 
p 
' p-i+l a 
yp < y -[-x + L: Y~:r + µ + -=.£.] p r 0 i=l l p ;a;-
Y > Y > y* > Y > 0 ,,L..:;:.... ( x u - x m) > a ( 1 
max - p - p - _p - "'7" _ p ~ 
A B 
(30) 
(31) 
1 
--). ;a;- (32) 
~~~~---~~~~~~...-~~~~~~~-·-4-~~~-+~~~--~+--~~~ 
-1~ 
y 
Figure 2 
v 
,p ymax Yp 
In this case, y* lies in the closed convex interval {AB} in Figure 2. On p 
the other hand, if the choice of a
1 
and B1 is su ch that 
u m 
x - x < a p 
1 1 ( - - - -). 
~ ~ 
Then (21) and (22) c~nnot hold simultaneously. 
(33) 
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Let yp denote the solution to (24). Thus, 
yp if A>'< > 0 2p 
y-1~ 
-- yp if neither 
A_;, J...1< > 0 (34) 
p lp' 2p 
~p if A.-J~ > 0 lp 
Figure 3 illustrates the nature of the solution of (24). 
Discounted 
Marginal 
Produc-
tivity 
Figure 3 
T 
}: C"-2·-A.1.)cr 
• l ]_ 
i=p 
i-p 
The Long-Run Distribution of x 
p 
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For an infinite size reservoir, the probability of a 
spillover is zero. Moreover, if µ is large and we start with 
u 
x 0 = x , the probability of empty r eservoir is, a lso, v ery small. 
From (1 2) and (13) as p is increased, rpx -+ O, 0 
µ -+ µ/k and 
p 
Hence fr om (7) 
2 
0 
p 
2 
a 
->- ----
k (2 - k) (35) 
p p-i+l ' a2 
x -+ lj! (µ/k - l: r Y'.', k( 2 _ k». (36) p i=l l 
However, if (32) holds (xu - xm) > a (_L - _L). That is, when the 
p ~ ;a;-
"adjusted" variability of the stream flow is small in comparison 
with the usable capacity, 
y. < y>:: < y . ' 
-l l l 
\7 i 1, 2, ... ,p. (37) 
69 
Hence, 
p p-i+l < p p-i+l * < ~ p-i+l= 
E r y. E r Yi_ r Yi 
i=l l - i=l i=l 
From (25) and (26) we have 
p p-i+l a u rpx + µ + ___£ E r y. = - x + 
i=l l 0 p · ~ 1 
and 
p p-i+l= (J E -xm + p + µ + ___£ r y. r x 0 i=l l p la2 
When p -->- oo then -r l:! -->- a and µp a k' p /k(2 - k) 
Therefore, 
i p-i+l 
i=l 
r Yi 
and 
e p-i+l= 
'-' r y. 
i=l l 
Hence, 
-->- -x 
-r -
u +l:!.+ 
k 
m+J:!.+ 
x k 
(J 
lks2 c2 - k) 
(J 
rpx 
0 
-xu + l!. + ~~-(J~~~ 
k lks
1 
c2 - k) 
< < 
m 
-x + 
(38) 
(39) 
(40) 
+ 0 
( 41) 
(42) 
l!. + --0---. (43) 
k lka
2 
(2 - k) 
Thus, the long term distribution of x belongs to a class of distribution p 
functions 
. 2 
ljJ. (µJ ,o ) where 
J xp xp 
2 (J 
xp k(2 - k) 
(44) 
and µj is bounded as follows 
xp 
m 0 < 
x 
/ka2 (2 - k) 
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]Jj < 
xp 
Notice that there exist (31 small enough 
x 
In this case, 
m 0 
u 
+ x 
u 
x 
0 
u 0 
x -----
As1 c2 - k) 
(45) 
so that 
0 (46) 
(47) 
In general, however, (47) holds if: 1) the value of r is large enough, 
and 2) the nature of the solutions y~, which is bounded above, makes 
1. p 
h ~ p- i+l ' d . h t e sequence s = ~ r y~ a non ecreasing sequence. In t is case, 
p i=l 1. 
s ->- s [ 30] and 
p 
where 
x + l/! (µ ,02 ) p xp xp 
2 
a is given by (44). 
xp 
(This ends the proof of the proposition). 
In this mode l, treating water release as a deterministic 
.decision variable facilitated the transformation of the chance 
constraints into deterministic form. This was done without assuming an 
a priori specific form for the decision rule . Moreover, an approx-
imation for the long-run distribution of the stock of water in the 
reservoir was derived that provided · reasonable bounds for the expected 
value of the distribution. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ON ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND CONGRESSIONAL 
ELECTIONS - A NOTE 
2.1 Democratic Theory and 
Voter Rationality 
The search for the impact of economic conditions on election 
outcomes is part of a wider search for issue voting in the electorate 
[22], [23]. -Jc It is a "treasure hunt" for a vital mechanism in classic 
democratic theories [12], [13]. The basic assumptions of these theories 
are the accountability of the legislator to the electorate and the 
latter's responsiveness to the former's performance and programs. 1 The 
classical democratic theorists2 argue that there are necessary 
conditions for accountability .to exist; these are the ability of a 
voter: 
1. to evaluate the incumbent's performance, and 
2. to signal his approval or disapproval in accordance with his 
evaluation by casting his vote for or against the incumbent. 
The American Voter [21] states "Commentaries on Democracy often assume 
1w. Berns wrote in "A Critique of Berelson, Lazarfeld, and 
McPhee's Voting" that "probably the most decisive test of an electoral 
system is the quality of men e .lected to office •.. and the quality of 
men chosen depends on the individual voters who ·.choose them" [39] 
IL Mayo emphasizes "accountability"; thus, "the election from this view-
point is a kind of accounting for stewardship." [15], p. 78. 
2R. Dahl, Pluralist Democracy in the United States [13], p. 17. 
*References are at the end of Chapter 3. 
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two basic facts about the electoral decision: first, that the public is 
generally in possession of sufficient information regarding the various 
policy alternatives of the moment to make a rational choice among them; 
that is, that it has clear goals and is able to assess what the actions 
of government shall mean for these goals; and second, that the election 
in fact presents the electorate with recognizable partisan alternatives 
through which it can express its policy preferences." Thus, account-
ability is not sustainable in a political system in which the voter is 
ignorant and disinterested. It is also seriously limited when the 
electorate's evaluations and signals consistently diverge.3 
2.2 National Politicians and 
the Voter's "Rationality" 
For accountability to exist, another condition is needed. This 
is the incumbent's belief that the elec torate actually behaves in this 
manner when reaching a voting decision. There is evidence that national 
politicians believe economic issues matter in national elections and 
function on this basis. Thus, R.M. Nixon [16] writes in Six Crises, 
3 Lazarfe l<l's et al. Voting disputes this statement by 
pointing out that "where the classical theory of Democracy is defective 
is in its concentration on the individual citizen. What are undervalued 
are certain collective properties that reside in the electorate as a 
whole ... " [10). H. Mayo was even more emphatic in rejecting the 
necessity of these conditions for the survival of Democratic theories. 
In ·introduction to Democratic Theory he wrote , "There is nothing 
irrational about voting on a broad preference for a person, party or the 
general drift a candidate or party may take. It may appear irrational 
in an economic sense (with its prudent and specific calculation of costs 
and satisfaction, or ends and means) but the rationality of ec onomic 
behavior is a very narrow type which, applied to other things in life 
(love, friendship, and even political policy), is as absurd and 
impossible as Bentham's 'felicific calculus'." [15), p. 77. 
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p. 303, "As the national economy began to turn upward in the winter and 
spring of 1959, the Administra tion's standing rose accordingly." Some 
political analysts take this concept further and attribute a premanent 
effect on the electorate to major economic programs. W. Leuchtenburg 
(5] writes in The New Deal p. 2, "The new deal produced an upheaval in 
American Poli tics . . . . A country which had been predominantly Repub-
lican changed to overwhelmingly Democratic."4 Tufte (18] shows that 
since the depression, government macro-economic policy has insured that 
disposable personal income never falls during a Presidential election 
year. Moreover, he finds that the timing of various income expanding 
measures relates to the electoral cycle. Finally, several scholars (35) 
cite the belief of various chairmen of the Council of Economic Advisors, 
that an expanding economy has a favor able impact on elector a l behavior 
towards the incumbent. 
2.3 Political Science and 
the Voter's "Rationality" 
· The findings of Empirical political science during the last two 
decades contradict the notion that the voter is the classical politi cal 
being portrayed in Democratic theories. Most of these studies (20] 
agree with the assessment in The American Voter, "The American electorate 
has generally low emotional involvement in politics, slight awareness of 
4Also, see Nixon in the White House, where Nixon wrote on the 
effect of different programs on the voters: "The Kennedy farm program 
provided for massive increases in the Federal Government control of 
Agriculture. Polls taken two weeks a fter the Kennedy farm speech and 
mine indicated a substantial shift in the farm vote, away from the 
Democratic candidate ... " [ 17], p. 303. 
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public affairs, low ability of thinking in structured ideological terms 
and pervasive sense of attachment to one or the other of the two major 
parties." [21] The classical democratic theorists argue that a 
responsible party system cannot coexist with an apathetic electorate and 
democratic theory cannot be erected on the shaky foundation described in 
works such as The American Voter. 
In more recent literature, political scientists develop a two-
pronged attack on these findings. 
1) In a reexamination of voting data, one group of political 
scientists seeks to reassert the existence and importance of issues in 
the voting decision and thus to restore the prospective element of the 
electorate decision. G. Pomper [22] criticizes the previous studies on 
two grounds. First, he claims that their experimental and questionnaire 
designs do not "specifically and substantially try to discover the 
latent ideologies of their subject." Second, he states that previous 
studies are time bound, in the sense that their findings will not gener-
alize to elections not covered by their data. He notes that the 
election campaign of 1956, for example, could hardly stimulate ideo-
logical voting.5 In a more direct approach, Boyd (23] claims to have 
established the importance of both urban unrest and the traditional 
issues which divide the two parties ·, such as the extent of the federal 
5Pomper's (22] examination of six issues: federal aid to educa-
tion, government provision of medical care, government guarantee of full 
employment, federal enforcement of fair employment, and foreign aid, led 
him to conclude that: 
parties took differential stands on these issues 
over time, the electorate became more aware of party 
differences on these issues 
consensus had risen appreciably by 1968 on the important 
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government's role in ensuring social welfare. 6 Others [25) warn that 
the existence of policy voting cannot be established without examining 
the processes which are relevant to the electorate's perception of the 
proximity of his favored candidates position and his own. These 
processes include, ·in addition to the alleged "policy voting," 
"persuasion" and "projection." In the second process, the perception 
and evaluation are fixed, while the voter's position is being influenced 
by the position he believes is held by the candidate he favors. In the 
third process, the voter projects his own position on the candidate he 
favors. 7 
aspects of party position vis-a-vis th ese issues. 
J. Kessel (26), however, did not share G. Pomper's reading of his data. 
He pointed out that the lack of precision in the wording of the 
questionnaire could result in capturing a covariation of two issues 
instead of isolating the particular influence of a certain issue. He 
also points out that the observable rise in the proportion of issue 
voting may be due to either a) the increase in the proportion of voters 
to whom thos e issues are important, or. b) responses to shift in party's 
ideologica l stand by voters whos e preferences remain the same. 
6R. Boyd [23) tried to isolate the short-term effect of the 
issue on voting from the long-term commitment of party identification by 
use of "normal vote" technique [24). Normal vote analysis provided an 
estimate of parties' expected proportion of the vote for any selected 
group of the electorate in a normal election. This estimate is based on 
the following factors: 
1. The balance of party identifiers within the group. 
2. The typical defection rates of party identifiers to the 
other party. 
3. Turnout rate. 
7s. Verba et al., in The Changing American Voter presents 
strong arguments supporting the existence of issue voting, but adds 
the following words of caution: "The data do not eliminate the 
alternative causal explanation: that people adopt issue positions to 
suit their already-selected voting choice." They argue with Brody and 
Page that "It is difficult if not impossible to choose between the two 
causal directions with the kinds of data available." [41], p. 173. 
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In short, the techniques used until now to study policy voting 
are notably flawed either methodologically or substantively, and the 
question of prospective issue voting is certainly not yet settled.8 
2) The second group seeks to establish the existence of a 
modified form of rationality in the voting decision of the electorate; 
the rationality of "retrospective voting." The advocates of this 
hypothesis argue that the voter is faced with: a lack of information 
about the competing programs, a high level of noise (such as campaign 
rhetoric), and steeply rising information gathering and processing 
costs. Therefore, he will settle upon the use of specific cues in 
reaching his decision on participation and voting. They further argue 
that the electorate possesses one hard piece of information: the 
incumbent's past performance. It is this piece of information that the 
electorate will use consistently in making its voting decisions. 9 
8This conviction is not shared by S. Verba et al. in The 
Changing American Voter. They assert that "the data suggest that the 
American public has been entering the electoral arena since 1964 with 
quite a different mental set than was the case in the last 1950's .... 
They have become more concerned with issues and less tied to their 
parties." p. 166. They point out that "the public responds to the 
political stimuli offered it. The political behavior of the electorate 
is not determined solely by psychological and sociological forces, but 
also by the issues of the day and by the way in which candidates present 
those issues." [41), p. 319. 
9H. Mayo remains unconvinced. He points out that: "Disap-
pointed politicians often talk of public ingratitude for past favors. 
But this is to confuse the personal reasons why the individual votes as 
he does with the fact that all election results are by their nature 
future-oriented. The authorization to form a government and to decide 
future policies is always given by the voters collectively and taken as 
such by the successful representatives. To the voters who are conscious 
of this, it is presumably not what they think a party has done, but what 
it will do, that counts most on election day. Such a diagnosis helps to 
explain why the so-called ingratitude for the past should have only a 
minor part in voting." [15), p. 80. · 
82 
For example, Kramer [l] states that "a voter, even a rational, self-
interested voter, may not find it practical or efficient to proceed by 
collecting information of various kinds -- and vote for the 'best' 
package offered. For example, there may be no relevant party platforms 
to compare, platforms may (indeed, usually do) concentrate on desired 
ends rather than specific policy proposals. Voters may not feel 
qualified to make a confident or a priori assessment of the relative 
merits of positions on subtle technical issues, or they may recognize 
that platforms are in no sense binding commitments. Other information, 
such as detailed legislative records of individual candidates, may be 
very costly to acquire and analyze -- these considerations suggest that 
a more relevant decision rule for voters would be based on readily 
available information such as the past performance of the incumbent 
party. 11 10 
lOThe awareness of the retrospective element is not new. As far 
back as 1961, Key wrote (27], p. 4 73, "perhaps the public can express 
itself with greatest clarity when it speaks in disapprobation of the 
past policy or performance of administration" and that the principal 
role of the electorate is to appraise "past events, past performance and 
past elections", because "only infrequently is a new program or a new 
course of action advocated with such force and the attention it receives 
so widespread that the polling may be regarded as advance approval of a 
proposed course of action. 11 
However, this realization remains at intuitive levels, coupled 
with an awareness of the difficulty of discerning which issues are 
involved in the retrospective voting process. On this, V.O. Key wrote 
in [27], p. 473, " •... The collective decision may not specify with 
minuteness the elements of policy or performance of which it disapproves 
and cannot indicate with precision the lines of policy that should be 
pursued, save that changes should be made." M. 'Fiorina [6] concludes 
that "political scientists are aware of retrospective voting, and at 
least some are convinced of its significance. But their studies provide 
little knowledge of the specifics of retrospective voting." 
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A variant of the "retrospective" model is the negative voting 
hypothesis. This postulates an asymmetric behavior in which voters 
penalize the incumbent if he errs, but do not reward him if he does not. 
The basis of this hypothesis can be. found in The American Voter [21); 
"The party division of the vote is most likely to be changed by a 
negative public reaction to the record of the party in power -- a 
majority party, once it is in office, will not continue to accrue elec-
toral strength; it may preserve for a time its electoral majority, but 
the next marked change in the party vote will issue from a negative 
response of the electorate to some aspect of the party's conduct in 
office." 
The theories of recent studies in the retrospective voting 
tradition concentrate on the effect of economic conditions on voting. 
This is because economic issues are, first, not time bound and have the 
nature of continuous recurrence, and second, they are believed to have 
a strong effect on the well-being of the individual voter. The idea is 
that a phenomenon which has such an effect on the micro-level will be 
the easiest to detect from aggregative data. Several studies have been 
made to investigate the covariation between economic conditions and both 
voting and turnout. These studies are classified according to the data 
base used in them. 
Cross-Sectional Studies 
The data in these studies are classified by counties or states 
over shorter series of elections. 
Rees et al. [30) investigate the relationship between the 
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Republican Congressional vote, and state "insured unemployment as a 
percent of covered employment" as well as net income per farm in forty-
one states during the seventy Congressional elections from 1946-58. 
A simple tabulation was used to show that a small negative 
covariation exists between unemployment and Republican vote, but none 
with income. However, as Fiorina [ 7) notes, "political responsibility 
varied across the period considered, so one is uncertain about the 
meaning or significance of the previous results." 
Poll Data Studies 
These studies use poll data rather than election returns. 
Clark (31] examines the correlation between the Gallup Poll 
monthly series data on Roosevelt's popularity and a national income 
series. He reports correlations of 0 - 0.52 in aggregate, and between 
0.78 ~ .95 when the data are segmented according to different economic 
classes. 
Longitudinal Studies 
These studies analyze aggregate national election results over 
a long series of Congressional elections. 
An early example of this group is L.H. Beam's study (28]. It 
examines the hypothesis that the public tends to vote for the retention 
of administrations that have been in power during prosperous times and 
to vote against the incumbent administration when depression has 
coincided with election time. 
Using an index of general business activity, he compares 
changes in the index between October of the election year and October 
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two years earlier, with changes in the House membership of the incumbent 
administration. Beam is able to show that in fifteen out of nineteen 
cases of decline of the indices, the incumbent has suffered a net loss 
in House membership. The effect has been particularly pronounced in 
mid-term elections, when losses have always been observed. In 
on-year elections, however, the phenomenon has been observed only in six 
out of ten. 
He also concludes that "the President's personality and other 
factors partially offset the impact of economic conditions in Presiden-
tial years." 
Recent contributions by Kramer (1), Stigler [3], and Arcelus and 
Meltzer [4] employ more sophisticated econometric techniques, but reach 
conflicting conclusions on this issue. Kramer poses two different 
models for mid-term and on-year Congressional elections to account for 
the possibility of "coattail" effects from the Presidential contest; 
the dependent variables are the Republican share of the vote in the first 
model and the President and Republican share of vote in the second. The 
same exogenous variables appear in both relations and include changes in 
employment, per capita real income, per capita money income and the 
consumer price index. A coattail effect variable is added to the on-
year election model to account for the effect of the candidate and 
"campaign tactics" in the Presidential race . In the Congressional 
equation, it is assumed that a certain fraction ·.of .this presidential 
effect is carried over into the Congressional vote. (See Appendix A for 
a more thorough exposition.) 
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Kramer's findings are that unemployment fluctuations appear to 
have no impact on the aggregate vote, but changes in real income do. He 
also finds that the incumbency variable coefficient is "invariably small 
and insignificant." 
He also finds that economic fluctuations affect the votes for 
Congressmen who belong to the President' party more than they do the 
vote for the President himself. This is puzzling because of Kramer's 
earlier argument in favor of associating incumbency with the control of 
the White House rather than Capitol Hill.ll 
Stigler [3] formulates a one-equation model to test Kramer's 
results. In this model the dependent variable is the percentage of 
total votes cast for Republicans, 12 or alternatively, the Republican 
share of total vote, and the explanatory variables are: incumbency, 
relative change in per capita real income (the sign is governed by 
llKramer's [1] ambition to use his result for long-range quanti-
tative predictive purposes -- in the sense that "10 percent decrease in 
per capita real personal income would cost the incumbent administration 
4 - 5 percent of the congressional vote" -- is ill justified. This is 
so because of the presence of multicollinearity in the model (Stigler 
reports high correlation (-.78) between changes in unemployment and 
relative change in per capita real income), which makes the separation 
of their effect in the model difficult. Also, the long span of the 
period of study casts serious doubt on the real utility of the estimated 
values of the coefficients in any forecasting exercise. One cannot 
believe, for example, that the effect of incumbency or the variations in 
economic conditions have the same effect on the voter of 1900 as that of 
1964. 
12stigler's formulations, where he uses changes in the Repub-
lican share of vote from preceding elections as ·dependent variable, 
suffer from a basic ambiguity. There are now four states of the World 
that Stigler is trying to represent by only one dichotomous variable; 
they are: whether or not the Republicans are incumbent at the tth 
election, and whether or not they were in power at the (t-l)th election. 
The change in the Republican share of vote will depend on which of the 
four states occurs. 
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incumbency), and the price level (measured by the consumer price index) .. 
He raises serious doubt about Kramer's findings by showing 
their sensitivity to changes in time periods covered. A shift from one 
year to a two year time base and whether certain years are included in 
the regression are also shown to affect the results. 
Stigler suggests a new forecasting model where the voter 
develops "credibility" indices for the competing parties based on past 
income experience. He then uses these indices to guide his voting 
decision. (Each index is computed by discounting the early experience 
by some discount rate and summing over the relevant period.) He finds 
no significance for the weighted average of income experience, and also 
confirms Kramer's observation about the insignificance of the unem-
ployment variable. His interpretation of his result, however, is cont-
roversial [32, 33] .. For example, his claim that the voter perceives no 
significant differences between the position of the two parties runs 
against: numerous studies [29], (33), and [8). For example, Fiorina (6) 
presents evidence that suggests "employment, wage levels and farm policy 
are Democratic issues; government spending and taxation are Republican 
issues. 11 13 
13rn M. Fiorina's study (6), we find the following Table on p.12. 
Consequence 
Employment 
Wages 
Depression 
Farm Policy 
Group References 
PRESIDENTIAL VOTE REPORTS BY SPECIFIC 
CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTION 
1952 1956 
52 27 
33 7 
38 -27 
46 
41 
1960 
57 
9 
14 
48 
52 
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One cannot help disagreeing with Stigler's reading of his own 
results. In various regression coefficients, such as those of 
price terms and the real income term (in some models), are significant, 
and even employment terms are sometimes significant. 
Arcelus and Meltzer (hereafter referred to as AM) examine the 
effect of economic conditions on both participation and vot.es in 
Congressional elections. 
On the participation decision, AM distinguishes between three 
categories of voters: the habitual voters, 14 those who vote in a 
Presidential year because of relative decrease in information cost, and 
those who are induced to participate by the impact of economic condi-
tions. The proportion of voters who participate in a given election is, 
then, given by the sum of the proportions of these categories. A 
certain proportion of the total number participating will vote Democra-
tic. Similarly, certain proportions will vote Republican or third party, 
Consequence 
PRESIDENTIAL VOTE REPORTS BY SPECIFIC 
CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTION (CONT'D) 
1952 1956 
Prices, Inflation 
Government Spending, Taxes 
4 
-70 
19 
-28 
Entries are % Democratic - % Republican 
1960 
12 
-63 
l4AM assume that voter participation fluctuates around rela-
tively stable levels although inspection of data reveals that "the major 
changes have been gradual trends, persisting over a series of elections 
rather than the abrupt shifts posited by the Arcelus and Meltzer model 
through the inclusion of dummy variables. This is a serious misspeci-
fication in the long-term model which could lead to biased estimates of 
all coefficients on the various motivation factors which induce those 
voters who are effected by economic conditions to participate." [2]. 
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such that the total partisan votes will balance the total number of 
voters participating in an election. AM conjecture that voters af f~cted 
by economic conditions may be induced to vote because they either 
perceive differences between candidates or parties on a particular issue 
or they wish to reward a party or candidate for a policy or outcome and 
encourage continuance.15 (For a more thorough exposition of their 
model, see Appendix B.) 
The major finding of AM is that "aggregate variables affect the 
participation rate in Congressional elections but have little, if any, 
effect on the relative strengths of the two major parties. There is 
very little evidence that an incumbent President can effect the compo-
sition of the Congress by measures that have short-term effects on 
unemployment or real income -- the findings support the hypothesis that 
the principal fluctuation in the percentage of votes received in Cong-
ressional elections arises from changes in the participation rate and 
not from shifts between parties. The principal effect of Presidential 
incumbency is to increase participation. Democrats are more affected by 
Presidential elections and the incumbent's party affiliation than the 
Republicans." 
15Arcelus and Meltzer offer no hypothesis as to the relative 
strengths of the three motivations in the electorate as a whole, or 
within each party advocate. In the absence of such information, their 
theoretical hypothesis does not lead to any clear predictions about the 
net effects of economic conditions on participation. In fact , this lack 
of integration extends to the theoretical underpinning of the AM model 
itself; that is, R =PB - C + D suggested by Tullock (36), where R is 
the net utility of voting, B is the value of the victory of a particular 
candidate, P is the probability that the voter affects the outcome, C is 
cost of voting, and D the utility of other factors affecting voting. 
AM do not discuss in detail the relationship between the factors in this 
model and their subsequent modeling of participation. 
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AM's modeling of the two parties' vote is, however, unsatis-
factory. The categorization of partisan vote into a proportion of 
habitual voters, a proportion of those affected by economic conditions 
(modified by incumbency), and proportion of the extra turnout in 
Presidential elections are not mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive. Certainly, an important category is missing, the group of 
voters which Kramer and Goodman called "shift" voters who regularly vote, 
but switch from one party to the other in response to economic or other 
issues. The omission of this category is particularly surprising, 
given that the objective of the exercise is to establish the existence 
of this group. Kramer [2] adds a fourth block of voters to AM's model 
to account for the shift voters. He establishes that the shift effect 
is not identified in AM's model. 
Moreover, AM's treatment of the various fractions of voters as 
being invariant with time seems at least dubious given the extended 
length of the study. The affect of time on information cost, shifts in 
demographic structure and the changing base of commodity production will 
undoubtedly affect these proportions. 
On the whole, the AM results leave a great deal of ambiguity 
about the nature and magnitude of the possible effects of economic 
variables on turnout and election outcomes. 
2.4 Survey Data Studies, the 
Micro-Approach 
In all of these papers, aggregation causes an interpretive 
problem. A fundamental question remains to be answered. "What is the 
linkage between the individual's response to his own financial fortune 
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and his response to the overall changes in the economy?l6 Some studies 
point out the possibility of the voter being optimistic about his own 
well-being while remaining pessimistic about the general conditions of 
the economy [37]. The presentation of the previous papers, as has been 
shown, suffer from a number of logical and methodological shortcomings. 
Moreover, the results seem, on the whole, inconclusive. 
M. Fiorina seeks firmer evidence by examining the effect of the 
individual's perception of his economic well-being on his voting 
decision (6). Using data from 1952-1970 .SRC election studies, he 
examines a number of related issues:l7 
16some attempt to provide such bases can be found in Ray C. Fair 
"The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for the President." [44]. 
where 
where 
17Fiorina used the following model: 
Y = a +b(P) + c(PE) + E 
Y 1 if respondent voted Republican 
= 0 othen1ise 
P1 1 if the respondent is Independent 
= 0 otherwise 
P 2 1 if respondent is Republican, 0 otherwise 
while (PE)/= [(PE)
1
,(PE) 2 , ... ,(PE) 6J are interaction terms of party 
identification and economic conditions. For example 
and 
(PE)
1 
= 1 if the respondent is Democrat and he perceived 
no change in his economic lot 
(PE) 2 
0 otherwise 
1 if the respondent is Democrat and perceived an 
improvement in his economic condition 
0 othen,,,rise. 
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1) Do the American people perceive party differences on issues 
of economic policy? 
2) If so, what is the substance of those perceptions? 
3) Are those perceptions associated with variations in voting 
behavior? 
On the first question, Fiorina satisfies himself in the affir-
mative; on the second, he finds some evidence that "employment, wage 
levels and farm policy are Democratic issues. Government spending and 
taxation are Republican issues." Both conclusions are based on examin-
ation of statistical evidence from cross tabulation. However, on the 
third question, the verdict is, for Congressional voting, that the 
findings are positive until 1960 and negative thereafter. 
Fiorina's interpretation of his results are not based on firm 
ground due to the omission of important factors from the model. This 
alone could lead, under certain conditions, to misspecification and 
to erroneous readings of the significance of coefficients. 
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Appendix A 
Kramer's Model 
Kramer's dual model [l): 
ye x B + U for mid-term elections t t t (1) 
and 
yP x B + U +v t t t t (2) 
ye 
= x B + U + yv t t t t 
he assumes the same Bin (2) and (3), which leads to the conclusion that 
the expected share of the vote for the presidential candidate (X B) is 
t 
the same as the expected vote for the Congressional candidates of the 
party. Such assumption is not substantiated by observations. The over-
whelming victory of a Republican president in the 1972 election also 
witnessed the election of a strongly Democratic Congress. Moreover, if 
we examine the basic model of Kramer, 
yP = v + o Ca P+ Blp L1 ) + u + vt 
t t t t 
(3) 
Ytc = v + o Ca ~ B1c L1 ) + u + yv t t t t C4) 
where ( 0 ) is the incumbency advantage coefficient, we see that the t 
assumption of equal B's in C2) and (3) implies that 
ac = ap and Bc = BP 
1 1 
This imnlies the unreasonable results that: 
a) the incumbency advantage has the same effect in the Presi-
dential and Congressional elections. 
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b) Voters hold Congressmen to the same degree of "acccount-
ability" as the occupant of the White House for the coun-
ry's economic conditions. 
Although these assumptions were vital for the procedure of 
the estimation adopted by Kramer (see Kramer's treatment in his appen-
dix), they are unnecessarily restrictive. To cope with the difficulty 
of the coattail variable, it is only necessary to reformulate the model 
as follows: 
c y x B + ku in Presidential elections t t t 
c y x B + u t t t 
otherwise. 
A two-step GLS Theil procedure could then be used to estimate the 
model. [43] 
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Appendix B 
Arcelus and Heltzer's Model 
A) On the decision to participate, Arcelus and Meltzer distin-
guish between three categories of voters. 
1) The Habitual Voter. Two major changes effect the proportion 
of habitual voters (H ) during the period of study: ex tension of suf-
t 
frage to women in 1920 and the "big" realignment of the 1932's. Thus, 
where 
X20 1 if t > 1920 
= 0 otherwis e 
X32 1 if t > 1932 
0 otherwise 
and v0 is the fraction of strictly "habitual" voters prior to 1920 . 
2) Those who vote in a Presidential election year because of 
the relative decrease in information cost. If we denote the incremental 
percentage of those voters by N , then 
lt 
where 
Nlt v PR + 6v1 (RI )(PR)+ e 2 1 t t t t 
PRt 1 if t is a Presidential Election year 
0 otherwise 
Rlt 1 if incumbent is a Republican 
0 othen11ise . 
96 
Thus, the second term is an interaction term of incumbency and type of 
election. 
3) Those who are induced to participate by the impact of 
economic conditions . 
. 
where P, U, C/P are percentage changes in consumer prices, the unem-
ployment rate and real compensation per man hour. 
Thus, the percentage of voters participating in a Congressional 
election VP is given by 
t 
where 
. 
aE = a P + a U + a (C) Jt t t p t 
B) The choice of party candidate. If VD = D 
t t 
VP is the 
t 
proportion of those elegible to register who vote for the Democratic 
candidate in election year t and similarly (VR) for Republican and 
t 
third party vote (VT)t, then 
VP = VD + VR + VT 
t t t t 
and 
. 
(6d2) p RI + d3U RI + d4 (c) RI + eD t t t t p t t t 
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Notice the inclusion of interaction terms between incumbency 
and economic variables, which makes this model more saturated than 
the previous ones. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ON THE RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: A SIMULTANEOUS 
EQUATION MODEL APPROACH 
3. 1 Introduction 
The various models developed by investigators to explain 
political choice have stressed either objective or "materialistic" 
factors, such as campaign expenditures or economic conditions [1] [6), 
or have stressed subjective or "nonmaterialistic" factors, such as 
salience of the candidates, party identification and some aspects of 
incumbency [8] . 
In a society where achievement and success are largely attri-
buted to hard work and rational effort and where political. structure 
results in political "education" which stresses the government respon-
sibility and ability to influence the economic well-being of the 
country, it is hard to reject, a priori, the argument of the various 
investigators mentioned in Chapter 2. These arguments rationalized and 
presented some evidence as to the effect of the performance of the 
government in the economic arena on the voting decision, whether it is 
on the individual's level or on the level of the electorate as a whole. 
All things being equal, one would expect that a voter will choose to 
give his vote to the person whom he can recall by name in the voting 
booth rather than to a complete unknown. The catch words used here are 
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"all things being equal"; the fact is that things are not equal as far 
as the individual is concerned. The question then becomes; "Under what 
conditions is the salience of the candidate transforms into a positive 
or negative vote?" 
Incumbency, on the other hand, has enjoyed a more celebrated 
place in the literature of voting than salience (see Chapter 2). It has 
been hypothesized that incumbency is used to bribe certain effective 
sections of the electorate through pet projects, etc., or to buy salience 
through the acquisition and expenditure of campaign resources. It can 
also have a certain magic which expresses itself through the saying, 
"The devil we know is better than the devil we don't." The real world 
is not polarized into objective and subjective elements; there is a 
dialectical unity in the world which underlies socio-political phenomena. 
To e xplain the effect of the subjective elements, we have to look for 
the underlying objective factors, and vice versa. Models which capture 
this essence of the real world are the only models which answer such 
questions as; "How do these factors influence this phenomenon?", rather 
than, "What factors are involved?" 
This paper examines the responsiveness of the participation and 
voting decisions of the voter to the performance of the incumbent 
president. This examination is conducted within a framework of the 
political phenomenon of simultaneity. Previous studies which were based 
on a single-equation estimation procedure suffer from conceptual as well 
as methodological shortcomings. A unification of the "objective" and 
"subjective" approaches in one framework will ascertain their effect on 
the individual's dual decisions on pa rticipation and voting. The 
100 
emphasis, however, will be on the effect of economic conditions on 
turnout and on the electoral fortunes of the President's party in 
Congressional elections. Earlier studies by Kramer [l], [2], Stigler 
[3) and Arcelus and Metzler [4] use models in which the dependent 
variable is the parties' aggregate Congressional votes. Various 
macroeconomic indicators of performance such as inflation, employment 
and income serve as explanatory variables. 
The contradictory findings and the numerous methodological and 
logical errors prompted M. Fiorina to seek confirmation of the 
phenomena at the individual voter's level [6]. Using SRC (1952-1974) 
data, he establishes that "a citizen's personal economic condition 
affects his Presidential vote, but for Congressional voting the findings 
are positive until 1960 and negative thereafter." He also observes that 
there is "no systematic relationship between a citizen's personal 
econo:::i.ic condition and his decision to vote or abstain." 
The above mentioned models are single-equation formulations 
which ignore important determinants of voting behavior, making it sub-
ject to simultaneity as well as misspecification bias. This obser-
vation covers not only this study, but almost all studies in the field 
of voting. We could hardly stress the importance of simultaneity not 
only in the voting decision, but also in all political phenomena. On 
this, B. Page [38) writes, "Single or recursive equation models suffer 
from simultaneity bias, yet simultaneous equation models are exceed-
ingly difficult to specify in a plausible fashion." What is surprising, 
though, is that little effort has been expended to locate those aspects 
of the problem where a simultaneous equation model can be formulated, 
101 
and where some exogenous variables can be excluded from some equations 
on a sound theoretical basis, thereby facilitating identification and 
estimation of the model. In the particular setting of economic retro-
spective voting, there is also the possibility that economic factors, or 
for that matter, any other factor may operate directly and indirectly 
through some specific variable on the dual decision of participation 
and voting for the presidential party. 
In general, the task is to take into consideration various 
simultaneity effects in order to answer a number of related questions. 
1) What are the relative effects of objective factors, such 
as the individual's perception of his own economic well-
being on both his decision to participate and his voting 
decision as opposed to informational factors , such as 
incumbency or saliency of the candidate? 
2) What are the underlying influences behind informational 
factors? Are there objective factors driving individuals 
to seek information about the candidates? What are the 
secondary channels through which an informational factor 
may also exert its influence? 
3) How do the effects of these variables vary over time? How 
do they vary between off-year and on-year Congressional 
elections? 
4) What are the overall effects of inctrmbency? 
In this paper a preliminary investigation of SRC (1952-1970) 
data is conducted to suggest the relevancy of various variables to the 
individual's dual decisions in participation and voting. Some testable 
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hypotheses will be developed. A simultaneous equation model will then 
be formulated. Simultaneity is captured through the assumption that 
incumbency as well as economic conditions directly affect the voting 
decision, as well as the assumption that it is indirectly affected by 
the awareness of the Presidential party candidate. It will be estab-
lished that there is no significant effect of economic conditions on the 
individual voter's decisions for all Congressional elections covered by 
the survey and for the pooled data. Other variables such as awareness 
of the President's party candidate and incumbency will show more signi-
ficance in off-year elections than in on-year elections. 
3.2 Preliminary Investigation 
of the Data 
The task of this section is to probe the available data using 
simple statistical techniques to investigate the relevancy to the indi-
vidual's voting decisions of various variables which are considered a 
priori as being relevant. 1 Also, the interaction between these 
variables will be examined. These findings will be used as motivation 
for the simultaneous equations model. Various indices are extracted from 
the raw data in the SRC surveys (1956-1970). These indices will then be 
used to make some tentative hypotheses and observations. 
Three categories of party affiliations are considered: 
1This is a common procedure in political science, but discussion 
of relevancy should be based on theoretical ground, not statistical 
ground. However, these cross tabulation techniques, in certain circum-
stances, are sufficient to prove some points without going to elaborate 
regression models. 
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Democratic, Independent and Republican. 2 Also, three categories of 
respondents to the question regarding their perception of changes in 
economic conditions are considered: those who perceived "better" 
conditions, those who perceived the "same" conditions, and those who 
perceived "worse" conditions. For this purpose, use was made of the 
following question in the SRC survey. "During the last few years, has 
your financial situation been getting better, getting worse, or has it 
stayed the same?" 
For the salience variable, use was made of a question in the SRC 
survey which asked the respondent to name the candidates for the House 
in his district. If the respondent could name the candidate, he was 
considered to be aware of him; otherwise not. The limitation of the 
data is mainly due to the availability of recognition data only 
for 1958, 1964, 1966, 1968, and 1970 elections . 
The r esults are mainly reported in the appendix, and the tables 
are suitably labeled as such by appending the letter A to the number 
of the table to distinguish it from the summary tables in the main text. 
Since it will be necessary to make some observation regarding the rela-
tive effect of certain variables over time, the tables show the differ-
ential values of these variables rather than their absolute values. For 
example, if a test is to be made that recognition of _the incumbent (Inc.) 
is increasing over time relative to that of the challenger, then 
2For the purpose of inference from pooled runs, it would have 
been better to code the PID variables as follows: 
PID = 1 if respondent belongs to the president's party 
= 0 otherwise 
However, we opted for the three·-way categorization D, R, and I to 
facilitate comparison with other works. 
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the relevant variable to observe over time is the differential recog-
nition of the incumbent. That is (the percent recognizing the incum-
bent minus the percent recognizing the challenger). This has simpli-
fied the form and inference from the summary tables. The interest will 
be in the number of entries in the original table with positive or ne-
gative sign, the magnitude of the entries (how much positive or negative 
are they?) and the number of cases which show increasing (~) or de-
creasing (~) entries over time. 
3.3 On Turnout and Economic Conditions 
The question is whether the inference from the data support AM's 
contention that the main effect of the individual's perception of his 
well-being falls on his decision to participate. We can postulate two 
hypotheses in this regard. 
a) The Apathy Hypothesis (A). This states that the probability 
of abstaining increases with betterment in the voter's 
economic conditions. Thus, it can be expected that a higher 
proportion of those in the "better" response category will 
be non-voters . . 
b) The Protest Hypothesis (R). This states that the proba-
bility of abstention increases with the worsening of the 
individual's economic condition. Thus, it can be expected 
that a higher proportion of those in the "worse" response 
category will be non-voters. 
Let PB be the proportion of abstention in the group who per-
ceived betterment in their conditions and PW be the proportion of 
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abstention in the group who perceived worsening in their conditions. 
The weakest criterion to test the Apathy (A) hypothesis requires that 
p 
B > PW, 3 while for the support of the protest (R) hypothesis that 
> p B. To test the two hypotheses, the proportions of different 
party affiliates (PID), in various economic response categories, who 
abstained are calculated in Table IA. For example, in 1956, 29 . 2 
percent of the Democrats who perceived improvement in their economic 
conditions abstained. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the results. It is 
concluded that the protest hypothesis claims 75 percent of the cases for 
the Democrats, while the two hypotheses have equal strength in the case 
of the Republicans and Independents. As is clear from Table 1, no 
general conclusion can be drawn as to the relative strength of the var-
ious hypotheses except that the protest hypothesis seems to be strongest 
in the case of Democrats. 
Table 1: Percent of Total Cases in 
Support of Either Hypothesis A or R 
Total number (n) of cases for each PID category 8 
Table 2 shows for different PID' s the average proportion of 
non-voters during on-year and off-year elections. The table presents 
3rt is a weak criterion, because it does not insist on "complete" 
monotonicity, i. e ., PB 2: PS .'.::'. P, , where p is the proportion of non-
vot • th II fl . \,\f S er in e same econoI!llc response category. 
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evidence that mid-term Congressional elections have a higher total 
proportion of non-voters compared to on-year elections. For example, 
the average percentage of non-voters among the Democrats during mid-term 
elections is 47 percent compared to 30 percent during on-year elections. 
Thus, if we accept AH' s contention that economic conditions mainly 
affect participation, the result may imply that the economic-condition4 
effect is relatively stronger in mid-term than in on-year elections. 
However, the lower turnout in off-year elections may be simply ex-
plained by the absence of the presidential race. 
Table 2: Percent of Non-Voters 
r----- -----T-
~-- -! _ o"::y~ar ~ff-year 
i Dem. i 30 % i 4 7 % L~_;t ___  l___ _ . _I~ ____ J ___ ~~_J 
n=4 n=4 
Table lA provides, also, some evidence of increasing non-parti-
cipation over time. This is true for all economic response categories 
in all party affiliations. 
3.4 On Voting Decisions 
The Effect of Economic Conditions 
First, we seek some confirmation for the intuitive notion of a 
positive effect of economic conditions on the voting decisions. The 
effect of various other variables will then be ~nvestigated 
lather explanations for this observation may be advanced. For 
example, the voter may simply believe that his vote matters less in mid-
term than on-year elections; or, that information cost is higher in mid-
term than on-year elections, due to the lower level of publicity of the 
former compared with the latter. 
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for different economic response categories, con·trcn .. .:LL1.?,··for: the 
presidential party's candidate and party affiliation (Table 2A). If 
the intuitive notion about the phenomena is correct, it is expected 
that a higher proportion of those who are in the "better" response 
category will vote for the candidates of the presidential party. 
Define P as the proportion of voters who favor the candidate of 
better 
the presidential party among those in the "better" response category; 
P and P are defined analogously. The weakest test of the 
same worse 
model is whether P > p , i.e., examining the two polar 
better - worse 
cases only. 
Table 3 summarizes the evidence by showing the percentage of 
cases which support the hypothesis. For all party affiliates, the 
hypothesis passes the test with the support of more than 70% of the 
cases. The Republicans present the strongest support for the notion 
that the individual's perception of his well-being has a positive effect 
on his voting decision. In fact, only 1966 deviates from the general 
trend in this case. 
Table 3: Percentage of Cases Which Support the Hypothesis 
Democrats Republicans Independents 
75% 87.5% 62.5% 
Total no. of cases for each PID category 8 
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The Effeet of Incumbency 
Kramer claimed that incumbency has no signi;f icant effect on 
voting once the effect of economic conditions is taken into account. 
Table 3A shows the incremental proportion in the presidential party 
candidates vote as a result of the incumbency of its candidates 
Thus, the more positive are the entries in the table, the firmer 
is the inference regarding the covariation of incumbency and vote. 
Except for 1960 elections, entries are overwhelmingly positive 
(more than 80 percent of the 63 cases), indicating that incumbency 
affects the vote for candidates of the presidential party. The effect 
is especially strong in the latter parts of the period. Table 4 sum-
marizes Table 3A. Consider that the first period includes 1956, 1958, 
and 1960; the second period 1964, 1966, 1968, and 1970. 
Table !1: Proportion of Party Vote Due to Incumbency, 
Controlling for Presidential Party and Economic Conditions 
Democrat 
Republican 
Independent 
Source; See Table 3A. 
Average of Entries 
in56, 58,60 ·· 
20 .12 
22.64 
-13.1 
. - · -------
Average of Entries 
in 64, 66, 68, 70 
66.51 
50 .56 
59. 77 
~ ~ ... ._ 
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Table 4 provides some evidence to support the contention of 
increasing incumbency effect over time on the presidential party 
candidate's vote in congressional elections for all party identification 
categories. There is, also, some evidence that the effect of incumbency 
is strongest among the Democrats during the early part of the period 
while it is strongest among the Independents during the latter part of 
the period. 
The Effect of Candidate Salience 
Since Stokes and Miller's classic paper .[20], in which they 
conclude that candidate salience has a positive effect on his vote, no 
one has challenged this proposition, except perhaps Ferejohn [~. Thus, 
it is necessary to probe a bit further into the effect of candidate's 
salience on voting. Table 4A shows the differential -vote of the 
presidential party candidate as a result of his recognition by the 
voter, controlling for PID and economic response categories. For 
example, during the 1958 election, of the Democrats (who perceive an 
improvement in their conditions and vote for the presidential party), 
the difference between those who know the incumbent and those who know 
the challenger is 17.1 percent of the electorate. The more positive 
are the entries of Table 4A, the firmer is the inference regarding the 
effect of salience on vote. The following observations can be made from 
the summary Table 5. 
1) All entries are decidedly positive and reasonably large, 
indicating a possible favorable effect of salience on voting. The 
evidence on incr.easing effect of saliency over time is also 
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conclusive. 66 percent of cases support this observation. 
2) No firm general observation can be made regarding differ-
ential impact of saliency on different categories of economic conditions 
and party identification. For example, it cannot be said of the people 
who vote for the presidential party candidates and perceive betterment 
in their lot that the Democrats are more likely to recognize those 
candidates. 
For the moment, at least, it can be said that salience of the 
candidates is positively related to the voting decision of the indivi-
dual. 
Table 5: Differential Salience of the Presidential Party Candidate 
%-p-~-~iri·;;---1·~~-f~;r~z;;;;--·l 
entries in increa~ing 
-·,··---- • - · . . --·-· T~~]3 _ _i~-·"·~-ov~r_!i1:1!. _ _ .____ J 
Dif~erential j i 
Salience of 87 1 56 ! 
~:~t~r~:!~~~~~:l n = 45 I n = 45 l 
L-.. ----,.- -.. ~-~--- -~-~~,,,__-...... -.;---t~'Ql ...... ... ,--.... ~~ -
(Summary of the Data in Table 4A) 
Economic Conditions and Salience of 
the Presidential Party Candidate 
, 
It can be postulated for this relationship a variant of the 
negative voting hypothesis: "The Avenger Model." In this model, the 
individual voter is most likely to incur the cost of information by 
seeking the presidential party candidate's name if he is hurt econom-
ically by the latter's policies. 
Table SA tests the model by showing the covariation of the 
perception of economic conditions and salience for Republicans, 
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controlling for incumbency. Specifically, it shows the salience of 
the presidential party in different economic response categories, 
controlling for incumbency. Table SB shows the same effect on the 
challenger's party candidate. 
For example, in 1958 there are 87.5 percent Republicans in the 
"better" category who recognize the presidential party candidate. The 
weakest test of the model requires that Pb < P for salience 
etter - worse 
of the presidential party. The evidence in this table seems to indicate 
some covariation between salience of candidates and economic perception. 
Moreover, the support for the Avenger model is high, as 70 percent of 
the cases are in favor of it. 
Salience of the Presidential Party 
Candidate and Incumbency 
Several authors claim that salience varies positively with 
incumbency [11), [6). To demonstrate the strong relationship between 
the salience of the presidential party candidate and incumbency, the 
differential of those who live in areas with an incumbent who belongs to 
the challenger party is calculated in Table 6A (controlling for economic 
responses and PIDs). For example, the table shows that in 1964, the 
proportion of the Democrats who recognize the presidential party can-
didate (in the "better" response category) and reside in areas with in-
cumbents belonging to the presidential party, exceed that of those with 
similar characteristics who reside in areas with incumbents belonging to 
the challenger party. The larger the differential (the entries in Table 
6A), the stronger is the inference regarding the effect of incumbency on 
the salience of the presidential party candidate. Table 6 summarizes 
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the observations made from Table 6A. 
Table 6: Differential Salience of the Presidential Party 
Candidate Due to Incumbency 
I % Positive Entries I % Entries Greater than 80% differential 
Democrat 100 I 80 n 15 i Republication I 100 I 
50 n = 15 
Independent I 100 80 n 15 
The data seem to indicate a stronger effect of incumbency on 
salience for the partisans than that for the Independents. 
Also, if the 1958 and 1964 elections are considered as a first period, 
and 1966, 1968 and 1970 as the second period, then .only four out of 
nine cases indicate increasing effect over time. 
3.5 The Model and Estimation Procedure 
The information in the previous tables is certainly suggestive, 
but firm conclusions have to await further evidence which takes care of 
the simultaneity effect on one hand and insures the proper control of 
all relevant variables in the problem on the other. The evidence in the 
data provides a reasonable basis to establish the relevancy of the 
various factors to the individual voting decision. For example, it is 
shown, given the limitations of the data and the tabulation technique, 
that salience of candidates, incumbency, and to a lesser degree the 
individual's perception of his economic lot, are related to the voting 
decision. Moreover, it is shown that incumbency and economic perception 
are related to the salience of the candidate. 
On participation, there is some support for the claim that the 
individual's perception of how well he has been faring economically is 
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related to his decision to participate or abstain. It remains to form-
ulate a model that captures the most critical relevant variables on 
one hand and takes into consideration the simultaneous nature of 
political phenomena on the other. The definitions of the variables in 
the model should facilitate the analysis of participation as well as 
voting decisions by using the same data base, whether for individual 
elections or in pooled form for all elections without redefining the 
variables. This kind of formulation will improve on the specification 
of previous models and reduce possible simultaneity bias. It will also 
exposit the primary and secondary influences of various variables on 
the individual's dual decision on participation and voting. A 
simultaneous two equations model is formulated. The first equation has 
the vote for presidential party candidates (or participation) as the 
dependent variable and the salience of the presidential party candidate, 
perception of economic conditions, incumbency, and party affiliation 
as explanatory variables. The second equation has the salience of the 
presidential party candidate as the dependent variable and incumbency, 
perception of economic conditions, education, and party identification 
as explanatory variables. A better specified model may be achieved by 
adding other variables, such as campaign expenditures and duration of 
incumbency in both equations. It may even be desirable to add a third 
equation for incumbency. While such modifications may affect some of 
the results obtained in this paper, it is proper to point out that the 
specification in this paper is dictated by both theoretical and practi-
cla considerations posed by the limitation of the data. 
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The Model 5 
where: 
1 if 'V F + b 3 P + b4 11 + E: l > 0 
(1) 
o;l + bl Rl + b2 y 
0 otherwise 
R 1 if 'kl == a2 + cl F + c 2 P + c 3 11 + c4 E + E:. ) > K (2) 
0 otherwise 
y is either the participation variable or the voting variable; 
that is, y == 1 if participating6 (or voting for the presidential 
5Another model with interactive terms between party ID and 
economic variables was formulated as follows: 
y == 1 if al + blp + b2 11 + b3 (DB) + b4' (DW) + bs (RB) + 
b6 (PW) + b7 (IBl) + b8 (IW) + b9 R1 + s 1 > 0 
0 otherwise 
'\, 
R 1 if R .. = a + cl P + c2 rl + c3 E + c4 (DB) + cs (DW) + 1 I 2 J.. 
c6 (RB) + c_ (RW) + c8 (IB) + c 9 (IW) + E: > K I 2 -
0 otherwise 
where Y 1, P, I, R and E are defined as in the original model. 
DB == 1 if the respondent is a Democrat who perceives a better-
ment of his economic condition 
= 0 otherwise 
DW 1 if the respondent is a Democrat who perceives a worsening 
of his economic condition. 
The other interaction terms for Republicans RB, RW and for Independents 
IB and IW are analogously defined. The results of this model are sub-
stantially the same as were obtained from the original model and are 
reported in Chapter 4. [45). 
f>:For a different focus, see Campbell, et al, "Voting and Turn-
out" [40] or S. Verba, Participa tion in_ America [42), where the emphasis 
is on factors tha t determine the psychological involvement of the indi-
vidual in politics. 
party candidate) 
0 otherwise. 
ll5 
R1 is the salience of the presidential party candidate where 
R
1 
1 if recogriize the presidential party candidate 
= 0 otherwise. 
F is the economic conditions variable 
F' = Fl 
F2 
F3 
where: 
1 if the response if "better" 
0 otherwise 
1 if the response if "same" 
0 otherwise 
1 if the response is "worse" 
0 otherwise. 
p is the party identification variable 
P' = pl 
p2 
p3 
where: 
pl 1 if the respondent is Democrat 
0 otherwise 
p2 1 if the respondent is Republican 
0 otherwise 
p3 1 if Independent 
0 otherwise. 
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I is the incumbency variable 
r 1 1 if the presidential party candida te is incumbent 
0 otherwise. 
E is the education variable 
E 1 if the respondent has college degree 
0 otherwise. 
Note that in every variable, one category is not included in the 
actual regression model to avoid singularity and over-identification. 
Also, the definitions of the dependent and independent variables facil-
itate pooling of data from several elections to nail down the effect of 
some crucial variables. As indicated, the data used are SRC (1956-1970) 
election data. 
Although the salience variable, R, is observa.ble as dichoto-
mous, it will be ass umed that R reflects an underlying continuous 
'V 
salience variable R with a threshold level of k such that 
'v > R k c=> R 1 
'V 
R < k => R 0 . (3) 
This assumption justifies the use of a two-step estimation procedure. 
Equations (2) and (3) define a standard probit model; coefficients of 
(2) can be estimated by maximum likelihood procedure. These estimated 
'V 
coefficients are used to construct R, which can be used as an instru-
ment to replace R in (1). The rest of the estimation procedure proceeds 
analagously to the two-stage least square [47]. 
The two-stage probit technique is used in estimating the model 
for individual elections and for pooled runs. All tests of significance 
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are conducted at 5 percent level of confidence.7 
The Salience Equation 
Table 7 shows the result of the first step of the procedure: 
the regression of the salience of the presidential party candidate. 
Note that c 1 is the coefficient of the "better" element of the vector 
of economic condition F, similarly ci is the coefficient of "worse" and 
c2 is the coefficient of the Democrat , while cz is the coefficient of 
the Republican element of the vector of party identification P. From 
these tables we can draw the following conclusions. 
1) Economic conditions have no significant ef fe c t upon 
salience of the presidential party candidate. Moreover, even the sign 
patterns are not consistent with a priori notions. The coefficients of 
the "better" and "worse" variables are overwhelmingly negative (more 
than 75 percent of the cases are negative), which does not support 
either a negative or positive hypothesis regarding the effect of eco-
nomic conditions on the salience of the presidential party candidate, 
even on considerations of sign alone. 
2) Education and incumbency are both very significant in 
determining the saliency of both candidates. All signs are positive 
except for the case of 1964 where the coefficient of incumbency is also 
insignificant. 
7The consistency of the estimates of the coefficients in this 
procedure has been established by Takeshi Amemiya [46). However, he 
also established that the estimates of the standard errors in the second 
stage are not consistent. This makes the distribution of the ratio of 
the estimate to the standard error in probit, not exactly t. This 
effect has to be considered when interpreting the results in this 
chapter. The significance test will be supplemented with a likelihood 
ratio test whenever two or more variables are examined at the same time. 
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3) Party identification has no effect on the salience of the 
presidential party candidate during off-year elections. For on-year 
elections, it was only significant during the 1964 election. This 
finding is contrary to the hypothesis that one is more likely to know 
the presidential party candidate if the latter belongs to the same party. 
The Voting Equation 
Table 8 shows the result of the probit estimation of the voting 
regression equation (1) using the computed values of the salience 
variables from equation (2). Several comments can be made. 
1) Economic perception has no significance or even sign sta-
bility on voting decisions. That is, the finding supports rejection of 
either a positive or negative hypothesis about the effect of the 
perception of economic conditions on the probability of voting for the 
presidential party candidate. A likelihood ratio test confirms this 
conclusion. 
2) Recognition of the presidential party candidate has a more 
significant effect on voting decisions during mid-term Congressional 
elections than in on-year Congressional elections. However, when data 
are pooled for on-year elections, the coefficient of salience is unambi-
guously significant and positive. This finding is solid, considering 
the degrees of freedom attained by pooling the data. 
3) The effect of incumbency is again more pronounced in off-
year elections than in on-year elections (although for the latter there 
are only two cases -- that of 1964 and 1968 -- perhaps not enough to 
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Table 7: Salicnc~ of Presidential Party Candidate 
Equation 2 
·----- --------
' I ' ~ 
1 c j c 1 c 2 c 2 c~ c 4 
-r---1- ---
1
; r,.-
: S · E I S E S E S -
a2 .i· Be~ ~er ' Worse , Dem. ! Rep. I~ c. I Ed. 
S.E. S.E. S.E. i . . i . . 1' •.. I .t.. 
I i I ------~-_-o-.-5-*~--o-.-1-~--0-. . 009 Li--0-.-0-9-~1 .---o-.o-4~-~~i-o-.-4~ o.34* 58 _ _ L __ _ 
--- i i : 
0.14 0.09 0.09 I 0.14 I 0.15 0.07 I .09 
1
1 I I '1 . 2:3 ~·, 
64 
66 
68 
I 0.5* I 0.6lf* I -0.07 I 
-0.15 .......LI' -0.~~ 1~7T ~09-· 
I I 
-0.08 -0.4* -0.04 
0.16 0.08 0.11 
i 
-0. 7* ' -0 14 
- _l _· J -0.06 0.5* o.o9 I 0.22 o.2v=1 ____ __ l_ --· _l_ I 
0.14 0.09 ~ 0.1 0.09 i 0.09 I 0.12 I 0.14 I 
y-------·-+-----1- I I 
1 __ -~ -0.0_9 ~o~~ -~ ~6 _j __ 0.22 i 
I 
j 
0.4* i 0.27* 
___ , ___ _ 
0.14 0.09 0.1 0.07 I 0.08 
I 
0.13 I ~~4 _._,I 
-------·--r---~-------~----+-----+-----+-----+------1 
_a·: 1_ ::_02 I 
70 
-0.7* -0.15 
- - - - -i-- · 
0.11 0.09 
0.003 
0.09 I 0.11 0 .12 t 
0.43* i 
I 
-r 
0.08 I 0.08 
0.63* 
58 & 66 
-0.05 
! 
0.3*! 0.5* 0.08 0.1 -0.6* -0.08 
...__ - -
- · - · -
___ L __ _ 
70 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.041 0.05 
- - --- - - - I 
*Significant at .05 level 
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support such a strong judgment). However, the model suggests a signif-
icant effect of incumbency in off-year Congressional elections. 8 
Again, when data from on-year elections are pooled, incumbency 
becomes clearly significant. This is perhaps not surprising, and it has 
been pointed out by a number of scholars [6], [8). These results show 
that both incumbency and salience of the candidate have strong, signif-
icant, and independent effects. 
On Turnout 
In this context, equation 1 is reinterpreted as a participation 
equation. The dependent vari able is a dichotomous variable (y) 
which equals one if the individual participates and zero if he abstains. 
The two-stage probit estimation procedure is repeated with the regres-
sion of equation (2) first, then equation (1) using the computed values 
of the recognition variable from (1). 
Table 9 shows the result of the second step of the procedure. 
Examination of this table does not support AM's hypothesis on the effect 
of economic conditions on turnout. Except for the 1958 elections, 
economic conditions fail to show significant effect on turnout. This 
may lead to the conclusion that economic conditions have some effect on 
turnout in the early part of the period examined. There are, however, 
some sign anomalies which cast doubt on this conclusion. For example, 
there is a negative significant coefficient for the "better" variable 
in the 1958 case. 
Brn reference to the observation made in footnote 7, it is 
reassuring to note the absence of sign anomalies in these coefficients. 
58 
64 
66 
68 
70 
64 & 68 
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Table 8: Vote for Presidential Party Candidate 
Equation 1 
CL b_ b_ b~ b3 b~ b4 I 
.l J. L L 3 
Const. Inc. Better Horse Dem. Rep. Salience 
·-- - -
- -
~ 
- - - - ~ ~ ·-- - - -
S.E. S.E. S.E. S.E. S.E. S.E. S.E. I 
I 
I 
-0.2 2.0* -0.01 -0.07 -1.0* 0.98* -0.31 I 
-- -- -- -- --- - - . - -
0.11 0.13 0.18 0.17 0.16 
l 1: 
-0.43* l 0.15 ~ 
--t-1 
0.2 i o.33 I 
o.os -0.02 l 0.18 I 0.17 
- - -- - ' ---- - -- -· 
0.08 
0.16 * 
0.22 0.27 0.08 I 
i 
-0.88* ! 0.45* -0.01 
! 
o. 7>'< -0.4>'< 0.35* j 
I i 
---- - -1 - >-- - -~ ----1 -
0.2 i 0.2 0.1 0.13 0.16 0.1 I 
O.S8* 0.51 -0.009 -0.15 0.62* -0.64* 0.12 I 
-- -- _.._ - -- - - - - - -- - - - - --- - -·· ·-
0.2 0.34 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.17 I I 
- -- ·· --1 
I 
-0.94* 0.56* 0.07 -0.02 -0.55* 0.89* _o.,,._
1 
--
-'--
- -- - ·- --
-- - . -
-· -
-
0.16 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.13 o.~ 
-0.5* 0.47* 0.06 -0.08 0.55* -0 .681< 0.21"' 
I 
---- -
-· --- -- - '--- --- - -- - -
- --0~3r 0.12 0.15 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.06 
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The most interesting observation is the significant, negative 
.effect of incumbency on turnout in comparision with a strongly positive 
influence of salience of the candidate. That is, incumbency increases 
the probability of the presidential party's candidate being known to the 
voter (i.e., increases his salience, which in turn affects positively 
the probability of turnout and his chances of receiving the vote), but 
the direct effect of incumbency on turnout is in the opposite direction. 
(See Figure 1) 
Figure l 
Thus, the boosting of the salience of the presid en tial party candidate 
by incumbency works in the opposite direction to its direct effect on 
turnout. Is there any "apathy" theory lurking in the background? 
Could the individual voter reason for himself that the incumbent is 
unbeatab le and therefore there is no efficacy for his vote? 
The answer could be yes, if the profile of the non-voter is 
postulated to be the same as that which emerges from Campbell et al. 
study [35]. 
"The non-voter tends to be a person of lower involvement whose 
emotion.al investment in politics and its partisan decisions is 
on the average much less than that of the voter. As a result, 
we would expect the non-voter to be less stable in his part isan 
inclinations than the voter and more responsive to the massive 
political stimuli that produce shifts of popular attitude over 
time. And we have little doubt that for the non-voter a sti-
mulus of great importance in this period, as in any other, was 
the fact of who was winning elections ..•• The power of partisan 
choice to motivate turnout is contingent on the individual feeling 
that his vote may count." 
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Table 9: Turnout 
--····· ·· · -·-----;;----,-----;---.---~;---------r----,-------. 
a I cl .[ ci_ bl b2 b3 I b 4 I 
Const. I Dem. j Rep. Worse Bette~ Inc. j Rec.og. ! 
I I I ---r 
58 ~68~ I 0.14 _J_ o.29* _lo.19* 1-o=* -0.25* 1 ~-60~" I 
______ ..... \_ o. 2~~.13 I 0.13 I o.a9 . Ia.a9 0.11 0.27 
I I I ! i ~75* i -0.26--l -0.15_! a.a5 l ~·~3 -+-0.14'" I ~·~ i 
. . 0.22 ! 0.23 a.2~~_!_1_~~~---1·-- ~-~~-~4 J 
l.Q.:53* l-0.25• o.33* +o.o5_ J=o.oJ -!-0.31" I o.s~:j 
! o.1s! a.12 a.14 a.o9 j o.o9 
1 
o.o9 0.18 I 
__ 
6
_
8 
__ _,_l_o_.~~~14_ ~zo~ ~1_2_~02-_ t-_o.67* 
1
_i.3=-1 
! 0.20 I 0.13 0.16 . 0.11 I 0.09 . a.17 · 1 a.351 
64 
66 
I ! I I I !~30"' i~9* o.56"'~_o.o6 a.a.=_ 1=_0.20,., J__l.2* .I 
\ 0.14 I 0.11 a.15 1 o.a8 p.a9 I o.a9 I 0.16 I 
l----
6
-
4 
__ &_
6
_
8 
_ _.__o __ -7-9*-..... 
1
--0. 03 _ 0. 06 -0 .10 I 0. 06 -J-i. 44>'< 1. :_ · 
0.15 0.12 0.14 0.08 0.06 a.07 0.24 
----- -------- . ---- --·-------------·· 
70 
124 
In other words, the would-be non-voter: 
1) is most likely to have weak preferences, 
2) is most likely to favor the incumbent. 
If we add to this a further assumption that 
3) he is most likely to believe that the incumbent would be 
the winner, which leads him to believe that his vote is of 
low efficacy, 
then the would-be non-voter in Campbell et al. study will be a non-voter. 
Conclusion 
No significant effect of the individual's economic condition 
was found on either his voting or participation decisions. There is 
evidence to support the conunon belief that salience of the candidates 
and incumbency affect the individual's dual decision. In particular, 
incumbency affects the individual's dual decision both directly and 
indirectly through the awareness variable. The simultaneous equations 
formulation suggests that possible misspecification in AM's model 
is responsible for their results that, "The principle effect of 
incumbency is to increase participation." The direct effect of 
incumbency on participation appears to be negative, although it has a 
positive indirect effect through the salience variable. Finally, we 
find no effect of economic conditions on the awareness of the candidates 
by the indiv idual. 
125 
Table l A: Turnout 
Same 30.2 40.6 24.9 48.4 t 
Worse 31.1 52.1 24.7 44.6 38.1 53.9 t 
For Independents 
58 !--- ~~ 60 -- , - - ---5;--T - -;64·-r -6~ - - ··· - --~6-3·-·1- ;·0--- . 
. - 1 +I - 1 + +! + 
39.4 i 29_ 7·t5·5.7 , so.o , 67.3 T 62.8 , 70.8 
62.5 i 23.1 I 5o.o 35. 7 59.3 
1
• 35. 7 55.3 
t Better 30.4 
26.7 Same 
! I ! 
Worse 43.8 I 70.4 J 53.8 ! 45.0 57.9 1 64.5 I 55.2 
I ! I I I I 1' i 
63.6 
I I ! ! I 
Total% I 30.3 I 57 . 8 1 30.5 I 55.4 I 47.2 ! 63.4 I 50.9 ! 65.7 t 
non-vot~-- --'------ +- ··--· -· -··1-- - - -·· ·· · · · _ _t_ __________ L __ _____  L. _______ , ___ __ _ 
For Republicans 
---- ~-~-~-·------..,----------Ls~ L.·~~l- -6~ J . .*.6~- - 6!_f-_:~+- ~~ 
134.6112.8 1 34. 5 1 13 . 7 42.4 l 32.6 ! 37.8 t 
I 36.3 12.4 [ 3s.2 I 22.1 36. 1 2s . s 46.8 + 
" Q<S' C>o Q ! ,·~56 :oo <?o <Y,_ I 
;::.<S' ~-<.' i + Q (> I 
Better --- -! 22.0 I 
Same I 27 .2 I 
I 
I 
Worse i 19.2 I 50.5 14.3 I 34.4 1 20 .5 28.8 24. 7 37 . 9 t 
'-------'----'l'---3_8_._ o__,__1 _ 1_6_. J.24.-.8_L 1s .1 l~.7~_,._1_:2_t_ i I Total % non-voters 23.6 
*on-year elections 
n does not support either hypothesis 
+ supports "apathy" hypothesis 
- supports "protest" 
1' increasing over time 
Economic conditions and turnout, 
entries are % non-voters of 
particular party affiliation in 
various economic response cate-
gories. 
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Table 2A: Economic Conditions and the Plurality of the 
l 
I 
Better ! 
Same 
Worse 
Bette~ 
Same 
orse 
i ( 
__ __L 
BettJe 
Same 
orse 
Presidential Party Candidates . 
(Entries are the Presidential Party Plurality.) 
DEMOCRAT 
;'>56 I •58 f *60 I *62 64 ' 66 I 
-48.1 l-35.2 -58.6 44.5 50.3 I 32.8 
-58.8 -55.5 -56.8 43.4 55 . 8 
I 
36.9 
-57.9 ~-63.2 43.8 52.0 40 . 1 
INDEPENDENT 
;'(56 I *58 ;'(60 *62 
. 64+; I 
33.9 12.0 16.2 17 .1-- ---;2 ' 8. 2 
10.0 -5.3 0 7.2 42 .9 
I 
-7 . 4 
31.3 7.4 -30.8 15.0 I 31.5 9.7 
REPUBLICAN 
' 
*56 *58 ;'~60 '"62 I *64 66 
64 .1 44.8 62.4 -43.5 -37.9 -36.8 
59 . 0 43.5 61.8 -44.3 -43.3 
-42 . 0 I 
60.9 41.0 46.7 -51.5 -52.3 -34.0 
Support the hypothesis . 
*68 
36.6 
37 . 3 
26.3 
;'(68 ; 
0 
7.1 
-10 . 4 
I 
*68 
I 
-46.61 
' 
-46. 31 
-59. 5 I 
*70 
-28 . 2 
-38.9 
-31.6 
70 
-12.5 
-2.6 
-6 . 0 
*70 
40.6 
38.0 
37.9 
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Table 3A: · Incumbency Effect on Vote 
(For all PID's) 
Better 
41.6 10 87.5 10.5 
_ma 51. 7 J 5o , -25__ ~-9~_:_3_ _ ":'._s ___ ~()__ +J 
Worse 
~-~~-.~-;=--- ··· - .... -·--· . 
11 ~ 58 60 r· 64 I 66 I 68 1 70 L 
-Dem- 130 - j 2o- -9- 46. 7 ~2117 .3 I 90.9 ! t 
I I I i I 
Rep 150.0 
1
, 45.3 -17.7 
1
16.7 1 84.2 
1
110 i 7.o <F> 
I Ind! I -14 I 20 -100 1-14 100 , 40.0 ! 80 t 
L-------·--~---.. -----·--~--~---.. ~------· ·--'--· 
Same 
,-- l 56 I 58 
Dem 40 .0 ! ... 25 .0 
Rep i 30.4 26.5 
I 
\ 3:~:-~~\f~s~~o~ 3~~2 f 5o -! + -
I -u.2j' 42.8 I 87 .5
1 
I 55.6 2.8 I t 
I I I 
1-33.2 . 46.6 j n .8 I 26~±12.5 It Ind I 4.0 33.4 
Entries are: 
(Proportion who voted for 
the presidential party 
and reside in an area with minus 
incumbents belonging to the 
presidential party.) 
~ increasing over time 
w decreasing over time 
(Proportion who vote d for 
the presidential party 
and reside in an area with 
a challenger party 
incumbent.) 
<=>No trend 
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Table 4A: Presidential Party Differential Vote and Salience 
Controlling for Different Party Affiliation/Economic 
Response Categories 
First Period Second Period 
58 64 66 68 70 
Dem/better 17.1 25.5 I 23. 8 15.8 44.4 t 
Dem/same 14.3 29.7 17.3 35 25 t 
Dem/worse 60.0 28.0 31.6 26.9 45.5 + 
Ind/better 16.6 27.0 I 40 25 0 ~> 
Ind/same 22.2 25.0 22.2 26.6 0 + 
Ind/worse 0 0 0 20 80 t 
Rep/better 23.2 11.4 I 46.2 14.3 18.9 t 
Rep/same 16.5 37.0 31.2 22.2 27.8 t 
Rep/worse 25.0 0 31.5 28.6 24.2 t 
Entries are: 
(Proportion of a category (Proportion of the same 
of respondents who voted category who voted for the 
for the presidential party minus presidential party and 
and recognise the pres- recognize the challenger 
idential party's candidate.) party's candidate.) 
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Table SA: Salience and Economic Conditions 
r~ 
[ ~<5'~0 :.oo 
o,{;o ~<i> ~ &~'/,>;-<. <- *58 "°64 "66 68 *Jo 
·-·--------
----
1 Bet~~~ 87.S 81.3 80 83.3 63.6 
Same 88.9 94.1 88.9 77 .8 7S . 0 
Worse 100 100 100 62.S 100 
-------<-- --~·--~-----·-
------
- ---------
Entries are: proportion of Republicans recognizing the Incumbents 
of the presidential party. 
Table SB: Differential Salience of the Cha llenger's Party 
Incumbent Candidate Among the Republicans 
___ __ _ _ --~~8 _ __ ' -- - =~=t-~~--Ws_---~ - •70_. 
Better 70 8S. 7 I 77.8 l 89.S · 91.7 
Same 93.3 94.7 I 87.S I 94.7 100.0 
\ Worse ____ i_o_o_·.· ~ ___ }_o_o _._L_ 7_0_.o _ _L_62_.s 100.0 
Entries are as defined above for the challenger party. 
*Supports the "Avenger Model." 
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Table 6A: Incumbency on Salience 
"Better" 
[. __ 58 64 66 68 70 
-·-i 
I Dem 100 88.4 85.3 82.2 66.6 + 
I I 
\Rep 84.4 62.5 70 66.6 36.3 + I 
I_ Ir~~-----~00 I 25 50 100 80 _______ _t_ I 
·----·----
"Same" 
-------
~~-~~~1-- ~~3- -~~- -- - -~~ .-2·----- :~~-- t 
p 86.6 88.2 77.8 61.1 56.3 + 
d 100 100 100 25 0 + 
- ---·---·-- - -- -· -·--------~------------
"Worse" 
-------·-·-------~ 
+l 
58 64 66 
- - ----· .. ···-·· -·--- ··-· -- -~. --·------·----~----
Dem 100 91.6 100 
Rep 100 100 100 
Ind 94 100 100 
Entries are: of the different PID 
(Proportion who recognize 
the presidential party's 
candidate and reside in 
an area with incumbents 
belonging to the presi-
dential party. 
minus 
68 70 
87.5 100 
25 100 + 
100 100 t 
(Proportion who recognize 
the presidential party's 
candidate and reside in an 
area with a challenger 
party incumbent.) 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: 
MAYHEW MAY STILL BE RIGHT! 
4.1 Introduction 
A number of authors have presented evidence that since 1950, 
there has been a noticeable decline in the proportion of competitive 
Congressional districts. For example, Tufte [4) shows that there has 
been a decrease in the "swing ratio", that is, the likelihood that a 
1 percent shift in votes will cause a change in the outcome of an elec-
tion. Kostroski [8] and Erikson [5] confirm the casual observations by 
· showing that there has been a substantial increase in the incumbency 
advantage in postwar Congressional elections. 
Three competing theories have been advanced to explain this 
phenomenon. The first is advanced by Tufte [4], who explains it by 
the incumbent manipulation of the redistricting schemes. He argues 
that "reapportionment rulings have given incumbents new opportunities 
to construct secure districts for themselves." The second theory is 
due to Burnham [7]. This one attributes the causes to a basic change 
in the behavior of the electorate. He points out that Tufte's 
observation regarding the drop in swing ratio may be due to the 
decreasing salience of party identification in the voting decision of 
the individual. The third theory, advanced by Mayhew [2], attributes 
the causes to the more effective use of the institutional advantages 
of incumbency by the incumbents. He argues that increasing use of the 
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resources of the incumbency office, .such as the franking privilege and 
publicity by the incumbent increased his salience,! which in turn 
increased his share of the aggregate vote. 
Ferejohn [3] finds himself in substantial agreement with 
the theory of basic change in electorate behavior. He successfully 
presents evidence against the theory of the incumbent manipulation 
of redistricting schemes by showing that the phenomenon of declining 
competitiveness has occurred both in the states that have been 
redistricted and in those that have not. He also argues against the 
theory of institutional advanta ge of incumbency. 
This paper will show that both the theories of basic change in 
electorate behavior and institutional a dvantage of incumbency may 
account for the change in voting behavior. It will first establish the 
relevancy of incumbency and candidate's salience to the individual's 
voting decision in a framework which recognizes the potential effect 
of other variables , such as economic conditions. It will then estab-
lish and explore the interactive nature of incumbency and salience. 
The various findings of this preliminary analysis will be used to 
motivate the form and variables of a simultaneous equations model of 
electoral competition. This procedure is necessary in order to avoid 
ad hoc inclusion of variables and to reduce .the possibility of bias 
due to simultaneity and misspecification. 
1candidate's salience means his recognition by the vo t er. 
Recognition and salience will be used interchangeably in this paper. 
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The most general formulation of the model establishes that both 
incumbency and salience have positive and significant effects on voting. 
It further establishes that incumbency also works through the s a lience 
variable i n influencing the voting decis ion of the individual. 
4.2 On The Theory of Institutional ; 
Advantages of Incumbency 
In a discussion of the kinds of activities in which congress-
men find it electorally advantageous to engage, Mayhew identifies 
"advertising" as an effective activity in winning votes. His definition 
of "advertising" is simple: "It is any effort to disseminate one '.s name 
among constituents to create a favorable image, but in messages having 
little or no issue content." [2] Mayhew essentially agrees with 
Stokes and Miller's assertion [9], that "Recognition carries a posi-
tive valence; to be perceived at all is to be perceived favorably." 
He further points out that incumbents engaging in "standard routines," 
such as frequent visits to constituency, nonpolitical speeches, and 
correspondence with constituents, will be better known than their 
challengers. The incumbent can afford to engage in these "advertising" 
activities, because the public largely foots the bill, while chal-
lengers must meet their own expenses. 
Thus Mayhew's model is simple: inc umbency me ans greater control 
of electoral resources, which .in turn produces higher salience of incum-
bents, which leads to greater incumbency voting. See Figure 1. 
1.41 
Greater Control of 
Resources by Incumbents 
+ 
+ 
STOKES/MILLER 
LINK 
8 
4 . 3 Ferejohn on The Theory of 
Institutional Advantages of 
Incumbency 
Figure 1 
Ferejohn [3] casts doubt on the theory of Institutional 
Advanta0.,es of Incum'->e11cy . For th · th t b L is eory o e correct, it must 
be true that: 1) there should be an overall increase in the level 
of recognition of the incumbent; 2) the relative level of recognition 
of incumbents versus challengers should also show an increase; 3) In-
creased level (or relative level) of recognition translates behavior-
ally into an increased level of incumbency voting .••. However, he 
establishes that: 1) the level of incumbency voting increases over 
time; 2) this increase is not accompanied by increasing salience of the 
incumbent over time; 3) increasing salience of both the incumbent and 
the challenger may decrease the probability of voting in their favor. 
Essentially, he doubts tha t the Stokes/Miller link is always 
positive; he presents evidence that the link might sometimes be 
negative [3]. He also denies the positive link between incumbency and 
salience. Ferejohn's model is shown in Figure 2. 
4.4 Preliminary Investigation 
of the Data 
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Figure 2 
The task of this section is to probe the available data using 
simple statistical techniques to suggest the relevancy to the indivi-
dual's voting decision of various variables which .are considered a pri-
ori as being relevant. It will also exposit the interaction between 
these variables. These findings will be used as motivation for the 
simultaneous equations model. Various indices will be extracted from 
the raw data in the SRC surveys (1956-1970). These indices will then be 
used to make some tentative hypotheses and observations. 
Three categories of party affiliations will be considered: 
Democratic, Independent and Republican. Also considered will be three 
categories of respondents to the question regarding their perception of 
cnanges in economic . conditions: those who perceived "better" conditions, 
tnose who perceived the "same" conditions, and those who perceived 
"worsened" conditions. For this, use will be made of the following 
question in the SRC survey: "During the last few years, has your finan-
cial situation been getting better,. getting worse, or stayed the same?" 
For the salience variable, use will be made of a question in 
.the SRC survey that asked the respondent to name the candidates for 
the House in his district. If the respondent co uld name the candidate, 
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he was considered to recognise him; otherwise not. The limitation 
of our data is mainly due to the availability of recognition data 
only for the 1958, 1964, 1966, 1968, and 1970 elections. 
The results are mainly reported in the Appendix, and the 
Appendix tables have the labels A and B following the table number to 
distinguish them from the summary tables in the main text. Since it 
will be necessary to make some observations regarding the relative 
effect of certain variables over time, the differential values of these 
variables will be shown in the tables rather than their absolute values. 
For example, if a test is to be made that recognition of the incumbent is 
increasing over time relative to that of the challenger, then the rele-
vant variable to observe over time is the differential recognition of 
the incumbent: the percent recognizing the incumbent minus the percent 
recognizing the challenger. This will simplify the form and inference 
from the summary tables. Of interest will be the number of entries in 
the original table with a positive or negative sign, the magnitude of 
the entries (how positive or negative they are), and the number of cases 
that show increasing or decreasing entries over time. 
The Effect of Incumbency 
Ferejohn (3) demonstrates the influence of incumbency on the 
voting decision, contradicting an earlier finding by Kramer [10). 
Kramer's model, however, eliminates some spurious effects by con-
trolling for economic conditions and presidential coattails. 
Table lA investigates the effect on the proportion of the 
Democratic vote of Democratic incumbency rather than Republican (Table 
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lB exhibits the same effect on the proportion of the Republican vote), 
controlling for different economic responses. 
Entries in Table lA are Democratic incumbency advantage, and are 
given by: proportion of people who voted Democratic in Democratic in-
cumbent district, minus proportion of people who voted Democratic in 
Republican incumbent district. Thus, positive entries imply positive 
effect of Democratic incumbency on the Democratic vote. :Moreover, the 
higher these entries are, the greater is the inferred effect of incum-
bency on the share of votes. The evidence is summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Vote Lifferentials Due to Incumbency: 
Summary of the Entries in Tables lA and lB 
-
Proportion of Proportion of 
Positive Differ- Cases Supporting 
entials in Tables Increasing Effect 
of Inc. 
Democratic 89 100 Inc. lA 
Republican 72 so Inc. lB 
n = 42 n 6 
Several observations may be made from Table 1: 
a) In general, the data support the contention of positive 
and increasing effect of incumbency on voting. Only 17 percent of all 
the cases show a negative entry. This agrees with Ferejohn's finding [3]. 
b) The Democratic share of votes is more sensitive to Democratic 
incumbency than is the Republican share to Republican incumbency. This 
is shown by a higher proportion of large entries in Table IA than lB 
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(there are 17 percent more entries which are greater th an 40 percent in 
Democratic incumbency). Moreover, the former shows increasing effect of 
incumbency on voting. Hore than 80 percent of cases in this category 
support this observation, while the picture for the Republican share of 
votes is not clear enough to reach a conclusion. 
There is other interesting information which may be obtained 
from the raw data in Tables lA and lB: 
c) The people who perceive worsening economic conditions 
(whether they vote Democratic or Republican) are the least likely to be 
influenced by incumbency. For example, in the case of Republican 
incumbency, 67 percent of the negative entries fall in the "worse" 
category. 
d) Republicans seem to be the least affected b-y their own 
incumbency. 
Thus, it seems legitimate to include incumbency as a relevant variable 
in any further analysis of the question under investigation. This 
finding agrees, in general, with Ferejohn's. 
The Effect of Candidate Salience 
In this section, a search will be made for evidence in support 
of the Stokes/Miller observation: "to be perceived at all, is to be 
perceived favorably." The differential salience of the other party 's 
candidate is calculated for those who voted for the other party candi-
date, controlling for party identification (PID) and economic response. 
See Table 2A. There is a similar table for those who voted for their own 
party candidate (Table 2B). Thus, entries in Tables 2 are: . the percent 
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of those who voted for candidate X and recognized him, minus the percent 
of those who voted for X and recognized the other candidate. Hence, the 
more positive the entries in the table, the firmer the inference regard-
ing the positive effect of salience on the candidate's vote. 
All entries are positive and reasonably large, indicating some 
positive correlation between salience and vote. Moreover, if 1958, 1964, 
and 1966 are regarded as the first period, and 1968 and 1970 as the 
second period, some weak inference can be drawn regarding the effect of 
salience over time; more than 50 percent of cases show increasing effect 
over time. This inference stays the same, whatever definitions are 
adopted for the first period and the second period of analysis. More-· 
over, the data in Tables 2A and 2B show the relationship between 
salience and voting to be more strongly positive for the other 
party's candidate than for the candidate of the voter's party: 75 
percent of the cases in the former category show an increasing effect, 
while only 50 percent of the cases show such a trend for the latter 
category. Table 2 summarizes these finding3. 
These tentative results indicate, to a certain extent, the 
existence of the Stokes/Miller link between salience and vote. Thus, 
for the moment at least, it can be concluded that the salience of 
candidates is positively related to the voting decision of the indi-
vidual voter. 
I 
Differential 
Salience of 
Own Party 
In I ts Vote 
Differential 
Salience of 
Other Party 
In Its Vote 
-- ---------·- - · 
Salience and Incumbency 
Anothe r Dimension 
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Table 2 
Percent of Percent of Cases 
Positive Increasing 
Entries Over Time 
100 so 
100 75 
I 
Most of the models dealing with the effect of salience on 
voting consider r ecognition of the candidates by the voter as an exog-
enous phenomenon beyond the rational" cal culus of the voter. Very 
li t tle effort h as been expended to discover the underlyi ng process 
beh ind the quest of t he individual voter for knowledge of the candi-
dat e's name. Knowledge and retention of this pi ece of information is 
not costless, hence t here must b e a process through which this cost is 
defrayed or compensated. Investigating this process he l ps to avoid 
simultaneit y b i as in specificat ions of model s f or voting. It also 
promises to enrich our knowledge of how various variables interact to 
effect the voting decision. Mayhew's [ l ] explanation of the principal 
source of decline in the numb e r of competitive seats in Congress, 
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may be viewed as a model of "defrayed cost." See Figure 3. 
The Elements of the "Defrayed Cost" Model 
Other 
Figure 3 
Voting 
Decision 
Consider "salience" as a consumable political good with a 
positive "perceived" price that could be consumed in any quantity. 
This assumption is valid if salience is considered as a continuum, 
starting from a mere recollection of the candidate's name to a 
comprehensive knowledge of his personality, achievements and background. 
However, only one level of recognition is observable, due to various 
institutional and experimental design considerations. Let g be the 
quantity of knowledge which an individual possesses about the candidate 
and k be the quantity of knowledge which corresponds to knowing the 
"name" only. Then 
if g ;> k we observe 1, 
anJ. if g .:::_k we observe 0. 
Assume a neoclassical utility function (the assumption of diminishing 
marginal utility of information in this case is highly 
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plausible) and a positive perceived price for information. Then, an 
individual's maximization of this utility subject to his budget ton-
straintwill determine whether he will purchase .this political commod;i.ty 
and how much he will consume. The demand equation for g will be 
D g = D g (Pl, P 2 ... Pg, ... Ph, I) 
where I is the "income" of the individual. Thus, the greater the 
income, the higher the demand for this political good (unless an infe-
rior good is considered; in this case, the opposite is true). Also, in 
the tradition of general equilibrium analysis, assuming all goods 
are gross substitutes, the lower the price of g, the greater is D [12]. g 
Thus, salience should rise· if the incumbent lowers the cost of· 
information to the individual voter by making use of media and pub-
licizing his Congressional activities. 
Does the data capture this covariation of incumbency and 
awareness? Table 3A shows the incremental percentage of those who 
recognize the Democratic candidate and reside in an area with Democratic 
incumbents over those who reside in an area with Republican incumbents, 
controlling for economic responses. For example, in 1958, the percen-
tage of the Democrats in the "better" category who recognize the Demo-
cratic candidate and reside in a district with a Democratic incumbe.nt 
exceed those in the same category who reside in a district with .a Rep-,-
U:blican incumbent by 89.7 percent. Table 3A is summarized in Table 3. 
I 
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Table 3 
Differential Salience of the Democratic Candidate 
Due to His Incumbency 
Percent of Positive Percent of Entries Percent of Cases 
Entries (n == 15) Greater Than 80 Increasing Over 
Percent (n == 15) Time (n == 3) 
100 60 100 
··-
The following tentative observations may be made: 
1) All entries are positive and exceptionally large, which 
confirms strong covariation between incumbency and salience. 
2) There is some evidence to indicate an increasing effect of 
incumbency on salience over time, at least for the "better" response 
category. 
The conclusion [3] that there is no evidence of an increasing 
effect of incumbency on salience is not substantiated. Hence, a major 
link in the theory of the institutional advantage of incumbency remains 
unbroken. Ferejohn's contrary conclusion follows from a table which shows 
no increase in the proportion of total voters who recognize the incumbent. 
The variable that should have been considered is the proportion who voted 
for the incumbent, not the proportion of total registered voters. When 
considering total registered voters, Ferejohn's conclusion is not sur-
prising, since a higher proportion of those who don't vote cannot recall 
the name of the incumbent [13]. Admittedly, however, these initial 
results, like Ferejohn's, are based on a small number of cases. 
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A preliminary model is formulated to test the relationship 
between salience of the Democratic candidate and incumbency. The model 
is of the form: 
where 
RD = a+ alEd + a2D + a3R + a4ID + u 
Ed = 1 
0 
if respondent has college degree 
otherwise 
D 1 if respondent is a Democrat 
0 otherwise 
R 1 if respondent is a Republican 
0 otherwise 
ID 1 if the incumbent is a Democrat 
0 otherwise. 
A probit estimation procedure is used. The results are reported 
in Table 4. Education and incumbency are significant in all years, 
while the party identification variable is significant in only one case, 
which corresponds to the respondent being Republican in the 1970 
election. The important item to notice, however, is that incumbency 
increases its significance and influence over time. This is a crucial 
link in the theory of institutional advantage of incumbency, as 
Ferejohn rightly observes. 
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Table 4 
Equation for the Recognition of the Democratic Candidate 
I 
Const. I Education I 
I 
-0. 35 * .... 0. 28 A 
1958 
(0.19) (0.11) 
-0.13 0. 30 ·k 
1964 
(0.21) (0.10) 
-0.28 0. 32 ;~ 
1966 
(0.21) (O .12) 
-0.25 o. 20 * 
1968 
(0.18) (0.10) 
-0. 40 * 0. 4lf * 
1970 
(0.20) (0.11) 
* significant at 5 percent 
** significant at 10 percent 
' 
I 
I Democrat I Republica n I Inc. Dem. 
I i 
0.25 -0.03 0.19 '~* 
(0.20) (0.20) (0.10) 
0.15 0.02 0 . 21 ,~ 
(0.21) (0.22) (O. 09) 
.... 
-0.02 -0.10 0. 45 A 
(0.20) (0 .21) (0.11) 
0.03 -0.03 o. 72 >'< 
(0. 2) (0.20) (0.01) 
0.02 -0. 43 ,., o. 38"' 
(0.20) (0.19) (0.11) 
Hence, there does exist some support for the "defrayed cost" 
model in this data. Incumbents provide information about their atti-
vities at a low cost to the electorate. This low cost information 
impinges on the individual voter randomly, affecting the later acqui-
sition of this information, which translates itself into higher incum-
bency voting. 
I 
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Economic Condition and Salience 
Another possible model is to postulate that the salience of the 
Congressional candidates increases if the individual voter is econom-
ically worse off, once control is made for incumbency. This model will 
be termed "the Avenger." That is, the individual voter is most likely 
to incur the cost of information by seeking the candidates' names if he 
is hurt economically by the President's policies. Ferejohn finds that, 
of those who vote for their own party, a lower proportion are aware of 
the candidate's name. This may be due to the presence of a lower 
proportion of those whose conditions are worsened within that group. 
Table 4A tests this model by showing the covariation of the 
perception .of economic conditions and salience. Specifically, it shows 
the salience of the incumbent Congressman within each economic response 
catagory in two cases: 
a) When the incumbent Congressman belongs to the President's 
party. 
b) When the incumbent Congressman belongs to the challenger's 
party. 
This will establish the presidential effect, if there is any. 
For example, in 1958 there are 87 .5 percent Republicans in the "be tter" 
category who recognize the incumbents from the presidential party. 
Define Pb as the salience of candidate X in the "bette r" response 
etter 
category, and P as the salience in the "worse" response category. 
worse 
The model is supported if P > P for salience of the 
worse better 
Congressional candidates. The evidence in Table 4A seems to indicate 
some covariation between salience of candidates and economic perception. 
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1he support for the model is also satisfactory, since 70 percent of 
all the cases support the model. The support for the model is the 
case of the presidential party candidates is overwhelmingly stronger 
than the case of the challengers. 
Thus, economic conditions should be included as a relevant 
variable in any further investigation of the salience variable. There 
is some evidence in support of both the "defrayed cost model" and 
"the Avenger" model. 
· Next, some of Ferejohn's evidence will be examined. His 
conclusion is that "controlling for incumbency status, in four of 
ten comparisons, increased recognition of his own party candidate 
actually decreased the probability of voting for him!" This con-
clusion, however, does not agree with the results of his earlier 
model without interaction terms between salience and incumbency (3]. 
For example, the regression results of his model show that the recogni-
tion of the Democratic candidate is positively significant for all 
elections, and that for the Republican candidate is positively signif-
icant for all elections except that of 1966. His model also shows 
that incumbency is positively significant in all the cases except that 
of 1958. See Table SA. Ferejohn suggests estimating a more saturated 
version of his model by including interaction variables between 
incumbency and salience. Hence, the following model is estimated. 
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y 
Y is the voting variable 
where Y 1 if vote Democrat 
0 otherwise. 
P is the party ident iI:=._ca tion variaiJlc 
where r
1 
1 if respondent is Democrat 
0 otherwise 
P2 1 if respondent is Republican 
0 otherwise. 
I is the incumbency variable 
I 1 if incumbent is Democrat 
= 0 otherwise. 
R is the salience variable 
R 1 if recognize Democrat candidate 
0 otherwise. 
R I is the salience/incumbency interaction variable. 
Table 5 , shows the results of . this regression. 
58 
64 
66 
68 
70 
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Table 5 
Vote for the Democratic Candidate A Saturated 
Version of Ferejohn's Model 
CONST. RI pl p? I R 
-0.57;\: 
-0.04 1. 50;'c -1. O>'< O. 4 7-l< 0. 36>'< 
(0.21) (0.25) (0.21) (0.21) (0.18) (0.15) 
0.25 0.11 0.52* -1.3* 0.53* 0.08 
(0.23) (0.21) (0.23) (0.23) (0.16) (0.14) 
-0. 65>'< 0. 47>'< 1. O>'< 
-0.91* - • 66>'< -0.02 
(0.23) (0.26) (0.21) (0.22) (0.18) (0.20) 
-0. 62-f< 
-0.21 0.86* -0.85* 0. 60>'< 0.46* 
(0.19) (0.22) (0.19) (0.20) (0.17) (0.14) 
-0. 74* -0.26 1. 20-f< -1. 30>'< 1.30* 0. 36-fc 
(0.22) (0.28) (O. 21) (O. 22) (0. 20) (0.18) 
The model supports Ferejohn's observation that the incumbency 
variable exhibits a significant and increasing effect on vote. 
However, the model also shows that the recognition variables have a 
similar trend in the later part of the period. To establish the 
significance of the recognition terms, a likelihood ratio test is 
conducted and the null hypothesis is rejected at 5 percent for all 
elections. However, this model is so riddled with multicollinearity 
that some interaction tenns are bound to lose their sign stability and 
that all coefficients of the model are suspect. 
The lesson learned from the previous exercise is that a single 
equation formulation that has both recognition and incumbency variables 
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as independent variables is not suitable for answering this inquiry on 
two grounds: first, the true model is susceptible to multicollinearity; 
second and more seriously, it is established that the model is mis-
specified under the most general assumptions regarding · the interaction 
of salience and incumbency. 
Finally, the model formulated by Ferejohn does not disprove 
that an adequate distributional shift in party identifiers may account 
for the observable change in the pattern of voting. His model was of 
the form: 
Vote 8(PID, Rec, PID·Rec) + u. 
It follows from the evidence presented in this paper that 
recognition is driven in part by incumbency and that incumbency is a 
significant factor in explaining the voting behavior. However, 
Ferejohn's model relegates incumbency to the error terms while keeping 
the recognition variable as an explanatory variable. This renders 
the model misspecified and casts doubts on the interpretation and 
significance of the variables in the model. 
4.5 The Model and Estimation Procedure 
The information in the previous tables are certainly suggestive, 
but firm conclusions have to await further evidence which takes care of 
the simultaneity effect, on one hand, and insures proper control of all 
relevant variables in the problem, on the other. The evidence in the 
data provides a reasonable basis to establish relevancy of the various 
factors to the individual voting decision. For example, it has been 
shown, given the limitations of data and of tabulation technique, that 
the salience of candidates, incumbency, and to a lesser degree, the 
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individual's perception of his economic lot are related to the voting 
decision. Moreover, it has been shown that incumbency and economic 
perception are related to the salience of the candidate. 
It remains to formulate a model that captures the most critical 
relevant variables on the one hand and takes into consideration the si-
multaneous nature of the political phenomena on the other. This kind of 
formulation improves on the specification of previous models and reduces 
simultaneity bias; it will also exposit the primary and secondary in-
fluences of various variables on the individual's vote. A two-
equation model will be formulated. The first equation will have the 
voting for presidential party candidates as a dependent variable, and 
the salience of the presidential party candidate, perception of economic 
conditions, incumbency, and party affiliation as explanatory variables. 
The second equation will have the salience of the presidential party 
candidate as dependent variable, and incumbency, interaction between 
perception of economic conditions and party ID, education, and party 
identification as explanatory variables. 
However, Mayhew's interpretation of the powers of the incumbency 
office may be restrictive. Such powers include, in addition to the 
advantages of the label of incumbency and use of the franking priv-
ileges, the opportunities to do more services for the constituencies. 
In this case, the opportunities given to Congressmen by the incumbency 
office to render services to their constituencies increases the more 
the Congressmen remain in office. The model, as it stands, measures 
the overall effect of the powers of the incumbency office, viewed from 
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this wider interpretation of these powers. However, the observable 
rise in the effect of incumbency on salience may be due not only to 
the increasing power of the incumbency office, but also to the increas-
ing efficiency of long-time incumbents in using these powers. In this 
case, it may be advantageous to include two variables in the salience 
equation: the dichotomous variable, I, measures the power of the 
incumbency office, and a continuous variable, I , measures the accu-
t 
mulated learning of incumbents. This modification may affect some of 
the results reported in this paper, and shed further light on the effect 
of incumbency in the electoral process, but we leave it to future 
studies. Nevertheless, this paper demonstrates that even with this 
self-imposed limitation on the structure of the model different results 
are obtained. 
The Model 
1 if a 1 + b1P + b2I 1 + b3(DS) + b4 (DW) + b5 (RS) 
+ b6(RW) + b 7(IS) + b8(IW) + b9(R1) + s 1 > O 
0 otherwise 
'\, 
Rl 1 if R = a 2 + c1P + c2r 1 + c 3E + c 4 (DS) + c 5 (DW) . 
+ c 6(RS) + c 7(RW) + c 8(IS) + c 9(IW) ~ K 
= 0 otherwise 
m.i.ci a sinilar equai:i0i.1 for :a.2 
wnere: 
y is the voting variable 
(1) 
(2) 
i.e. y = 1 if voting for the presidential party candidate 
= 0 otherwise . 
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R is the salience variable 
where: 1 if recognize the Presidential party candidate 
0 otherwise. 
F is the economic response variable 
F ... Fl 
F2 
F3 
where: Fl 1 if the re.sponse is "better" 
0 otherwise 
F2 1 if the response is ''same'' 
0 otherwise 
F3 1 if the response is "worse" 
0 otherwise. 
P is the party identification variable 
p 
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where: pl 1 if the responde nt is Democrat 
0 otherwise 
p2 1 if the respondent is Republican 
0 otherwise 
p3 1 if Independent 
0 otherwise . 
I is the incumbency variable 
I 1 1 if the Presidential party candidate is incumbent 
0 otherwise. 
E is the education variable 
E 1 if the respondent has college degree 
0 otherwise. 
·The interaction terms a re 
DB = 1 if the voter is Democrat and perceived "bette r" 
conditions 
0 otherwise 
DW 1 if Democrat and perceived "worsened" conditions 
0 otherwise 
RB 1 if Republican and perceived "better" conditions 
= 0 otherwise 
RW 1 if Republican and perceived "worsened" conditions 
0 otherwise 
IB 1 if Independent and perceived "better" conditions 
0 otherwise 
and E 1 , E 2 are random components . 
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In every variable, one category is not included in the actual 
regression model to avoid overidentification. Notice that the formu-
lation of the model allows pooling of data from several elections to 
nail down the effect of some crucial variables. As has b e en indicated, 
the data used is SRC (1956-1970) election data. 
Although the salience variable R is observable as dichotomous, 
r\, 
it will be assumed to reflect a continuous variable R, with a threshold 
k such that 
'V R<k ~R =O. ( 3) 
This assumption will facilitate using a two-step probit estimation 
procedure. Equations (2) and (3) define a standard probit model; 
coefficients of (2) can be estimated by maximum likelihood procedure . 
'V 
These estimated coefficients are used to construct R, which can be 
used as an instrument to replace R in (1). The rest of the estimating 
procedure proceeds analagously to the two-stage least square [15]. 
A two-stage probit technique is used in estimating the model 
for individual elections and for pooled runs. All tests of signi-
ficance are conducted at the 5 percent level of confidence. 
A word of caution has to be added here. It has been shown that 
in the second stage of such procedures, the standard errors of the 
coefficients are not consistent [14). This makes the distribution of 
the ratio of the coefficients to their standard errors not t exactly. 
Therefore, the conclusion of significance derived from the inspection 
of these ratios has to be taken with this fact in mind. 
163 
Results 
The Salience Equation . Table 6 shows the result of the regres-
sion of the first equation. The following observations may be made: 
1. Incumbency is positive and significant in all elections 
(except that of 1964 where it also picks up the wrong sign). Pooling of 
data establishes this observation firmly. There is some evidence that 
incumbe ncy incre ased in influence towards the endof th e period consi-
de red. This is a crucial step in Mayhew's .argument, which seems to 
be supported by these fi ndings. 
2. Except for two cases, that of "Dembet" in 1970 and 
"Indworse" in 1958, the coefficients of economic conditions are not 
significant and do not possess sign stability in the equation for the 
s a lience of the presidential party candidate . 
3. Party identification does not have any effect on salience. 
4. Education is significantly positive in all elections and in 
pooled runs. 
A modified equation for the salience of the challenger's party 
candidate, where no interaction terms are included, is run. Table 7 
shows the results of this regression. The above findings are firmly 
supported. 
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Table 7 
Equation for the Recognition 
of the Challenger's Party 
EDUCATION DEMOCRAT REPUBLICAN 
** * 0.18 0.17 0.42 
(0.11) (0.20) (0 .. 21) 
'"' 0.40 -0.11 0.23 
(0 . 10) (0.22) (0.22) 
;'\ 
0 .29 -0 .04 0.25 
(0.12) (O. 20) (0.21) 
* 0.48 -0.31 -0.18 
(0 .10) (0.19) (0.19) 
- -
-
* 
;'~ 
0. 60 ' -0 .40 -0.24 
(0.12) (0 .19) (0.20) 
INC. REP. 
* 0.80 
(0 .09) 
i" 0. 92 
(0.09) 
- ;~ 
0.36 
(0.12) 
* I 0.19 I (0.09) 
·;'<: 
0.79 
(O .11) 
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The Voting Equation 
Table 8 shows the results of regressing the first equation 
of the model using the computed values of the salience variable from the 
first step of the estimation procedure. The following observations may 
be made. 
1. Except in 1958, where it also picks up the wrong sign, 
incumbency is positive and significant. Pooling data establishes this 
observation firmly. There is also some evidence in support of 
Ferejohn's assertion that the incumbency effect is greater during off-
year elections than in on-year elections [3]. 
2. Except for the 1964 election, salience has a positive, sig-
nificant effect on voting. Pooling the data, however, seems to indicate 
that the effect is primarily during off-year elections . This is perhaps 
due to the 11 drowning" of the effect of salience by the presidential coat-
tail effect. Moreover, there is some evidence that salience exhibits an 
increasing effect on voting. This finding, and the previous one that 
indicates ihat incunibency exerts increas-in.g .influence on salience, 
strengthen Mayhew's argument.2 
3. The pattern of signs for the economic conditions/party affi-
liation interaction terms is confusing and does not support any positive 
or negative hypotheses about their effect on voting. 
2rn reference to the observation, made earlier, regarding the 
lack of consistency of the standard errors of the coefficients in the 
second stage, it is reassuring to note the absence of sign anomalies 
in these coefficients. Moreover, the fact that what is of interest 
here is trends over time rather than individual significance of 
coefficients. 
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On examining the evidence presented in these tables, the 
following observations may be made from Tables 8 and 9: 
1. There is a slight increase in the coefficient of incumbency 
in the equation for votes of candidates of the presidential party. 
2. There is also a slight incrc.ase in the coefficient of 
saliency of the candidate of the presidential party in the vote 
equations. 
3. Almost all of these coefficients are significant and 
positive (Table 9). 
4. There is a slight increase in the coefficient of incumbency 
in the saliency equation for presidential party candidate equation. 
The second and third observations do not support Ferejohn's [3] 
contention of Mayhew's theory. The link between the increasing 
significance of incumbency voting and the increasing salience of the 
incumbent must be broken in order to sustain objections to Mahyew's 
theory. 
However, the fourth observation shows that incumbency is 
increasing in significance even when salience is controlled. This 
means that the Ferejohn-Burnham theory of basic change in the 
electorate behavior may also be right. 
It is the conclusion of this paper that Mayhew's theory is not 
defeated. It must therefore await further evidence to either 
substantiate it or to discard it. Further, it ~s found that both the 
theories of institutional advantage of incumbency and basic change in 
electorate behavior account for a significant part of the decline of 
competition in Congressional elections. 
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A more direct examination of the problem posed by Mayhew is 
still desirable. Such examination involves the inclusion of campaign 
expenditure and duration of incumbency in both equations of the model. 
A better specified model may even involve adding a third equation for· 
incumbency. While such modifications may affect some of the results 
reported in this paper, it is proper to point out that the specification 
in this paper is dictated by both theoretical and practical consider-
ations posed by the availability of data. 
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Table 2A 
lST PERIOD 2ND PERIOD 
58 64 66 68 70 
DEMOCRAT/BETTER 17.1 10.0 19.2 17;1 44.4 t 
DEMOCRAT/WORSE 60.0 20.0 42.9 23.8 45.5 t 
REPUBLICAN/BETTER 15.0 11. 5 46.2 H.3 62.5 t 
REPUBLICAN/WORSE 25 0 31. 5 28.6 14.3 t 
Entries are: among the people who voted for the other party 
candidate (percent recognize other party candidate -
percent recognize own party candidate). 
Table 2B 
lST PERIOD 2ND PERIOD 
58 64 66 68 70 
DEMOCRAT/BETTER 22.9 25.5 23.8 15.8 4.5 
DEMOCRAT/WORSE 22.7 28.0 31.6 26.9 38.2 
REPUBLICAN/BETTER 23.2 2.8 8.5 21.1 19.0 
REPUBLICAN/WORSE 25.0 13.8 10.9 5.0 24.0 
Entries are: among the people who voted for their own party 
candidate (percent recognize own party candidate -
percent recognize other party candidate). 
t 
t 
+ 
t 
17.3 
Table 3A 
Salience and Incumbency (in Democratic Candidacy) Effect 
on PID's Controlling for Economic Conditions 
~ 58 
Democrat 89.7 
Independent 60.0 
Republican 100 
Entries are: 
recognizing 
candidates 
area with Democratic 
incumbents 
"Better" 
64 
88.4 
25.0 
62.5 
66 68 70 
85.3 82.2 100 
50.0 100 100 
70 .0 66.6 100 
proportion recognizing the 
Democratic candidate in an 
area with Republican 
incumbents 
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Table ~A: Salience and Economic Conditions 
+%~ *58 *64 *66 68 *70 SA 01': ~ O,,p</c 
0'.¢' 
BETTER 87.5 81. 3 80 83.3 63.6 
SAME 88.9 94.1 88.9 77 .8 75.0 
WORSE 100 100 100 62.5 100 
Entries are: proportion of Republicans recognizing the Incumbents 
of the presidential party. 
Differential Salience of the Challenger's Party 
Incumbent Candidate Among the Republicans 
- --- :s_--in".... }>, I 
"58 * 64 66 68 -;ls 70 ~;;~~+'c~11 o<tsf'._I 
BETTER 70 85. 7 77.8 89.s 91. 7 
SAME 93.3 94. 7. 87.5 94.7 100.0 
WORSE 100 100 70.0 62.5 100-.0 
Entries are as defined above for the challenger party. 
*Supports the "Avenger Model." 
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Table SA 
Ferejohn 1 s Model, Reestimated Using Probit 
CONST . DEMOCRAT REPUBLICAN RI RD RR 
* * * * 
•k 
-0.12 1. 5 -0.98 -0.28 0.81 --0. 72 
1958 
(0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.13) (0.17) (0.18) 
-;'~ 
* 
-;'.:. -;'-; 
* 
"1.: 
0. 78 0.52 -1. 3 -0 . 40 0. Lf4 -0 . 53 
1964 
(0.23) (0 . 23) (0.23) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14) 
-;'.:. 
* 
~~ •k ·k 
0.15 0.99 -0.91 -0.73 0.74 -0.81 
1966 
(0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) 
';~ 
* * '" * 
·{: 
-0.61 0.82 -0.89 0.33 0.83 -0. 70 
1968 
(0.2) (0.19) (0.2) (O .11) (0.15) (0.14) 
* * * 
";'~ 
* * 0 . 49 1. 2 -1. 3 -0.81 0.73 -0.99 
1970 
(0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0 . 16) (0.18) (0.19) 
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CHAPTER 5 
LEFTIST IDEOLOGICAL SHIFTS IN ARAB CONTEMPORARY POLITICS: 
A SPATIAL THEORY APPROACH 
5.1 Introduction 
In this 'paper,a formal model of the political motivation behind 
the choice of Marxism/Leninism ideology by a number of non-communist 
leftist parties in the Arab world is presented. This conversion to 
Marxism has occurred in many political parties throughout the Arab world 
including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P.F.L.P.) 
and Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (D.F.L.P.) in the 
Palestinian Arab movement, the National Front for the Liberation of 
South Yemen (N.F.L.Y.), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman 
(P.F.L.O.) [16), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Western Sahara, 
formerly Spanish Sahara (POLISARIO) , as well as scores of lesser politi-
~al parties and movements in Lebanon and the Arab east. All these par-
ties, together with the Arab Baath Socialist Party, the Union of Popular 
Forces in Morocco, the original Arab Socialist Union of Egypt (which has 
significantly changed since Nasser's death) may be identified as leftist 
according ·to the criteria presented in th e next section. 
Consider the P.F.L.P. as an example of the group that shifted 
to Marxism-Leninism. The P.F.L.P. grew out of the Arab Nationalist 
movement, whose trans formation to Marxism-Leninism (M-L) is striking [9, 
14, 15] . The initial structure and ideas of this movement were not 
' 
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left of the center by any local or external standards.I Most of the 
cadre and leadership were people with property who did not reject their 
background [I4]. The mo~ement's goals (unity, liberation and retri-
bution) were broad enough to make everybody from the extreme right to 
the extreme left eligible for membership (9, I4, I5]. Yet, despite the 
party's early nationalist heritage and its initial hostility towards 
the Communists and Baathists -- indeed, toward all socialist ideas [I5] 
it took less than six years (9) for the party's leadership and cadre 
to transform to the Marxist-Leninist ideology . 
To distinguish their position from the traditional Arab Com-
munists, they point out the Communists do not comprehend that "the 
analysis which Marxism gave to a particular situation at certain times 
cannot be the same for the new situation which has been developed from 
the previous one." (9) Thus, the P.F.L.P. political strategy stress 
their convictions that: 
"I. The Modern Capitalism is different from wha t it was during 
Marx's days . 
2. The class structure in underdeveloped societies are different 
from that in an Industrial society which Marx tackled. 
3. Nationalism, which was used by the European Bourgeoisie 
during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries for conquest 
and exploitations, has acquired a revolutionary, progressive 
content in the third world. It became the framework of their 
struggle against Imperialism, which is the highest stage 
of Capitalism." 
These are the basic arguments with which the P.F . L.P. hopes to distin-
guish their position from the Arab Communists. They summarize the dis-
tinction as follows (9): 
Ion this the P.F.L.P. strategy (9) states that "the political 
ization of the P.F.L.P. is a continuation of the Arab nationalist 
ment which has a petit-bourgeoise structure and content." 
organ-
move-
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"The Arab Communist parties were only committed to Marxism-
Leninism superficially, hence were incapable of leading the 
revolution in our country. They either understood the theory 
in a static, lifeless manner, or implemented it mechanically 
without due analysis to its lo cal contact. u 2 
In order to relate their views to traditional Marxism, the 
P.F.L.P. points out that "what is essential and immortal in Marxism 
is the dialectical way in which all problems are analyzed -- the dialec-
tics of continuous change and movement. ••. " Hence, the P.F.L.P. agrees 
with the Marxist method of analysis, but tries to escape some of the 
historic predictions and specifics of the theory. 
The adoption by the P.F.L.P. of Marxism-Leninism as the core of 
their ideology was not an isolated event. In June 1968, the N.F.L.Y., 
the movement which shared in the struggle against the British in Aden, 
shook off the historical leadership of Al-Shaabi to adopt Marxism-
Leninism [ 16] . 
A series of questions arise. Did these parties shift positions 
because Marxist-Leninist ideology captured the imagination of the Arab 
masses? How could the strong leadership of N.F.L.Y. lose their 
ideological grip on the rank and file of their party so swiftly, and 
after that leadership had achieved a resounding victory over the British? 
One fact is certain: the standard bearers of Marxism-Leninism 
in the Arab world, the Communist parties, did not make any significant 
in-road in contemporary Arab politics [7, 9, 13), nor did they at any 
time have a chance of building a stable presence inside any Arab 
2The researchers failed to find any adequate exposition of the 
P.F.L.P. 's new theoretical contributions beyond what is already men-
tioned. For example, the role of nationalism and the "organic" rela-
tionship between class and national struggle has been developed by the 
Baathists a quarter of a century before the 1967 P.F.L.P. 's Congress. 
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government even though they were the oldest organized party of the 
left. 3 An explanation of the shift towards Marxism-Leninism by the 
P.F.L.P. and others must be sought outside the example set by th e 
Arab Communists. 
5.2 On Ideology in Arab Context 
In this section, the importance of ideology and what it means 
in contemporary Arab politics will be pointed out. 
In his book on revolutionary Arab ideology [l], Dr. Elias 
Farah4 gave the following interpretation to the concept of ideology: 
"The ideology is a system of ideas with a concrete purpose; 
it is a collection of ideas about the world, life, and society 
which together form the basis of collective action .... Thus, 
we can distinguish between religious, nationalistic, democratic, 
bourgeoisie, socialist and communist ideologies .... The ideo-
logy is a social condition for any renaissance, that is becaJJse 
it helps to describe the total picture of society and in parti-
cular specify the relationship between what is special and 
temporary in the society and what is general for all humanity." 
More critically, he observes that: 
a) Modern societies are ideological. 
b) Ideology is a "must" to guide change. 
c) No revolutionary party is without an ideological commitment. 
3The P.F.L.P. states that "the traditional Communist parties in 
the Arab world failed because of their structure and mistaken strate-
gies . . .. " P. 130-140 [9]. 
4nr. E. Farah is a member of the National Command of Arab Baath 
Socialist Party. The extract is from the Arabic text. (5th ed., 1975, 
pages 10, lL) 
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It is on these sets of ideas that "almost" all the Arab parties 
on the left agree, and it is on these observations a serious study of 
ideological choice in Arab context should be based. On the same theme, 
the P.F.L.P. political and organizational strategy [9] states: 
"The foundation of a revolutionary party is a revolutionary 
ideology; without it, the party cannot be but a group moving 
instinctively or under the influence of events. The revolu-
tionary ideology is that which deals with all aspects of man 
and society in the relevant time." 
These convictions are shared by a large number of Arab 
intellectuals outside the organized parties. 5 Indeed, the consensus 
that no serious party could be without an elaborate and complete ideo-
logical structure is shared even by many parties on the right such as 
the Moslem Brotherhood and El-Tahrir. In their writings, the .leaders 
of thes e parties go to great lengths to show that the ir ideology, 
Islam, answers unambiguously all the questions that modern ideologies 
try to answer [22, 23]. In fact, the conviction that a well developed 
ideology is an absolute necessity for any meaningfu1 social, economic 
and cultural development can be traced to the heritage of Islam. Islam 
is more than a complete set of religious and ethical doctrines; it is 
an ideology, because it concretely outlines the shape and content of 
6 the Islamic state [21-27]. 
5see Klofis Makhsood, The Crises of Arab Left, Arabic text, 
First edition [17], Self Criticism After Defea~, S.J. Al-A 1 Adhin, 
Criticism of Religious Ideology [34]. Arabic Texts, First editions, 
and N. Alwash in [36). 
6see, for example, M. Aflag, On Memory of the Arab Prophet, 
and The Baath and Heritage [5]. 
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Some revolutionary Arabs credit the early successes of Islam 
to the comprehensiveness and completeness of its ideological structure. 
[33, 34). Because of the completeness of his traditional ideology, 
Islam, the active Arab individual demands a similar level of completeness 
before considering any new, competing alternative. 
5.3 The Left in Arab Context 
A particular party will be identified as leftists if the 
following subjective and objective factors are present; 7 
I) Subjectively, if the relevant party identifies itself 
publicly as being leftist. 
2) Objectively, if: 
a) other Arab parties recognize it as leftist, 
b) there is an international recognition of this claim, 
c) the party manifesto limits, to various degrees, private 
ownership and the role of the market. 
The most important objective criteria for identification is (c). 
This factor actually is a composite one, for it involves a measure of 
attitude toward religion and the organization of the state. 
Islam, the dominant religion of the Arab world, is not only 
a set of rules to regulate a relationship with God, but also a system 
of government. It describes the role of an Islamic government, the 
bas.ic tax system, economic classes, and the relationship between 
7see 
' After Defeat. 
for example, On Revolutionary Arab Politics Before and 
[3] 
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individuals and government. 8 Hence, a party position for public 
ownership which deviates from the widest interpretations of the 
teaching of Islam reflects a rejection of the role of religion in 
guiding the state. 
Thus, it seems that (c) encompasses the two most important 
objectives of the Arab left: limited private ownership, and restriction 
of the role of religion in state affairs. 
5.4 Conventional Explanations 
for Ideological Choices 
It is difficult to disentagle, in the plethora of articles and 
papers dealing with Arab politics, those elements which deal primarily 
with ideological choice. Some terms have been so much abused as to 
cause much confusion. Such terms as "radicals" have been associated 
exclusively with the "leftists." Radicalism in the Arab world is asso-
ciated with issues, not ideologies. It is possible for an individual to 
be radical on a political issue without being in the slightest way 
socialistic, and vise versa. Arab Communists have been the least 
radical on the Arab-Israel issue, and Fatah, the largest Palestinian 
Arab movement, has no particular allegiance to socialist ideals. Such 
confusion about terms leads to serious errors in analysis of Arab 
politics. 
8see, for example, Our Philosophy, M. El-Sader, first edition, 
Arabic text [21]; Mr. Yousif, The Contrived Gap .Between Science and 
Religion [24], p. 1-10; Said Kotib, Islam and the Problems of Civi-
lization [22], p. 164-168; Mr. Khallaf-Allah, "The Koran and Socialism," 
in Il-Katib, July 1966; D. Saab H., Islam Facing the Challenges of 
Modern Life, [23], p. 20-25; Y. Al-Milaiji, Consultation in Islam. 
Versus Its Role in the Western Democracies and Marxism [26]; an&~A. 
Al-Khatib, The Financial Policies in Islam [25]. 
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Therefore, rather than documenting the traditional scholarly 
literature dealing with Arab ideological choices, two conventional 
explanations will be outlined and an informational version of our 
theory will be presented. 
Leadership Transformation Theory 
This is the oldest and most traditional explanation of ideo-
logical shifts by third world parties. Leaders are sovereign. They 
perceive the "common good" of society in a particular way at certain 
stages of their lives and experiences and adopt a certain ideology. 
Their ideological position changes to the left or the right through 
f - 1 . 9 urtner persona experiences. According to this theory, George Hahbash 
and the group leadership in the P.F.L.P. would have had to undergo an 
ideological transformation from the right to the left, then have 
influenced the cadre and supporters to follow suit. 
The support for this theory, however, is not limit e d to the 
traditionalists. The revolutionary factionlO of the P. F .L .P. asserts 
that [14) "the basic lesson from the Cuban experience is that when the 
elements in control of the leadership of a particular petit-bourgeoise 
9Almost all articles dealing with "Nasser" ideology fall in 
this category. 
10rhis faction had seceded from the P.F.L.P. in March, 1972. 
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movement have the ability of transformation to Marxism-Leninism, then 
the possibility of transformation of the whole movement is there. 1111 
They go on to assert that "the existence of Marxist-Leninist elements in 
a petit-bourgeO.ise organization is not the important factor in trans-
forming the whole organization, but it's the position and effectivity of 
those elements in the leadership that are vital." 
The reasons that are usually given for an ideological shift by 
a leader, such as personal experience, leadership ego, or other psy-
chological factors, are unconvincing. The theory leaves unanswered the 
question of why the followers went along with the leader. 
Outside Pressures 
This theory states that the parties have no independent idea-
logical choice. Parties adopt various positions on political issues 
(e.g., the Palestinians, oil, West-East orientation, etc.) as a result 
of forces largely outside the control of the political party. Thus, the 
more external force applied on the parties to be "radical" on these 
issues, the greater will be the shift to the left. For example, a 
conflict between a less desirable Western policy and a more desirable 
Soviet policy in the Arab world would make Hahbash a staunch Marxist-
Leninist, and thus transform the whole P.F.L.P. Another example is the 
lL ~ee I4], p. 29. In fact, this faction even denies the 
sincerity of the P.F.L.P. adoption of Marxism/L~ninism. They state in 
fl4], p. 34, that "the official adoption of Marxism/Leninism does not 
mean that the P.F.L.P. possesses the necessary conditions for the trans-
formation. For history taught us -- as Lenin mentioned -- that when the 
enemies of Marxism fail to fight it on an open ground, they are apt to 
fight it from inside by adopting it superficially. All those who lived 
inside the P.F.L.P. and are acquainted with its leadership cannot but 
doubt the earnestness of the transformation." 
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account of Nasser's policies related by M. Haiykel in his book, Abdul 
Nasser and the World. He portrays Nasser's drift to the left as a 
reaction to the West's unwillingness to finance the high dam. This 
theory asserts that the ideological shift is a choice, but it is a 
forced one. 
A variant of this theory is what can be termed "the conspiracy 
theory." Here, international forces conspire to form and aid various 
factions in the party and force a change in leadership by either 
deposing them physically or usurping their real power over the faction 
loyal to their ideology.12 It cannot be denied that super-power 
policies have appreciable effect on creating issues and affecting the 
position which various Arab parties assume,13 but the political and 
ideological conflicts in the Arab world are driven ma inly by Arab 
aspirations. The final results of outside efforts can be very different 
from what was originally intended.14 
The 1967 document, in which the P.F.L.P. decl ares the adoption 
of Marxism-Leninism, criticizes the general Soviet policy in the Middle 
East, particularly in the case of Palestine. Later, the Movement 
12Laqueur, N., "Russia Enters the Middle East." Forei gn Affairs, 
January 1969: [31). 
13 Foreign Affairs_, July 1957, "Strategy of the Middle East," 
[32]' p. 661. 
14The Soviet policy is seen by the rejection front (the Baa.th 
and the P.F.L.P.) as being too moderate towards Israel. Essentially, 
Soviet policy has no squabble with the legitimacy of its existence, 
only with its "imperialist connection" and its ultra-religious/nation-
alist character. In fact, the Soviets offered their own guarantee to 
the security of 1967 borders of Israel. 
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criticizes Chinese policy in the Arabian Gulf. 15 These observations 
discredit the one-directional coupling theory: 
Choice of 
Issue 
Position 
Choice of 
Ideology 
The conspiracy version can only explain short-•term ,phenomena. 
such as temporary shifts of position on certain issues, but not a 
radical, long-term ideological shift. The P.F.L.P. leadership has not 
been changed by outside power, but has itself undergone an ideological 
shift. 
5.5 A Theory of the Leftward Shift 
The ritual of applying lessons from European class conflicts to 
the economic, social, national, and religious conflicts in the Arab world 
has a rational basis. Those who are successful in projecting the appro-
priate images can hope to obtain useful international socialist or com-
munist support in the conflicts with their opponents, or at least to 
diffuse leftist support of their opponents. On the far left, the Marxist-
Leninist ideology, which has been developed and refined over decades of 
conflicts with democrats, socialists, anarchists, and 
capitalists, offers a politicized individual an apparently coherent and 
modern world view as a substitute for an old religious theology which 
no longer is satisfying. In developing Arab countries, many people 
raised in a traditional society become frustrated and anxious in the 
process of adapting to modern urban society. Similar psychological 
15The Chinese, in an effort to outbid the Soviet policy in the 
Middle East, recognized what they called the "legitimate" interest of 
the Shah in the Arabian Gulf, according to the official version of the 
talks between the Chinese prime minister the Shah in Tehran, 1974. 
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pressures are faced by Europeans who change from a static, traditiona l 
social structure to a more dynamic, technological, and urban society. 
It is here argued that many politically active Arabs prefer a political 
party that seems to clearly define its economic and social consequences 
to a party that might offer them greater benefits, but with risks 
stemming from non-clarity. In other words, risk-averse individuals 
participating in a risky political struggle prefer a less desirable but 
certain outcome to a more desirable uncertain outcome. If, in addition, 
the Marx ist-Leninist positions appear to be more certain than other 
leftist party positions in Arab politics, then it will be demonstrated 
that the risk aversion assumption causes the leftward shift already 
discussed. 
In particular, it can be theorized that a rational actor (party) 
would maximize political support, measured by enrollment in the party . 
However, it can be argued that maximizing membership is only a derivative 
objective and that the real objective is assuming power. For example, 
infiltrating the Army and police, assassination, and factional elitist 
politics have been a central part of the struggle for power on many 
occasions. 
While this argument cannot be disr~garde9, . it is _: tnie .:: that .all 
these methods of assuming power are the final act of a long process of 
popular education and psychological preparation of the masses against 
the incumbent regime by the organized revolution~ry parties . The 
highest form of this preparation is enrollment in the revolutionary 
party itself. All Arab leftist parties argue that no stable 
revolutionary change of government can be affected without wide and 
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solid support. 16 The P.F.L.P. political and organizational strategy 
states: "Working with the masses, caring about its problems and 
helping solve these problems, organizing and leading the masses is our 
first and paramount task. The masses are the reason behind our exis-
tence. It is the only way to mobilize the revolutionary potential to 
achieve our goals. 11 17 It goes on to say that "any gap between us and the 
masses is a dangerous signal to our own existence." 
On the same theme, M. Aflag writes, "The masses are the greatest 
force and the only insurance of achieving the goals of Arab revo-
lution.1118 He also asserts that, "The masses are the fina l reference, 
the masses are now, more than any time before, the fermenter of revo-
lution and history peacemaker." 
These convictions are not merely ideological, they are prag-
matic. The continuous failure of military regimes in the Arab world, 
starting with El-Zaim and Shishakely in Syria, and continuing with 
Kassim in Iraq, Nasser in Egypt and Jadid in Syria, are obvious 
examples for changes which fail to have the prerequisite of a revolution-
ary, solid grass roots support among the Arab masses. Thus, the choice 
16see, for example, analysis for the collapse of the Baathist's 
8th of February revolution in Iraq 1963, in M. Aflag , The Point of 
Commencement· [6] . 
17see [9], page 101. 
18see [6], page 183. 
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of party enrollment as an objective for a rational leftist party is 
reasonable in terms of the nature of Arab society. 
It is also postulated that individuals have specific preferences 
for ideological positions. These preferences reflect class and family 
background, formal and informal education, and social association. The 
individual will enroll or support the party that: 
1) offers an ideological structure nearest to personal 
position, 
2) offers the most complete ideological structure. 
Parties are hampered from ascertaining the distribution of the 
preferences among the population by sampling or polling due to obvious 
political and institutional constraint, even when they assume power. 
Also, for a long time after a revolutionary change , the psychological 
drag of the previous regimes will distort individual pre ferences. 
Yet, in spite of their incomplete knowledge of the distribution 
of preferences in the population, leftist parties have to take posi-
tions on a variety of ideological and political issues as they face the 
challenges of day-to-day political events. In a way, this exercise can 
be viewed as a trial-and-error procedure that increases their knowledge 
about the underlying distribution of preferences. The results will be 
evaluate d through their effects on enrollment. 
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Thus, in this theory, it is essential for any viable party to 
have as complete an ideological structure as possible, in order for 
such an ideology to be able to answer not only questions pertinent to 
the organization of society, but philosophical and ethical questions of 
the type which Islam, the traditional ideology, sought to answer. 19 
These are precisely the questions to which Marxism-Leninism 
give central importance. Therefore, the rational party in this model 
seeks to maximize its enrollment while facing the following decisional 
cost structure. 
1) A penalty cost of incompleteness of its ideological 
structure. 
2) Information and organizational cost of developing, 
articulating and communicating its ideology. 
The choice is conducted within the following informational environment: 
1) The true preference distribution of the population is 
uncertain. 
2) Marxism-Leninism is an apparently tried and well-
articulated ideology that is followed by millions of 
people, so that acquisition of this ideology by a parti-
cular party entails negligible informational and organiza-
tional cost. 
3) In the Arab world, the position of Marxism-Leninism (x*) is 
to the left of the preferred positions of most people on the 
1tuch questions as why and how society changes, thought and 
matter dialectics. 
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ideological axis. 20 See Figure 1. 
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/ --~·------~----------·------- -------+-------- ---- I deoJ.ogy 
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Figure 1 
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The model which is developed in the next section shows how a 
rational party will move toward Marxism-Leninism in its own ideology. 21· 
The document published by the National Leadership of the Baath 
Party [71 seems to support this theory. It states: 
"The Baath always believed that scientific social discoveries 
come only through effort to analyze the situation and discover 
facts ..•. This attitude has always exposed those who adopted 
other revolutionary ideologies, particularly the Marxist-Leninist, 
as ready-made framework because of laziness and incapability."22 
20on this, the P.F.L.P. strategy [9] states that "The present 
popular ideology among the masses are to the right of our position." 
p. 19. 
21Another explanation that can be loosely termed rational choice 
of the main phenomenon addressed by this paper, is that advanced by R. 
Wesson in, Wby Marxism? The Continuing Success of a Failed Theory. N.Y. 
1976. The gist of his argument is that Marxism is adopted because it 
can he made to serve the needs of diverse nrotest qrouns and radical 
movements. However, his analysis is mainly concerned with Western 
groups and movements. 
22There is an interesting footnote on the same page. It states: 
"The behavior of those who adopted Marxism---Leninism without due analysis 
to the local conditions and the socio-historical context of the current 
stage can be termed scientific surrender .... This means that such 
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5.6 The Model 
The spatial model .about to be introduced is an extension of the 
unidimensional spatial model of party competition exposited by Downs.23 
Suppose that all Arab political elites conceptualize the spectrum of 
left parties as points on a single ideological dimension. Let 8 .. lJ 
denote the position of party j as perceived by individual i (i 
N and j =I, ... , p), where N denotes the number of elites and p 
denotes the number of parties on the left. 24 In order to develop 
I ' ... ' 
specific results which illuminate the phenomenon under discussion, it 
adoption is a result of cultural and ideological bankruptcy." On the 
same theme in {2], p. 7, Dr. Farah wrote, "There is an e s sential differ-
ence between adopting an ideology as a result of deep belief and convic-
tion and adopting it because of competition for followers and sup-
porters .•.• It is said that a great deal of socialist ideals are adop-
ted because of the latter factor, not because of deep conviction or 
belief." 
23rhe unidimensional spatial model was introduced into the 
political science literature by Downs [39) . The social choice theory 
for the unidimensional case was developed by Black [40). Davis and 
Hinich I41) extended and developed spatial models for two party elec-
toral competition; see Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook [42]. 
24 Allowing each citizen to have a different perception of each 
party position is an extension from traditional spatial models. 
· Shepsle [43) introduced candidate uncertainty into spatial models, but 
he assumed that the uncertainty term for party j in his model does not 
depend on the policy positions of the jth party. We differ from Shepsle 
by assuming a relationship between the perceptual uncertainty and the 
party position, and by using a different type of multiparty compet i tion. 
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is necessary to use a special form for individual utility functions. 
Suppose that all individuals have quadratic utility functions 
for party positions, i.e., let 
u( e .. , x.) lJ l c - aik ( e .. i lJ 
2 
x.) 
l 
represent the utility which individual i receives if the position 
is adopted. The term x. is individual i's ideal po.int; c. is a constant 
l l 
which will play no role in our results; and aik is a positive constant 
which is a function of the positions of the other parties, but is 
independent of eij; e.g., when p = 3, ail depends only on ei2 and ei3' 
and ai3 depends only OLl 8il and 8iZ' The quadratic utility function is 
the simplest model that incorporates risk aversion. 25 
In keeping with the game theoretic orientation of spatial 
theory, suppose that the parties are willing to alter their positions in 
order to increase their political power and hence their chances of 
implementing their program. In terms of this model, suppose that the 
average perceived position of the jth party 8 = N-lLN 8 .. is determined j i=l lJ 
by the positions that the party advocates. The party can alter its 
average position in the population by changing its platform, but there 
will still be a diversity of individual perceptions. 
As an important additional assumption, suppose that parties do 
not coordinate their platforms. Occasionally, several parties form a 
coalition against others, but the competition for supporters is fierce 
and very non-cooperative. This is in fact a correct observation about 
leftist parties all over the world. 
2~ee pp. 75-76 of Riker and Ordeshook [44), and Shepsle [43]. 
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The parties choose their positions in our model to maximize 
their political support among the effective part of the population, and 
for this reason need to know the preferences of the cadre. The language 
used by Downs and in the formal theories of voting, conveys the impres-
sion that the results require the assumption that the candidates (or 
parties) know the distribution of ideal points; but for the median voter 
result for two candidates, each candidate need only know the median 
ideal point in order to guarantee at least a tie. For elections with 
more than two candidates, however, the form of the ideal point distri-
bution determines the play of the game. This perfect information 
assumption for candidates has been made to facil1tate the theorizing , 
but it is obvious that it is impossible to know the preferences of a 
large, heterogeneous political body, and it is difficult to even obtain 
a precise estimate of the median position using the type of survey data 
and methods that are available in the West. In orde r to model the 
uncertainty about preferences, assume that the population of N political 
individuals is a random sample from an infinite population whose statis-
tical parameters are imperfectly known by the parties. This trick is 
commonly used by statisticians. For example, the average position of 
party j ·' 8. = N-l L:~ l 8 .. is a random variable. By the Central Limit 
J i = lJ 
Theorem (assuming finite variance), the difference between 8. for a 
J 
given group andµ. , the mean of the infinite population, is approx-] 
imately l//N for large N. Thus, µ. can be estimated within an accuracy 
J 
of l//"N,·~ by taking a random sample of the N individuals who themselves 
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are a representative sample from the unobservable infinite population. 26 
Suppose that the amount of time, money, and energy which indivi-
dual i contributes is,,proportional to u(8 .. ,x.), and that the party's 
1] 1 
political pewer is the sum of the resources contributed by the cadre to 
that party:. T:heµ, party j.. ,Bl."1.xirn;i.ze;;> .the expected value of its political 
power by choosing a position e. which maximizes the average utility in 
J 
27 
the population. · Let E: •• = 
1] e .. - e. denote idiosyncratic perceptual 1] J 
error of the jth party's position, and let CT: denote the variance of£ .. 
J 1] 
in the population. By straightforward algebraic manipulation, the 
average individual utility for party j is 
2 2 
c - a1.k (8. +CT.)+ 2a.kx. 8. - a.k J J 11] 1 (2) 
where the overbars denote mean values. 
As the special featu:te of this model, that 2 is assume CT. a non-
J 
decreasing function of e. , 2 is positive, and i.e . , the slope of do./d8. 
J J J 
26when N is large, the difference between 8j and µjis negli-
gible. For a formal statement of the relationship between sample sta-
tistics and population parameters, the reader should consult any stand-
ard mathematical statistics books; e~g . , Sections 7.5 and 7.6 of Modd 
and Graybill (46). 
27 This is due to the fact that the average of the sum of the 
utilities is the sum of the average utility. To be formally correct, 
the terms "expected" and "average" refer to mean values in the infinite 
population, but when N is large, there is no practical distinction be-
tween these mean values and averages over the set of N individuals. 
Thus, 8. is used in this paper instead of µj in order to reduce the notatio~al complexity as much as possible. We will also use x to denote 
the population mean ideal point. These distinctions will be confusing 
for readers who regularly use sample averages as if they were true 
population parameters, but a note is made here of the distinction as a 
modest concession to mathemat±cal rigor. 
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thus the variance of the perceptual error decreases as 8 moves to the j 
left. Recall that the Marxist-Leninist position was assumed to anchor 
2 the left of the ideology dimensions; thusy the assumption on a. implies 
J 
that the M/L position has the smallest variance. 
As an additional modest assumption, suppose that a~ is a 
. J 
strictly convex function of 8 i.e., its second derivative is positive. j ' 
It is then clear from (2)· that the average utility, and thus the 
expected power of party j, is a concave function of 8. (j = 1, 
J 
. . . , p) . 
As long as 81 , ... ' 8 are restricted to some common interval, the cou-p 
cavity of the party objective functions (their expected power) implies 
that there exists a Nash equilibrium,which we denote 8~ 
.;~ 
, ... ' 8 * 28 p 
This means that if party j chooses 8. I 8., but all the other parties 
J J 
choose their equilibrium positions, then party j's utility is less than 
* if it had chosen 8., i.e., once the parties are at the equilibrium, 
J 
there is no incentive for one party to make a unilateral move. 29 
The property of an equilibrium that we wish to exploit is as 
* .;~ 
any equilibrium set 8., ••• , 8 of party positions must 
. J p 
follows: 
satisfy the first order conditions 
* 
da .2 aikxi 
8. + _J__ = -- (3) 
J d8. 
J aik 
2 ~ee Hinich, Ledyard, and Ordeshook [45]. The non-cooperative 
assumption is important here. 
2~here may be many equilibria. In order to obtain a unique 
equilibrium, we would have to restrict the form of aik" For example, 
there is a unique equilibrium if a ik is independent of the party posi-
tions. 
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for each j = 1, ..• , p. In order to simplify the exposition, restrict 
2 
attention to the special case when d0j/d8j = S, a constant, and the aiK 
are independent of the other party positions. Then (3) becomes 
8. 
J 
where 
a = 
k 
a - S 
l( (4) 
is independent of the party position. Consequently, the equilibrium 
defined by (4) is unique. As S, the slope of the relation between a~ 
J 
and 8., increases the party's move to the left. If in the course of 
, 
J 
party competition the variance of the other parties increases relative 
to the variance of the Marxist-Leninist position~ then (3 increases. 
The other parties then move to the left in order to increase their 
power. See Appendix for a clarifying example. 
The interpretation of this result in the Arab context is this. 
Suppose that the variance of the party positions in the population is 
the same for all parties at the initial stages of political sociali-
zation of the proto-elites. As these politically active individuals 
become more aware of the ideological positions of the parties, suppose 
that the Marxist-Leninist position appears to be more certain than 
any other left position. Moreover, suppose that the variance of a 
party decreases as it adopts Marxist-Leninist policies, but the relative 
"' variance increases as individuals compare the parties. In terms of this 
model, this means that S increases over time. If, on the other hand, the 
variances of the parties decrease (or increase at the same rate) then 
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S remains constant. It is here argued that competition between Arab 
left parties results in a leftward shift toward the Marxist-Leninist 
position as a result of a perceived increase in the variance of the 
other parties relative to the Marxist-Leninist position by the elites. 
This increase is due in part to the increasing articulation of the 
Marxist-Leninist ideology made possible by a variety of relevant new 
Communist experiences, such as the Cuban, Vietnamese, and Western 
Communist parties, coupled with the increasing resources devoted by 
the Chinese and the Russians to clarify the ideological issues through 
which they project their struggle. On the other hand, only meagre 
resources are devoted by the third world countries to classify the 
ideology of their societies in the ever-increasing complexity of the 
modern world. 
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Appendix 
In order to illuminate the formal reasoning behind our result, 
consider the following example. Suppose that all politically active 
individuals in a village have identical ideal positions that they are 
unable to articulate. Assume that this position is to the right of the 
M-L position, and involves compromises between M-L interpretations and 
traditional positions on social and economic issues. Since the origin 
and unit of the space are arbitrary, set the M-L position at zero and 
let x = 1 be the ideal position of the politicized villagers. 
Assume that two parties are competing for support in the village. 
One party adopts the M-L position, while the other articulates a program 
that it hopes to be perceived at the village position. Due to the 
ambiguities and confusions inherent in a compromise between Marxism and 
traditional concepts of property rights and the like, each villager 
perceives the party to be at 8. = 1 + E .• The term E. is an idiosyncratic 
1 1 1 
distortion of the party's ideological position. Assume that the variation 
of the E. in the village is modeled by a normal distribution with mean 
1 
zero and variance one. As can easily be seen from a table of the normal 
distribution 15.9 percent of the village perceive the "compromise" party 
to be to the left of the M-L = 0 (Figure 2). These individuals prefer 
the M-L party since it is closer to their ideal (x=l). Only 68.2 percent 
prefer the "compromise." 
Suppose the "compromise" party moves to the left and adopts 
the position 8 = 1/2. Assume that as a result of moving towards the 
M-L position, the standard deviation of E is reduced to the value 1/4. 
i 
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Then only 2.3 percent of the village perceive the party to be to 
the left of zero. Another 2.3 percent perceive the party to be to 
2 
the right of 8 + 4=1, and thus they prefer the M-L party. Most 
(95.4 percent) prefer the party at 8 = 1/2 to the M-L party. 
;-1-L:.:.o .l 
2.. 
Normal Distribution of Perceived Positions 
of Leftist Party. 
Figure 2 
(). 
l 
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CHAPTER 6 
AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF PRODUCTION AND INVESTMENT 
FOR PETROLEUM RESERVOIR - A NOTE ON 
KULLER AND CUMMING'S MODEL 
6.1 Introduction 
Since the classical paper by Davidson [l], there have been many 
models which illustrate the role of user's costs in oil production. 
However, a paper by Kuller and Cumming offers the most comprehensive 
treatment of user costs by introducing the following assum-
ptions: 
1. Total recovery, as well as annual production rates from 
natural drive, depends not only on cumulative production, 
but also on the rate at which production has taken place. 
2. The recoverable stock, as well as the production rate, 
depends on the time path of investment as well as on 
cumulative investment (i.e., the capital stock). 
In their model, n firms are exploiting a given petroleum 
reservoir under centralized management which maximizes the expected 
profit function,TI,over a . known planning horizon T, subject to con-
straints reflecting the above two assumptions and non-negativity. They 
identify four user cost elements: stock user costs, boundary user 
costs, user costs of capital consumption, and production user costs. 
Their policy prescriptions are simple: 1) produce at -a rate which 
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equates marginal net income to firm J and the user cost association 
with firm J's production, and 2) equate the marginal cost of investment 
(to firm J for capital-type k) with the marginal present value of the 
reservoir-wide benefits associated with such investment. The latter 
includes not only direct impacts on the marginal productivity of J's 
capital and J's future variable and boundary costs, but also ex ternal 
impacts on ·other firins' variable and boundary costs as well as on the 
recoverable stock [2]. 
This note will extend the results of Kuller and Currrrning by 
introducing an additional source of randomness in the planning model, 
that which pertains to the planning period. 
6.2 The Effect of Random Planning 
Horizon 
One element in the decision matrix of the oil producer is 
uncertainty about the arrival date, T*, of the "backstop" technology 
that will replace hydrocarbon fuels as the principal source of energy. 
This uncertainty introduces another element into user cost and 
modifies the production decision of the producer. Assume that the 
central management of a field believes that T* is randomly distributed 
on the range [O,T]. To facilitate comparison of these results with 
those obtained by Kuller and Cumming, assume further that their T 
corresponds to the expected value of T* in this framework. 
Let K be the capital stock at period t· Rt = (rl, r2' ... , r ) t , t 
is the history of production; v = (vl, v 2, .. . , v ) is the history of t t 
investment; c is the generalized cost · function of period t. Then, let 
t 
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C C (R , V ,K ) 
t t t t t 
ac 
t 
Clr 
T 
r 
Jt 
> 
-
ac ac ac 
0, __ t?: 0, __ t < 0, t < 0 
Clvt Clv - ClK -T t 
T f t 
the volume of petroleum extracted by firm J, J 1, ... , n 
during period t 
Rt annual production rate by all firms during all periods, 
i.e., R 
t (r ' 11 r ' ... ' 21 r ' nl 
... , r 
ln-1 
... 'r ' 
nt-1 
gross investment by firm J in capital component k, 
k = 1, •.• , q, during period t 
Vt gross investment for all capital components by all firms 
during the periods 1, ... , t 
firms J's stock of capital components k at the beginning 
of period t 
net depreciation of firm J's stock of capital component k 
during period t 
x the recoverable stock 
FJt an upper (physical) bound on firm J's capacity to prod uce 
petroleum during period t 
C firm J's cost function during period t Jt 
213 
-t 
a discount factor, (1 + r) where r is the appropriate 
discount rate 
p = unit price of petroleum during period t 
t 
wherel 
oDJkt < oDJkt > 0, 
oDJkt 
> 0 
dVJkt 
-
o, 
orJT 
-
oKJkt 
-
oFJt oFJt oFJ < 0, > 0 , __ t > 0 or. - dV. - ak1 t lT lT 
~< 0, dX > 0 
oriT dViT 
T = 1, t ; .. . ' 
i, J = 1, 2. ' ... , n· 
' 
k 1, ... ,q 
l<t<T. 
6.3 Chance Constrained Formulation 
The problem will be formulated as a chance constrained opti-
mizing decision (4). In particular, the constraint relating to the 
total recoverable stock becomes of the form 
Probability r JT 
1 . 
1This "all or nothing" situation for the lifetime of the oil 
industry is unrealistic , since it is known that oil will command a 
positive price long after the emergence of the backstop technology. 
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And the problem is then: 
T* n 
Max E { L: L: [P r J - CJt(Rt,Vt,KJt)]St} 
t=l J=l t t 
subject to T* n 
p {- L: L: rJT + x(RT*'VT*) > 0} = 1 
T=l J=l 
KJk, t+l 
rJ > 0, VJk > 0 t- t- V J, k and t, 0 < t < T* . 
* Let T obey a probability mass functio~ yt,defined on [O,T] such 
that 
and 
T 
L: 
t=O 
yt > 0 for 0 < t ~ T, yt 0 t ¢ [O, T] 
1. 
Define the probability that the "backstop" technology does not 
emerge in the period 0 tot by ~t' i.e., the probability that T 
is in the range t to T is 
Let R be the production plan for the entire period 0 to T. 
Thus, 
E { TI(R)} 
T 
l: Yt 
t=l 
215 
or, changing the order of summation: 
Let 
n T 
E {TI(R)} l: l: ¢t St[PtrJt - CJt (R ,V ,K3 )]. J=l t=l t t t 
n 
i' S(T )= x(R , ,V ,)- l: l: rJt • 
Tx T" J=l t=l 
Then the problem becomes: 
n T 
Max l: l: ¢t St[PtrJt - CJt(Rt,Vt,KJt)] 
J=l t=l 
p(S(T)\~ O) = 1 
r Jt ~ 0, v Jkt ~ 0 VJ, k and t . 
* But p(S(T ) 2: 0) = 1, under the assumption that yt > 0 for 
0 < t < T,is equivalent [3] (up to a set of y -measure zero) to t . 
L 
S(t) > 0 for all t. Thus, the Langrangian for the problem is: 
n T 
L: l: 
J=l t=l 
T n q 
- L: 2: [ 2: 6 B { K l - K + D k ( r J t , v J kt, K J kt) } 
t=l J=l k =l Jk, t+l t+l Jk, t+ Jkt J t 
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- 1/J Jt f\ {r Jt - F (R ,V ,KJ )} Jt t t t 
t n 
- C\S) { L: L rJT - x(RT,VT)} t T=l J=l 
n q 
+ <;;Jt st UJt + L: L: 0 Jkt f\ v Jkt J • 
J=l k=l 
6.4 Characteristics of Pptimum 
Production Rates 
From the Langrangian expression: 
T n dCi 1: (P cp S L: L: ST cpt) t t t T=t i=l CJr Jt 
q ()DJkt 
L: ~ st+1 - 1/J s + k=l Jk,t+l CJrJt 
Jt t 
T 
L: <AJ3>t <1 - ~) + c: Jtst o 
t=l CJrJt 
or, 
T n F. q 
T 
L: 
T=l 
n CJF 
L: 1/J . s ___:i! 
. l lT T () i = r Jt 
CJDJkt 
+ L: L: 1/JiT l___!II ST + l: ~Jk,t+1st+1 
i=l k=l CJrJt T=t rJt 
T ()cJt T n CJc. 
2: B cI>+ 2: 2: 
lT 
BT cp + 
T i T =t T T=t+l ()rJt i=l CJr Jt 
i:fJ 
T-1 dX L: (AB) (1 ) V{,. J ' n· + --- -- ~' ... ' ' T or T=l 
-iT l < t < T 
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6. 5 Elements of User Costs 
As in Kuller and Cumming, the following user cost components 
can be identified. 
Stock User Costs for Firm J 
A measures the increase in net incomes from the reservoir 
associated with an incremental change in the endogenously determined 
stock; the stock user cost for firm J in period t is given by 
A.B- (1 - ~) 
T Clr Jt · 
Boundary User Costs 
Since'¥. measures the increase in net incomes which would 
l'L . 
result from an incremental relaxation of the restriction, the boundary 
user cost is given by 
'¥. lT 
User Costs of Capital Consumption 
The multiplier 6 k 1 associated with the capital equation J ,t+ 
measures the marginal productivity of capital type k used by firm J in 
all future periods t+l, t+2, •.. , T; the user costs of capital consum-
ption is given by 
~ 6 S ClDJkt 
Jk t+l t+l ---k=l ' Clr Jt 
Production User Costs 
These user costs reflect the stock value of oil and gas to the 
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firm, contributing to output as natural forces of production, and are 
given by 
T (jC.. T n dCiT 
I: · . ii S + I: I: B~ ~ T "'r L T=t+l Jt T=t i=l 0 Jt 
i,J=l, .. ~,n; 1 < t ~ T 
However, a new user cost element is now introduced by the randomness 
of the planning horizon. This element will be termed "the boundary-
time cost." It is equal to 
T-1 ax 
I: (AB )(1 - ar. ) 
T=l T lT 
6 . 6 The Effect on the Optimal 
Production Rates 
Comparing these first order conditions with those of Kuller and 
Cumming, the following can be noticed: 
1) The net marginal benefit of producing one extra unit is 
decreased by a factor ~t(<l). This decre ase causes the net 
marginal benefit curve to shift downward. 
2) The effect of time-horizon uncertainty on marginal cost is 
indeterminate, and depends on the relative magnitudes-·of 
changes of opposite directions in the terms of the first -
order conditions equation. ·In comparison with the corres-
ponding terms in Kuller and CHrnming , the term 
T n 
l, I: l)Jil 
T=l i=l 
is greater, because of the additional uncertainty. 
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The terms (AS)-T (1 - ~) are smaller and the terms 
arJt 
n ()c 
-'T T 3c.T L: __ 1-_ 
T=t+l ()rJt 
R 
T 
<I> and 
T 
L: ---'-~ s <I> 
'"' t T T i=lorJ 
may increase or decrease 
i#J 
depending on whether the extra terms in the summation which correspond 
to T = Ti~, T* + 1, ... T balance the reduction in each term of the 
summation caused by the weighting factor <I> • 
T 
On the whole, if 
T-1 ()x 
L: (AS)T(l - ~),the boundary time user cost, 
1:=1 l_ 
is sufficiently large, then the marginal user cost increases in 
comparison with that obtained from Kuller's and Cumming's formulation. 
This means, that a reduction in marginal benefit causes a reduction in 
production rate. In other cases, the effect on the production rate 
is ambiguous, since it depends on the shape and relative shifts in 
the marginal cost and marginal benefit curves.2, 
Marginal Cost 
or 
Marginal 
Benefit 
MC 
r2 ~rl 
Figure 1 
MC 
MB 
MB 
Production Rate 
r 
~n comparing the effect of the introduction of the boundary 
time user cost on the production decision with that obtained from Kul-
ler' s and Cumming's formulation, it is here assumed that their T 
corresponds to the expected value of T* in this formulation. Thus,T > T. 
6.7 Characteristics of Optimum 
Investment Rates 
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From the Langrangian ex?ression: 
ac1 t anJkt ~ f\ <Pt= - 1::,Jk, t+l 6t+l ~v 
oVJkt o .. Jkt 
~ 
T n 
+I l: oF. lT 
3'v Jkt 
n I acit <Ptr\ 
i=l 3v Jkt T=t i=l 
i/:J 
T n ac. T-1 dX l l lT ¢T f\ + l /tf\ - Clv Jk T=t+l i=l avJkt T=l ' t 
i, ;1 1,- - n· 
' 
k l~- - - q 
1 < t < T. 
These first order conditions state that the optimal level of firm J's 
investment in capital-type k during any t, 1 < t .::'._ T is given by 
equating the present value of the marginal costs of such investment, 
adjust for the uncertainty of the planning horizon, to the aggregate 
benef its of the reservoir associa ted with such investment. The interpreta-
tion of the terms in the above expression follows closely that given 
by Kuller and Cummings's [2]. Comparing with their results note 
that the discounted marginal cost of the investment is reduced by a 
factor of <I> < 1 and that the aggregate benefit to the reservoir as 
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a whole has a new term as a result of the inclusion of uncertainty 
in the planning horizon. However, even if D, F, x and C are the same 
functions as those considered by Kul1er and Cuunnings, the effect 
on the aggregate benefit of the reservoir is ambiguous. Only, if 
T -1 
I 
T=l 
ax 
()vJkt is large enough to swamp all the changes in the 
other terms on the right hand side of the first order conditions that 
the aggregate benefit increases at all levels of investments for 
all capital components. In this case the optimal investment level 
increases unambiguously. 
See Figure 2. 
Marginal 
Values 
Figure 2 
v · 
2 
Discounted Marginal Cost 
Aggregate benefit 
Investment rate 
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This note captures the effect of only one aspect of 
uncertainty, that which is related to the time of the emergence 
of the backstop technology. Other sources of uncertainty remain 
unexamined, such as uncertainty related to the price path and 
particularly the uncertainty regarding the prevailing price of 
the emerging alternatives. Moreover, a more realistic treatment 
should deal with the situation where: 
a) the oil commands a positive price after the emergence 
of the backstop technology; 
b) the strategic aspects provide the oil producers with a 
strategy of delaying the emergence of the alternative 
technologies. 
The preceding analysis demonstrates that the theory of crude 
oil production is affected by incorporating the type of uncertainty 
considered in this note. 
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